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Throughout much of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the costs of
workers’ compensation systems across the country escalated for
employers and problems increased for injured workers.   Medical and
indemnity costs soared, claim frequency increased dramatically,
employers alleged fraud by workers and providers, workers com-
plained that benefits were inadequate and often delayed, and both par-
ties were concerned about the increasing cost of litigation.  Widespread
frustration led to a series of reforms in 1993. 
One innovative set of reforms adopted in several states allowed
unions and employers to collectively bargain their own workers’ com-
pensation system, essentially “carving-out” that arrangement from the
statutory system. The parties were allowed to negotiate alternative
medical and medical-legal arrangements meant to reduce medical
costs.  Alternate dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms were encour-
aged to speed the legal process and reduce litigation-related expenses. 
The carve-out legislation was modeled on a similar experiment in
Massachusetts, where Bechtel and the Pioneer Valley Building and
Construction Trades Council had a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) governing a single construction project.  The Bechtel experi-
ence was important because of the apparent success at reducing
reported workers’ compensation costs, largely by lowering injury rates
and reducing litigation (see Table 1.1).1 
In California, the state with the most workers under these agree-
ments, the parties were given substantial latitude in how they set up the
program.  For example, they could create an exclusive list of medical
providers and medical-legal evaluators, and they could create an ADR
system to replace most Division of Workers’ Compensation (DWC)
and Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) procedures.
These ADR procedures were often accompanied by restrictions on the
participation of attorneys.  Two constraints remained on carve-outs: the
agreement could not reduce compensation to injured workers and the
final step of the ADR system had to include the option of an appeal for
reconsideration by the WCAB. 
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Table 1.1 Changes in Pioneer Valley Results when Carve-Out Was 
Implemented
This volume evaluates the first few years with these novel organi-
zational forms in California. We also draw out lessons for carve-outs in
California and other states and for the statutory workers’ compensation
system.  Importantly, the experience of carve-outs also provides
insights into how all employers might want to alter their handling of
workers’ compensation claims and, more generally, into ADR pro-
grams and decentralization of employment regulation. 
CARVE-OUT PROGRAMS IN CALIFORNIA
Within three years of the passage of the legislation, eight carve-out
agreements had been reached (see Table 1.2).  The largest carve-out
covering a single project was an agreement between the California
Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO, and the Metro-
politan Water District of Southern California. This was a project labor
agreement covering all contractors and subcontractors on a $2 billion,
5-year construction project to create the Domenigoni Reservoir (East-
side Reservoir Project or ESRP).   The largest carve-out covering mul-
tiple employers involves the 23 local unions making up the state’s
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) and a multi-
8 months before carve-out 8 months after carve-out
No. of claims 38 22
Lost-time claims 11 2
Litigated cases 7 0
Costs $480,000 $220,000
Hours worked 217,117 223,744
Lost-time incidence 10.12 1.78
Ratea
Costs per hour $2.21 $0.98
a The lost-time incidence rate is the number of lost-time injuries per 200,000 hours
worked.
SOURCE: Bechtel Construction Co. (1997).
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employer group called the National Electrical Contractors Association
(NECA), consisting of about 500 contractors.  Each individual
employer has the choice to sign up or remain in the statutory system.
In 1997, carve-out employers had over 5,000 full-time equivalent
employees (about 1 percent of construction employment in the state)
and paid over $240 million in payroll.  The carve-outs had a number of
elements in common and some variation.  For example, each of these
carve-outs established lists of medical and medical-legal providers and
vocational rehabilitation providers who could provide services for inju-
ries and illnesses occurring under the carve-out.
All but one agreement (TIMEC Co.) also established ADR sys-
tems.  These ADR systems start with an “ombudsperson,” a neutral
person available to all parties who attempts to avert and/or resolve dis-
putes at an early stage.  If this is unsuccessful, the worker may move
the matter to the next step, typically formal mediation by an indepen-
dent, neutral mediator.  Two ADR programs used a joint labor-manage-
ment committee at this point.2  If mediation is unsuccessful, the parties
turn to an outside neutral arbitrator—often a retired Workers’ Compen-
sation Administrative Law Judge.  By statute, the decision of the arbi-
Table 1.2 Addendums to Collective Bargaining Agreements that 
Established Carve-Out Programs Before 1997
Employer(s) Union(s) Date of agreement
Signatory’s to CBA S. Calif. Pipe Trades 
District #16
July, 1994
Cherne Contracting Corporation Local 250 and S.C. Pipe 
Trades #16
July, 1994
District 9, NECA IBEW, 9th District Oct., 1994
Several contractor associations So. Calif. Dist. Council 
of Laborers
Dec., 1994
TIMEC Co. Intl. Union of Petroleum and 
Indust. Workers
Jan., 1995
Morrison-Knudsen of Ohio Contra Costa Building Trades May, 1995
Signatory Employers So. Calif. Carpenters 
(12 Counties)
Dec., 1995




trator may be appealed to the seven-member WCAB (California Labor
Code Section 3201.5[a][1]).  Ultimately, a decision of the WCAB can
be appealed to the civil courts at the Court of Appeals level.
EARLY EVALUATIONS OF THE CARVE-OUTS
While the original DWC reports stated that it was too early to eval-
uate thoroughly the impact of carve-out programs on the cost of work-
ers’ compensation, preliminary results were promising.
At the end of each calendar year, carve-out participants report to
the DWC on claims during that year. From 1995 to 1997, these annual
reports listed only eight mediations and two arbitrations on over 2,000
claims. The DWC reports suggested that this represented a virtual
elimination of disputes under the ADR process.   
In addition, the DWC reported that costs to employers in carve-
outs were approximately one-half of those experienced by employers
outside the carve-out arrangement.
Insurers stated that they were offering employers a workers’ com-
pensation premium discount of approximately 5 to 25 percent for par-
ticipating in a carve-out program.  Because workers’ compensation
costs are typically 3 to 15 percent of wages in construction, these pre-
mium reductions were potentially substantial.   
At the April 1996 National Conference of the Building and Con-
struction Trades Department, AFL-CIO, a workshop was held consist-
ing of representatives from carve-out programs in California and
Florida.  These presentations were extremely favorable, although anec-
dotal, and focused on the following results that had been achieved to
date. 
• Lower injury/claims rates.  It was felt that, with labor and man-
agement working together to achieve common results, greater
awareness of safety had been achieved on carve-out construction
projects.  At the same time, this was the area where the anecdotal
evidence seemed weakest and where the evidence seemed most
conflicting.  On the one hand, it was reported that the number of
claims filed on construction projects covered by these programs
had declined.  On the other hand, none of the presentations could
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provide specific descriptions of the types of safety provisions that
had been put in place.   It was not clear whether reduced claims
frequencies could have arisen from favorable selection of
employers into these programs or from injured workers being
accommodated in such a way that they did not file claims.
• More effective medical delivery.  It was widely reported that the
quality of medical care delivered was better under the collectively
bargained programs, although there was no health service
research data to back up this claim.   Anecdotally, two sources of
improvement were noted: there was an increased willingness of
care providers to participate, as exemplified by the University of
California at Los Angeles Spine Center agreeing to become a pro-
vider to collectively bargained programs.  The Spine Center is
reported to be a premier treatment facility that had avoided the
workers’ compensation field because of all the legal disputes
involved.  Another example of this increased willingness was the
care which at least one program exercised in selecting medical
providers it accepts into its program.
 Several programs had case managers assigned to see injured
workers through treatment and rehabilitation, which much
improved the continuity of care.  No specific examples were pro-
vided to support this claim, and there was no evidence to suggest
that these programs were able to establish procedures that rou-
tinely enable injured workers to return to employment at an ear-
lier stage.
• Virtually no friction in dispute resolution.  There was unani-
mous agreement among the existing programs that the dispute
resolution system was working very well—better than expected.
At the time, no disputes had proceeded to the arbitration stage.
• Cost savings.  Based in part on the experience from Pioneer Val-
ley (see Table 1.1), these programs held out the hope that cost
savings of as much as 30 percent could be achieved through
fewer claims and greater effectiveness.  All of the programs then
in operation reported savings significantly in excess of the
expected 30 percent. In addition, Florida’s rate-setting authority
allowed a 15 percent discount off the top of the manual rate in
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recognition of the special program features, including the man-
aged care medical networks.
• Great satisfaction expressed by employers, workers, and union
leaders.  Union leaders claimed they had not heard a single com-
plaint about these programs from other union leaders or employ-
ers and had complete support for the programs from union
membership.
AREAS OF CONCERN ABOUT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
There was also a growing body of criticism and concern about
aspects of the carve-out program (Moscovitz and Van Bourg 1995;
Ozurovich 1995).  The concern centered around five areas:
• Inadequate due process.  It was alleged that ADR might weaken
the legal rights to due process by denying workers access to legal
representation and the ability to collect information through dis-
covery or deposition.
• Reduced benefits.  It has been suggested that the use of limited
medical networks reduces choice of physician by workers and
may result in reduced quality of medical care.  
• Distribution of savings.  It has been suggested that employers
will not pass on anticipated savings to workers.  The distribution
of savings is particularly problematic on projects with defined
time frames and little opportunity for multiple, consecutive,
CBAs. 
• Continuity of treatment and adjudication.  Perhaps the most
important and least considered concern has to do with continued
coverage for long-term disabilities.  CBAs are time-limited, while
partial or total permanent disabilities and certain temporary dis-
abilities may extend well beyond the limits of these agreements.
Further, the disabled worker may cease to be a member of the
bargaining unit covered by the agreement.  Finally, many disabil-
ities result from cumulative exposures over long periods of time,
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where many employers inside or outside a particular agreement
retain partial responsibility for these cases.
• Unnecessary risk to unions and employers.  It has been sug-
gested that these programs may place unions at risk of legal lia-
bility for failure to provide fair representation to each member
(for instance, by denying the current system’s right to due process
or by limiting benefits).  It also has been suggested that these pro-
grams may jeopardize the employer’s immunity from civil action
filed by employees that are provided for in the current system. 
OUTLINE OF THE BOOK AND RESEARCH METHODS 
We begin in Chapter 2 by giving some important background
information on the reasoning behind the development of carve-outs
and how the carve-out structure fits within the framework of current
institutions.  We describe the important characteristics of the workers’
compensation system and the particular characteristics of the construc-
tion industry and how those have influenced the development of carve-
outs.  An overview of carve-outs in California is then presented in
Chapter 3.
This study utilized a number of methods to evaluate carve-outs.
We reviewed the CBAs and surveyed the ombudsmen for all California
carve-outs.  The survey covered their background, training, and duties,
among other issues (Chapter 4). 
We chose two carve-outs for intensive case study because they rep-
resented two very different models.  The ESRP carve-out was a very
large project with a single owner (Metropolitan Water District) and
more than 200 contractors and subcontractors and all crafts unions
(Chapter 5).  The NECA/IBEW agreement was a multi-employer
carve-out with a single union covering electrical contractors employing
union electricians throughout the state (Chapter 6).   
Within each category (large-project and multi-employer carve-
out), we chose the carve-out with the most members and longest his-
tory.  This sample selection rule increased our respondents’ experience
and yielded more data.  At the same time, because we chose our sample
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partially on the basis of its success in getting started, these two projects
may not be representative of all carve-outs.
We interviewed representatives of all the interested parties at each
carve-out: the ombudsman, employers, employees, union, workers’
compensation insurer, arbitrators, mediators, and lawyers.  At the
ESRP we included the project owner as well as local, state, and
national representatives of the building trades.  At the NECA/IBEW
we included representatives of NECA, the employers’ federation.  We
read all written materials we could identify for each carve-out, includ-
ing the PLA (at ESRP), the CBA, handouts from the ombudsmen to
injured workers explaining the carve-out, injury reports, other reports
by parties to the agreements, and standard correspondence from insur-
ers to injured workers. 
We performed site visits using pairs of researchers.  The ESRP vis-
its were from May to August in 1997; the NECA visits were from June
to September in 1997. All interviews were recorded and transcribed
and the entire research team read all interviews.  Most interviews
involved follow-up phone calls (or occasionally faxes or e-mails) to
clear up specific points or to ask follow-up questions.  
At each case study site, we asked the ombudsperson to identify
workers who had disputes that had resulted in filings for mediation or
arbitration. The workers were chosen based upon suggestions made by
the ombudsperson.  The ombudsperson first contacted the workers to
get approval for our interview.  Thus, the sample of workers we inter-
viewed was biased towards those individuals who had “tested” the sys-
tem.  We did not interview any workers who did not have a dispute or
whose dispute was rapidly and successfully handled by the ombudsper-
son.  
Because the point of the ADR is to avoid mediation, our infor-
mants are an unrepresentative sample.  That is, these employees in
some sense represent the failures of the ADR system to avoid a formal
dispute.  Thus, they provide one extreme bound of the problems that
ADR might cause.  (The other bound involves injured employees who
did not know they had rights to compensation.)  The intent of inter-
viewing these employees was not to find out the experience of the rep-
resentative injured worker, but to find out the worst-case experience of
employees for whom ADR was not leading to a rapid resolution of
their dispute.
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Finally, we analyzed quantitative data from the first two to four
years of experience of the NECA/IBEW carve-out (Chapter 7).  We
examined a number of important outcomes including indemnity, medi-
cal, legal and medical-legal costs, injury rates, and dispute frequency.  
We conclude with a summary and with recommendations for
changes to carve-outs, to the statutory system, and for future research
(Chapter 8).
Notes
1. Bechtel indicated in discussions with the authors that they had been unsuccessful
at recreating the success of the Pioneer Valley project at other large construction
projects in subsequent years.  However, Bechtel felt none of these later projects
included all of the unique characteristics of the Pioneer Valley project simulta-
neously.
2. These were the Pipe Trades and Cherne programs.  However, the ombudsperson
for the Pipe Trades recommended a mediation stage to replace the committee.  In
the subsequent round of negotiation, the Pipe Trades addendum was amended to





Carve-outs in California involve modifying the workers’ compen-
sation system in the construction industry.  Carve-outs primarily affect
medical service providers, utilize ADR procedures, and may improve
safety programs.  Thus, this chapter briefly presents background infor-
mation on the workers’ compensation system, the construction indus-
try, special issues of workers’ compensation in construction, ADR, and
safety programs.  
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
Workers’ compensation systems provide compensation to employ-
ees for work-related injuries or illnesses, including medical treatment
costs, temporary payment for lost wages, and permanent disability pay-
ments that compensate workers for residual impairment disability
resulting from occupational injuries.
Established in California in 1911, workers’ compensation trades
rights and benefits between employers and employees.  In the workers’
compensation systems, employees give up the right to pursue awards
(which may be larger) through the tort system in exchange for a system
that is supposed to guarantee prompt delivery of benefits and that pro-
vides legal protection against discrimination.  Employers provide
workers’ compensation benefits regardless of fault, in exchange for
protection against civil action by employees. 
Both parties are provided with an administrative law system for
dispute resolution that aims to resolve disputes quickly.  By constitu-
tional mandate, “the administration of such legislation shall accom-
plish substantial justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and
without encumbrance of any character . . . ” (California Constitution,
Article 4, Section 14).
In the early 1990s workers’ compensation costs were at historic
highs.  The perceived success of an experiment in labor-management
12 Chapter 2
negotiation at reducing these costs—the Pioneer Valley Project in
Massachusetts —encouraged the California Legislature to enact Senate
Bill 983.  This bill allowed CBAs between a private employer or group
of employers engaged in construction unions to create an alternative
workers’ compensation system.  These agreements, called carve-outs,
allow the parties to negotiate any of the following.
• An ADR system governing disputes between employees and
employers or their insurers that supplements or replaces all or
part of those dispute resolution processes contained in California
Labor Code Division 4: Section 4903 and 4905 (Workers’ Com-
pensation and Insurance), including, but not limited to, mediation
and arbitration 
• The use of an agreed list of providers of medical treatment that
may be the exclusive source of all medical treatment provided
• The use of an agreed, limited list of qualified medical evaluators
that may be the exclusive source of such evaluators
• Joint labor management safety committees
• A light-duty, modified job, or return-to-work program
• A vocational rehabilitation or retraining program utilizing an
agreed list of providers of rehabilitation services that may be the
exclusive source of providers of rehabilitation services
The parties were not allowed to collectively bargain an “agreement
that diminishes the entitlement of an employee to compensation pay-
ments for total or partial disability, temporary disability, vocational
rehabilitation, or medical treatment fully paid by the employer as oth-
erwise provided in this division” (California Labor Code Section
3201.5b).
Parties
Within carve-outs, union and management negotiators design and
control the dispute resolution process.  Employers, unions, or insurance
companies employ and compensate the dispute resolution personnel.
Consequently, unlike the state administrative law system, the decision
maker in the dispute process is not necessarily neutral about the out-
come, especially as they affect third parties.  In addition, the collective
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bargaining process may leave one side with greater control over the
ADR.  Therefore, we will carefully define the parties and the roles they
play within workers’ compensation.
Employers
The “employer” side of the compensation system has three func-
tions: 1) the employer of the injured worker (employer), 2) the party
having financial responsibility for costs arising from an injury
(insurer), and 3) the party administering the claim (claims administra-
tor).
All of these functions can reside in a single entity (self-adminis-
tered/self-insured employer) or exist in various combinations.  The
incentives of these parties are not always coincidental, nor is the com-
munication among these parties and with the worker always similar
across different arrangements. 
Insurers
Insurance arrangements within workers’ compensation take sev-
eral forms, ranging from self-insurance to insurance with experience
rating to insurance without experience rating (for small employers, for
example).  In addition, the adjudication process can determine certain
awards that fall outside the coverage supplied by the insurer, either
directly on the employer, another insurer, or another third party.
Private insurance
Most employers (over 99 percent of  private sector employers, rep-
resenting 80 to 85 percent of private sector payroll) purchase insurance
from private insurance companies or the State Compensation Insurance
Fund.  These policies usually cover all direct indemnity, medical, and
legal costs of a workplace injury.  A deductible policy is unusual
among small employers but more common among large employers.
The economic incentive for safety (independent of indirect costs to
employers, e.g., training replacements, etc.) is maintained for employ-
ers by recording all insured costs for an employer (at the Workers’
Compensation Insurance Rating Bureau [WCIRB]) and adjusting
insurance premiums based on an employer’s past experience as mea-
14 Chapter 2
sured by  experience modification.  Experience modification adjusts an
employer’s premium to reflect the firm’s performance relative to other
employers with workers in a similar industry and/or occupation.
Self-insurance
Large private companies and county and local government agen-
cies can elect to self-insure.  They are required to establish the financial
resources to cover any expected liability.  Less than 1 percent of pri-
vate employers self-insure, representing approximately 15 to 20 per-
cent of private payrolls.  Nearly all public agencies, other than state
agencies, are self-insured.
Safety groups
Legislation was passed in 1969 allowing employers to form “safety
groups.”1 These are employer associations involved in a common trade
or business.  The association negotiates rates for members.  Usually,
the agreement involves cost-plus contracting.  Excess premiums are
returned to the group and divided among employers based on each
employer’s portion of the overall premium paid, not the individual
safety record.  However, the incentive of experience rating is main-
tained in that “each member of an organization insured under a group
policy shall be treated as a single and separate entity as respects rates,
classifications, and rating plans.”2 Data on each individual employer’s
experience is reported to and maintained separately by the WCIRB.  In
addition, each such group is required to “seek to reduce the incidence
and severity of accidents” [California Insurance Code §11656.6 (5)].
Employers with annual premiums of less than $250,000 joining a
carve-out arrangement are required to be members of a safety group.3
Owner controlled insurance plan (OCIP)
Also referred to as “wrap-up projects,” OCIPs are used for large
construction projects where the owner assumes responsibility for
workers’ compensation and liability insurance on the part of all general
contractors, contractors, and subcontractors.  These policies are gener-
ally written as “large-deductible” policies.  For example, the owner
might be responsible for the first $100,000 of losses on any claim and
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$500,000 to $1,000,000 of losses overall, with the insurer liable for the
remainder.  In addition claims administration costs are billed separately
at either a flat rate per claim type or a percentage of claim costs.  Under
this arrangement, a separate policy is written on each and every con-
tractor and subcontractor, and the experience of each policyholder is
reported to the WCIRB.  However, the owner pays the insurance pre-
miums. Construction carve-outs negotiated as part of a PLA are
insured under this type of arrangements.4 Safety incentives are main-
tained for the individual contractor because the individual employer’s
experience under the OCIP policy is combined with any experience on
work outside the OCIP to create the future experience modification for
that employer. 
Legally uninsured state agencies
State government agencies are not required to carry insurance.
They are “legally uninsured.”  Despite efforts by the California Depart-
ment of Corrections to promote legislation allowing a carve-out to be
formed covering the California Correctional Peace Officers Associa-
tion, no state agencies are eligible to participate in carve-outs.
Injuries and Illnesses Within Workers’ Compensation
Approximately 8 percent of California’s workers suffer an occupa-
tional injury or illness each year.5  Most of these injures are minor, with
approximately two-thirds resulting in medical treatment with at most
one or two days off work.  Each of these injuries or illnesses result in a
claim being opened and a report filed with the Department of Industrial
Relations.  Most however, are quickly resolved, with all medical care
paid for by the employer or the employer’s insurer.  These cases make
up less than 5 percent of the costs of workers’ compensation.  The
remaining one-third of claims involve indemnity payments and are
more complex to resolve. 
If an injured worker misses more than three days work, the worker
receives Temporary Disability payments equal to approximately two-
thirds of the worker’s wage at injury, up to a set maximum (equal to
$490/week in 1999).  These payments continue until the injured worker
is released to return to work or is declared “Permanent and Stationary”;
that is, the worker has reached his or her level of maximum medical
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improvement.  This may be complete recovery (80–85 percent of the
total injuries, totaling about 9 percent of costs) or there may be Perma-
nent Partial Disability (15–20 percent of claims, making up 80 percent
of so of total workers’ compensation costs).  Permanently disabled
workers receive disability payments meant to compensate them for
their lost ability to compete in the open labor market.
A worker who incurs a permanent disability that precludes him
from returning to his previous occupation and is unable to work an
alternate or modified job is eligible for vocational rehabilitation bene-
fits.  These benefits include resources for temporary support, voca-
tional rehabilitation maintenance allowance, training, and job search
assistance. 
Minimum indemnity benefit levels are set by statute.  Nothing pre-
cludes an employer or insurer from increasing the level of benefits.
However, even in unionized workplaces, where the maximum work-
ers’ compensation benefit is a low proportion of some employees’
earnings, few contracts increase benefits. 
Serious and frequent disputes arise over the duration of temporary
disability, the level of permanent disability, and eligibility for voca-
tional rehabilitation.  These disputes often involve opinions by compet-
ing doctors selected by the opposing parties. Many observers feel that
these disputes arise and are difficult to resolve because the parties
choose doctors whose opinions are more extreme and consequently
more favorable for the selecting party.
Medical treatment
Medical treatment in the workers’ compensation system is paid for
by the employer or its insurer. Medical treatment costs represent
approximately 40 percent of the benefits paid out to injured workers
($2.0 billion for insured employers in 1997 (WCIRB 1998)).  Statute
establishes the following conditions that govern medical treatment and
bear directly on the motivation for a development of carve-out arrange-
ment.  
• Coverage is “first dollar coverage” with no deductibles or co-pay-
ments by the employee.
• The employer is required to pay for all treatment that is reason-
ably required to cure or relieve the effects of the injury.
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• The employer under nearly all circumstances can determine the
choice of medical provider only during the first 30 days of treat-
ment.
• The employee has the option after the first 30 days to select any
doctor, chiropractor, psychiatrist, acupuncturist, etc.  If the
employee notified the employer prior to an injury, the employee
can predesignate a treating physician for all treatment, including
during the first 30 days.  Almost no employees predesignate phy-
sicians.
• Starting with the 1993 California reforms, the opinion of the pri-
mary treating physician on a claim was given special legal
authority when there was a dispute over medical or medical-legal
issues.  The opinion of the primary treating physician is presumed
correct, and it is difficult for the opposing party to rebut.  Conse-
quently, control of the choice of primary physicians is an impor-
tant issue when a claim involves a dispute.
Medical treatment costs are governed by the Official Medical Fee
Schedule.  This schedule establishes “reasonable maximum fees paid
for medical services” provided under workers’ compensation (Califor-
nia Labor Code Section 5307.1). 
Disputes between medical providers and insurers concerning med-
ical treatment are common.  These disputes involve the length, inten-
sity, or appropriateness of treatment and the charge for treatment.
Disputes between the provider and payer concerning medical treatment
frequently result in medical liens being filed against a case.  These
liens require the intervention of the WCAB to resolve.  In the late
1990s, lien resolution accounted for 25 percent of conferences and
hearings scheduled by the WCAB.6 
Medical cost containment is a major issue, in part, because workers
pay no co-payments or deductibles. In addition, group health models
such as health maintenance organizations that have helped reduce the
growth of health care costs are not easily transferable to workers’ com-
pensation because these models involve increasing the health care pro-
vider’s incentives to reduce costs.  However, the employer controls
medical care for only the first 30 days, and the majority of medical
costs is due to the relatively few cases that last more than 30 days
(Ernst & Young 1996a).  The result of these forces is that health insur-
18 Chapter 2
ance costs increased little during the 1990s, but employers still faced 5
to 10 percent annual increase in average medical costs per claim within
workers’ compensation (WCIRB 1999).
Under carve-out arrangements, labor and management can negoti-
ate over the length of medical control.  This flexibility permits the
carve-outs to integrate care with group care providers, including the
worker’s non-occupational treatment provider.  CBAs usually have set
the length of employer medical control at the life of the claim.  How-
ever, the employer does not choose the doctor, as can be done in the
statutory system, but restricts the doctor to a jointly negotiated list.
While this list is often extensive, applicant attorneys have voiced frus-
tration at not being able to choose doctors they feel will treat or evalu-
ate injured workers most favorably.
Complaints about abuse of control of the treating physician are
also leveled at the employer. In fact, the statutory maintenance of the
30-day limit on employer control in the face of rising costs has been
justified as a way to encourage employers to maintain the proper trade-
off between treatment and cost.  The reasoning is that if the employee
receives good medical treatment during the initial period, they will
have little incentive to change physicians after 30 days.
Medical-legal evaluations
Many critical issues in workers’ compensation are legal questions
determined by medical findings.  This is referred to as the medical-
legal process and is distinct from treatment.  Medical-legal evaluations
generally begin at the time the injured worker reaches maximum medi-
cal improvement, referred to as “permanent and stationary” in the Cali-
fornia system.  At this time, the primary treating physician makes a
report concerning several issues, the most important of which are listed
below. As with decisions about treatment, these findings are presumed
to be correct and are difficult for an objecting party to overcome.
Permanent disability.  The most important issue and the most
often disputed concerns the level of residual impairment present when
the worker’s condition has stabilized. The evaluating doctor records
both objective and subjective findings that measure impairment
according to California’s rating schedule. These impairment measures
are translated into disability ratings, from 0 to 100 percent, by raters
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who modify the standard rating for impairment by age and occupation.7
Workers receive permanent disability payments based on these find-
ings.
Apportionment.  When permanent disability results from the
aggravation of an existing disabling condition or underlying disease
process, then the permanent disability benefits are apportioned
between the current injury and the pre-existing condition.  For exam-
ple, if a worker sustained a previous back injury resulting in a work
restriction of no heavy lifting (a 20 percent Standard Rating) and the
current injury results in a further restriction to semi-sedentary work (60
percent Standard Rating), the worker’s employer will be liable only for
the additional disability.  This has important implications for both the
worker (whose award may be reduced) and the employer (whose cost
can be reduced). Also, apportionment can involve a second or third
employer where exposure occurred on a cumulative injury.
Future medical care.  The evaluating physician determines
whether the worker will require medical care subsequent to settlement
of the indemnity portion of his or her claim.  Since the employer/
insurer is responsible for all medical care connected with an injury,
even 20 or more years in the future, this issue is often financially
important and subject to dispute.  This issue is usually resolved as part
of a lump sum payment covered by a Compromise and Release agree-
ment at the close of a claim.  However, a substantial minority of claims
are resolved through a stipulated settlement which settles all issues but
reserves the worker’s right to future medical treatment paid for by the
insurer.
Qualification for vocational rehabilitation.  If the treating physi-
cian decides a worker’s permanent impairment precludes that worker
from returning to his or her usual occupation, then the worker is eligi-
ble for vocational rehabilitation benefits.  This benefit typically
increases the indemnity on a claim by 20 to 50 percent.
Worker restrictions.  The physician also determines what work
restrictions the worker and employer should follow.  These are impor-
tant to workers’ early return to work and eligibility for vocational reha-
bilitation.
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The cost of medical-legal exams fell substantially between 1990
and 1996, by 85 percent at insured employers (Neuhauser and Wiegand
1997).  However, medical-legal costs represent less than 3 percent of
insurers’ direct costs.  The major effect of the medical-legal process on
employer costs and employee benefits is through the effect of the opin-
ion of the medical-legal evaluator on the indemnity payments to
injured workers and reserves for future medical treatment. For many
injuries, opinions on the degree of permanent disability are partly sub-
jective.  Thus, parties can influence evaluations by manipulating the
choice of the evaluating physician.  For example, two doctors evaluat-
ing the same patient may differ in their permanent disability evaluation
by a substantial amount.  In one study examining ratings from pairs of
doctors, claims differed by more than 7.5 rating points on half of the
ratings—a difference of between $3,000 and $15,000, depending on
rating and average weekly wage (e.g., a disability precluding very
heavy lifting and one precluding climbing, walking over uneven
ground, or comparable physical effort).  On 10 percent of these claims,
the two ratings differed by more than 35 rating points, a difference of
between $20,000 and $100,000, depending on rating and average
weekly wage (e.g., a disability precluding heavy lifting and one limit-
ing the work to semi-sedentary work).  These differences are particu-
larly extraordinary in light of the fact that the vast majority of ratings
are below 25 percent (Peterson et. al. 1998).  Extreme ratings are con-
centrated among a subset of the evaluating physicians.
Carve-outs offer an opportunity for management and labor to
agree on establishing limited lists of medical-legal evaluators.  Ideally,
the lists of evaluators would eliminate the most extreme doctors while
including the majority of evaluators and thus maintaining choice.  This
selection would require substantial efforts by management and labor to
identify and agree upon an appropriate list. As we will discuss later,
this has been one of the areas where carve-outs have been least suc-
cessful. 
Dispute resolution
A small percentage of claims have disputes that result in formal
dispute resolution processes.  Disputes can occur at each step of the
process, from determining if an injury was work related to the choice
of medical treatment provider to the length of time off of work.  The
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costly disputes typically relate to permanent disability, with disputes
centering on the extent of permanent disability.  Moreover, employees
can pass through each stage of the dispute resolution process multiple
times in complicated cases. 
When a dispute occurs, it first goes to a mandatory settlement con-
ference—a form of ADR.  If no settlement is reached, the parties can
move on to a formal hearing.  Only about 7 percent of claims are for-
mally adjudicated. 
Subsequent to a decision by a judge, parties can appeal the deci-
sion to the WCAB.  (This is also the level at which a dispute that is
unresolved in the carve-out ADR process would enter the conventional
compensation dispute resolution process.)  A very small proportion of
decisions of the WCAB are appealed to the State Courts of Appeals.
Claim resolution in workers’ compensation is a long process. Half
of all permanent disability claims are unresolved 30 months after
injury and 10 percent remain unresolved after 5 years.
One of the few efforts to analyze the determinants of litigation
(Falaris, Link, and Staten 1995) found that insurance status (self-
insured vs. insured) and industry group affected the frequency of litiga-
tion. These variables do not come into play here because all employers
are insured and within a single industry.  The nature of the injury also
played a role in litigation frequency with back, knee, shoulder, and
multiple body part injuries leading to higher litigation rates.  Litigation
also followed a hump-shaped age profile, increasing and then declin-
ing.  For this analysis, we did not have age and body part data avail-
able.
Attorney representation.  Eighty percent of permanent disability
claimants are represented by attorneys (WCIRB 1992–1998 Survey).
The legal fees for attorneys’ representation of injured workers are
determined by the WCAB. The average award is 12 to 18 percent
(depending on the custom of the particular WCAB office) of the award
for permanent disability, future medical, and vocational rehabilitation
maintenance amounts.  Injured workers’ attorney fees equaled 12.5
percent of all permanent disability indemnity payments paid to injured
workers in 1997.  From the employers’ perspective, attorney expenses
(for employers and insurers) were 4.4 percent of premiums in 1997,
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which was about one and a half times the level of applicant attorney
fees (approximately 18 percent of awarded indemnity).  
Disputes involving other parties.  The direct financial liability of
a workplace injury can fall on parties other than employer or its
insurer.  Disputes over these liabilities are sometimes adjudicated
within the workers’ compensation system and sometimes they involve
additional legal issues that are resolved in the tort system.  Examples
include third-party, serious and willful, wrongful termination, and
cumulative injury claims.
Third-party claims arise when an injury occurred in the course of
employment but responsibility, through negligence of action, can be
attributed to a party other than the worker and employer.  Under these
circumstances, the worker can pursue compensation through the tort
system and the insurer can also seek recovery through subrogation.
Serious and willful8 and wrongful termination9 violations related to
workplace injuries subject employers to substantial penalties that can-
not, by law, be indemnified by the insurer.  The former involves egre-
gious acts of employer conduct, while the latter refers to dismissing an
injured worker due to his or her injury.  As will be discussed later,
these violations pose particular problems for adjudication under a sys-
tem where the employer is involved in selection or payment of the
adjudicator.
Cumulative injuries subject each employer at which exposure
occurred (in California, only employers during the 12 months prior to
the injury date) to responsibility for indemnity and medical benefits.
Apportionment of responsibility among these employers or their insur-
ers for the judgment brought in the case against any one employer is
the responsibility of the WCAB. Note that in a carve-out, the adjudica-
tion could be made by a party interested in shifting costs to outside par-
ties.
Each of the above issues involves specialized legal knowledge;
thus, injured workers without legal representation rarely pursue them.
Discussion
In theory, workers’ compensation (in the words of the California
Constitution), “shall accomplish substantial justice in all cases expedi-
tiously, inexpensively, and without encumbrance. . . .”  Evidence in
Background 23
recent years, however, indicates that many injured workers in Califor-
nia have not been able to get through the system quickly or easily (Sum
and Stock 1997).  These workers’ problems appear to be caused, in
part, by tremendous difficulties in learning about their rights and obli-
gations in the workers’ compensation system and in getting sufficient
help to process their claims.  When faced with denials of their claims,
long delays, or threats to their employment, these workers either forego
their rights to medical treatment and benefits altogether or end up in
protracted disputes and litigation.  Many of the workers report they felt
the system was unfair, that they were “kept in the dark” about what was
happening with their claims, “shut out,” and “pushed aside.” 
Many system participants have blamed the dispute process for the
frequency of multiyear delays.  The role of attorneys is particularly
controversial.  Critics argue that attorney involvement leads to delays
in resolution and escalation of disputes.  Proponents of attorney
involvement point out that the system is complex by nature and an
unrepresented worker is unlikely to understand the full range of
employee rights and potential legal issues and benefits. 
Workers’ compensation overlaps with many other services
Numerous other social insurance benefits overlap the workers’
compensation system.  For example, State Disability Insurance (SDI)
makes temporary disability payments to workers when they are dis-
abled as a result of a non-occupational illness or injury.  The SDI sys-
tem is supported by payroll deductions from wages earned by workers.
While SDI is meant to support non-occupational disability, it also pays
workers if the employer or insurer delays acceptance or disputes the
occupational causation injury.  Once an insurer accepts a claim, SDI
attempts to recover its disability payments from the workers’ compen-
sation insurer.  If there is a dispute over compensability, SDI files a
lien on any settlement that is reached through the WCAB.  SDI pay-
ments and liens in workers’ compensation are common.  For example,
they totaled over $300 million in 1997 (Nefsky 1998).
Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security
Income are federal benefits paid to permanently and totally disabled
workers.  Payment of these benefits is affected by payment of other
social insurance benefits, including workers’ compensation.  Conse-
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quently, the structuring of compensation settlements has important
effects on eligibility for federal benefits.
Health Benefit: Workers’ compensation pays all medical costs for
work-related injuries and illnesses.  However, there is a good deal of
cost shifting between workers’ compensation and private health insur-
ance, in both directions.  For example, the non-occupational insurer’s
costs rise if an occupational injury is not reported as occupational and,
instead, is treated under the regular health benefit. 
The Americans for Disabilities Act (ADA) established protections
for disabled workers in the workplace, requiring that employers make
reasonable accommodations for seriously disabled workers.
Moreover, workers’ compensation itself has many interactions
beyond those of the employer, employee, and care providers.  Liens by
third parties, apportionment of permanent disability between multiple
employers, third-party liability against subcontractors covered under a
wrap-up project, and liability for future medical treatment on the health
benefit side are just a few of the issues that overflow the boundaries of
a carve-out.
BACKGROUND: THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
The construction industry is primarily composed of small employ-
ers (less than 100 employees) who employ an itinerant workforce.  The
majority of individual contractors cannot successfully predict their
future volume of business and employment due to the system of com-
petitive bidding for projects.  Except for a few key personnel, employ-
ment is limited from project to project.  Even within a particular
project, employment fluctuates widely by craft.  On a commercial or
industrial building, for instance, operating engineers and teamsters are
required to operate earth-moving equipment for site preparation and
excavation.  They then largely disappear in favor of carpenters, con-
crete finishers, ironworkers, plumbers, pipe-fitters, and electricians.
One result of this variability in employment opportunities has been
the growth of craft unions that persist far longer than any single job
(and often longer than most employers).  Along with the growth of
unionism has been the growth of pension and health care programs that
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are jointly administered by each union and a federation of employers.
These joint management-labor trusteed benefit plans and the history of
negotiating over benefits as well as wages set the stage for carve-outs.
The construction industry is one of the most dangerous, with high
rates of injuries and high rates of serious injuries.  Workers’ compensa-
tion costs are a particularly important cost of business to construction
contractors.  Unionized employers’ workers’ compensation costs
ranged from roughly 3 percent of wages for electricians and plumbers
to nearly 8 percent for painters and carpenters, and up to 27 percent for
roofers (WCIRB 1994). 
Until recently, management/union CBAs almost never involved
bargaining over the design of the workers’ compensation system or the
delivery of medical or indemnity benefits in the compensation system.
The sole exception to this was agreements involving salary continua-
tion benefits for industrially injured workers.  These were common for
police and firefighters in California, and for some state and govern-
ment employees, but unusual for workers in the private sector.10  The
medical provider, rehabilitation professionals, claims administration,
and dispute resolution processes, despite their direct impact on workers
and working conditions, were not subject to bargaining.11 
For the purpose of this report, we will be concerned with two types
of agreements common to the construction industry, CBAs and PLAs.
CBAs are the generic form of these agreements and can be used for any
agreement between management and labor.  Within this report, we will
use them in conjunction with agreements negotiated between a single
trade and an employer or group of employers.  Each construction trade
negotiates a CBA covering a set time period and particular geographic
area.
A PLA is a special type of CBA that covers a single project or
group of projects and all trades working on the project.  They are fairly
common on very large construction projects.  While CBAs usually
involve one union, many employers, and last three years, PLAs involve
multiple unions at one work site for the duration of a large project. 
A PLA generally contains many of the contract provisions of the
CBAs in force in the local area.  In addition, PLAs offer several advan-
tages:
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1) If a project relied on local CBAs and multiple trades were
involved, there would be contracts expiring and being negotiated
constantly, with wage and rule changes.
2) They often contain additional clauses, terms that are special to a
project (e.g., no strike or special transportation arrangements).
3) They allow employers to insert special safety measures, such as
drug testing.
The existence of a CBA or PLA is required for the negotiation of a
carve-out arrangement. The carve-out agreement is negotiated as an
addendum to the CBA. 
Carve-outs require an administrative structure to oversee medical
provider selection and administration of the ADR process. Unions and
management in construction had a long history of organizing jointly-
trusteed funds for specific purposes (health and pension).  Conse-
quently, the structure for developing a neutral source of payment for
the adjudication process was already extant.  Without this reliable
structure, it is difficult to imagine that a carve-out ADR would be sta-
ble.  Direct payment by employers to the adjudicators would not be
perceived as neutral.  Alternately, workers would be unlikely to partic-
ipate in paying for the adjudication if the expected benefits of the
arrangement inured to the employers.  
BACKGROUND: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The legislation authorizing workers’ compensation carve-outs per-
mits unions and contractors to set up an ADR process. The provisions
privatize the fact-finding, or trial, phase of disputes that arise from
workplace injuries, while preserving the injured worker’s ultimate
right to appeal to the public system.  With minor variations in the
CBAs, they uniformly call for the private resolution of disputes by
ombudspersons, mediators, and arbitrators.  
To understand how ADR methods operate in carve-outs, it is first
helpful to understand how they operate and how they differ from tradi-
tional dispute resolution processes.  For purposes of contrast we begin
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with a brief overview of the traditional litigation system and the factors
leading to the rise of alternative systems of dispute resolution.  As will
be seen, the principal distinguishing characteristics of ADR derive
from the nature of the process and the roles played by third-party neu-
trals.
Traditional Litigation 
In the traditional legal system the resolution of disputes is an
adversarial process that revolves around the law and the courthouse.
Disputes are legalized by the rights of constitutions, statutes, court
rules, or other sources of law, and parties seeking to vindicate those
rights do so in a court of law according to procedures that are generally
predictable, well defined, and designed in large part to further the goal
of fairness and accuracy in the pursuit of justice. 
In an adversarial process, the parties to the dispute present their
versions of the facts and the law to an authority who in turn issues a
decision resolving the dispute, and the decision may be appealed to a
higher authority.  The proceedings are conducted according to intricate
rules of evidence and procedure. As such, litigation is highly formal-
ized in both its structural institutions and the agents who engage in the
process.  Judges decide questions of law.  Juries (or sometimes judges)
decide questions of fact to which the law will be applied.  Attorneys
generally represent parties in litigation because of the technical sophis-
tication of the process. As a result, direct party involvement is often
minimal.
Although specific rules vary between courts and administrative
agencies, the essential structure tends to be fairly constant.  The litiga-
tion process begins with the filing of a complaint by an aggrieved party
alleging some violation of law and the response to such complaint by
the opposing party.  These preliminary filings set out the initial issues
of the litigation, which are then clarified during an investigatory or dis-
covery phase. Requests for judicial determination or motions are com-
monly filed during or upon completion of discovery, including motions
on the admissibility of evidence and for summary judgment.  The latter
typically comes at the close of discovery and asks the court to rule in
favor of the moving party as a matter of law.  If that motion is rejected,
the matter proceeds to trial, after which a decision is reached by a jury
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or a judge. Parties can appeal that decision to higher courts to ensure
the accuracy and integrity of the decision.
Considerable dispute resolution activity usually takes place infor-
mally before the filing of a complaint.  Attorneys for both parties spend
considerable time evaluating the legal and factual merits of their cases,
interviewing potential witnesses, and marshaling arguments that ulti-
mately would be used to persuade the trier of fact to rule in their favor.
During this period the two sides begin negotiating possible settle-
ments—a process heavily influenced by the parties’ analysis of their
respective cases and general negotiation strategies (Mnookin and
Kornhauser 1979).  
While litigation is often thought of in terms of trial, this pre-trial
negotiation process ultimately ends in the resolution of the dispute in
the overwhelming majority of civil and criminal cases.  Indeed, 95 per-
cent of all disputes are resolved through negotiation and without the
need for trial.  This phenomenon is also reflected in the California
workers’ compensation system. 
The Rise of Alternative Dispute Resolution
This litigation process may be effective as a truth-and-justice seek-
ing vehicle, but it is very expensive and often quite slow.  An already
sluggish civil trial process is further slowed by the gamesmanship of
litigation, which increases costs to parties and the system itself.  These
costs then lead to higher insurance premiums and lower public confi-
dence in the system.  In addition, the complexity of the process, the
trauma often associated with trial, and a general dissatisfaction with the
traditional legal system have led to a search for new approaches for
resolving disputes. 
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw an unprecedented rise in ADR
in public and private spheres at state and federal levels.  
The potential advantages and disadvantages of ADR involve both
efficiency and process.  Efficiency arguments supporting ADR are that
it is a faster and less expensive process than traditional litigation—
although researchers have not been able to document such advantages.
Efficiency rationales are by far the most commonly cited justifications
for the adoption of ADR in most spheres, including in workers’ com-
pensation carve-outs.  
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Process rationales suggest that ADR processes are more satisfying,
produce better outcomes, are more private, and contribute to a more
civil society through less contentious methods of dispute resolution
(Burger 1982; Raven 1988; Simon 1985).
The disadvantages of ADR are a mirror image of its strengths.  To
the extent that court formalities equalize the power imbalances
between the parties, the informal structures of ADR can reinforce those
imbalances.  Similarly, the privatization of dispute resolution through
ADR infuses a profit motive for the neutral third party into dispute res-
olution processes that does not exist in the public system.  As such,
“repeat players,” particularly large institutional players like insurers
and banks, have been found to enjoy a significant advantage in ADR
(Bingham 1997). ADR also results in the sacrifice of constitutional and
other public rights, such as the right to an attorney and due process, and
to the accurate application of public laws.  It also sacrifices the deter-
rent value of public decision making.  For all these reasons, one of the
most controversial issues in modern ADR is whether one can be com-
pelled into such processes.
Forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution
Carve-outs use three of the many forms of ADR: arbitration, medi-
ation, and the assistance of ombudspersons.  Each will be discussed in
turn.
Arbitration
Arbitration refers to an adversarial process in which a neutral third
party decides the dispute between the parties in an informal proceed-
ing, not bound by traditional rules of evidence or procedure. The arbi-
trator’s decision, or “award,” is generally final and not appealable on
substantive grounds.
Today, virtually all CBAs include provisions for arbitrating griev-
ances.  Contractual arbitration is also common in the nonunion work-
place; employment disputes in the securities industry, for example, are
almost all decided by arbitration rather than trial.  
Arbitrators wield considerably more unchecked power than judges.
They act alone and blend the functions of triers of fact and law into a
single adjudicatory power for resolving disputes that is supported by
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broad statutory and common law discretion.  Moreover, they generally
are not bound by the constraints of substantive law in either the proce-
dures by which they conduct their hearings or in the standards they use
to resolve the dispute.  In fact, arbitrators need not even have legal
training.
The several types of arbitration share some characteristics.  First,
they are informal procedures, unlike their highly regimented public
court counterparts.  Both sides have an opportunity to present wit-
nesses and evidence and to engage in cross-examination—subject to
the arbitrator’s discretion or, significantly, the rules agreed upon by the
parties themselves prior to the arbitration (or by the government in
court-related programs).  There is typically much less discovery than in
traditional litigation.  As a result, the arbitrator’s decision is generally
rendered quickly on the basis of the arbitrator’s sense of fairness under
the circumstances rather than on traditional legal norms. 
Unlike public judges, the decisions of arbitrators are generally not
subject to substantive review.  They may be modified in the case of
technical imperfections, but they may only be vacated upon proof of
bias, fraud, misconduct, or abuse of discretion by the arbitrator.
For this reason, the selection of the arbitrator is critical to the pro-
cess.  As expected, the identity of the individual arbitrator plays a sig-
nificant role in the outcome of a given case (see, for example, Schultz
1990; Rosenberg and Folberg 1993). Thus, the competence, neutrality,
and independence of the arbitrator are crucial if the process is to be
both fair and perceived to be fair. 
However, arbitrators often support themselves by arbitrating.  The
desire for repeat business coupled with a situation where one side is a
repeat player can put dangerous pressure on the arbitrator to favor the
repeat player.  The pressure can be eased somewhat by the customary
participation of all parties in the selection process.  Reputation is the
arbitrator’s stock in trade, and a reputation for bias can lead to the
refusal of parties to select an arbitrator.  While the marketplace pro-
vides this safeguard at one level, the safeguard is only likely to be
effective if both parties are aware of potential arbitrators’ reputations. 
Mediation 
Unlike adjudicatory judicial and arbitration proceedings, media-
tion is a consensual process in which the parties decide the resolution
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of the dispute themselves with the help of a neutral third party.  This is
typically accomplished by the mediator taking the parties through a
series of stages such as: agreeing upon ground rules, identifying facts
and positions, promoting mutual understanding and developing mutu-
ally acceptable options, and agreeing on options (Moore 1987). 
As a method of dispute resolution, mediation’s central strength lies
in the ability of the parties, with the help of a neutral third party, to get
beyond the initial positions that defined the conflict to the real underly-
ing interests of the parties—as well as the powerful potential to unleash
creative solutions not possible in a more adversarial process.  As such,
it can be particularly effective in interest-based cases where the preser-
vation of relationships is particularly important and which allow for the
consideration of options for resolution that exceed those that would be
traditionally available in a court of law.   While courts can confirm
mediation agreements for purposes of enforcement, the process’ most
fundamental enforcement power comes from the fact that the parties
themselves have reached the agreement.
On the definitional question, there are two central models of medi-
ation: facilitative and evaluative.  Under the facilitative model, the less
controversial of the two, mediators may only facilitate the parties’ own
consensual dispute resolution process and should offer neither their
opinions nor their substantive expertise to the parties.  This view has
been adopted by the American Arbitration Association, the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution, and divisions of the American Bar
Association.  Under evaluative mediation, mediators are encouraged to
offer whatever opinions, expertise, and advice the parties need to
resolve the dispute.  As a result, evaluative mediations can often
resemble the settlement conferences that are a staple of the traditional
public litigation system.  
One’s definition of mediation will in turn affect the question of
mediator training and qualification, also an issue of continuing debate.
Many, if not most, states (through legislation, court rules, or task force
recommendations) now use a hybrid method of mediator qualification,
requiring some combination of two or more of the following factors:
academic degree, apprenticeship or mentoring requirements, training
requirements, and practical experience.  Although, no consensus has
emerged and states have not yet begun to regulate mediator qualifica-
tions (Shaw 1994a, 1994b; Rogers and McEwen 1989, Ch. 10).  
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Regardless of orientation, mediation may not be effective for all
disputes.  Mediation can favor the economically or emotionally stron-
ger party and work against the one who can least tolerate conflict and
who most values a harmonious resolution. This may inspire some par-
ties to settle for far less than they might obtain before a judge in a tradi-
tional adversarial setting.  As Auerbach (1983) put it, “Compromise
only is an equitable solution between equals; between unequals, it
inevitably produces inequality.”  
One common remedy for this problem is the ability of parties to be
represented by counsel in mediation proceedings.  This solution is con-
troversial because it moves away from the vision of mediation as a
party-driven process that seeks to get beyond legal issues to the under-
lying causes of the dispute.  Involving lawyers leaves open the contro-
versial issue of the lawyer’s role. Whether the lawyers should assume
their traditional role of primary spokesman and advocate for their cli-
ents, and the standards by which they should assess and provide coun-
sel on the ultimate mediation agreement are open questions that are the
subject of vigorous debate in the dispute resolution community (Riskin
1984).
Ombudsperson
The third type of ADR process called for by the carve-outs is that
of the ombudsperson.  This is something of a misnomer, however, in
that an ombudsperson is not a process at all.  Rather, it is a mode or
vehicle for dispute resolution that can include many different pro-
cesses.
The term “ombudsperson” is of early 19th Century Scandinavian
origin and most generally may be understood as a buffer between large
institutions and their constituents. “Most commonly, the ombudsper-
son in Scandinavia was appointed by the Parliament to ensure that the
laws and statutes were properly applied, and to guard against abuses,
malpractice or error by officials designated to administer the laws; the
person holding the office has been referred to as ‘the watchman of the
watchman’” (Marti 1994). 
Today, ombudspersons may be found throughout American life—
in universities, government agencies, newspapers, hospitals, prisons,
social welfare agencies, and consumer settings.  There are two princi-
pal types of ombudspersons: classical and organizational.  
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The “classical” ombudsperson derives most directly from the
Scandinavian model—one who serves as a bridge between a govern-
ment and its citizenry.  As described by one of America’s foremost
administrative law scholars and early students of the ombudsperson,
Walter Gellhorn, the classical ombudsperson is a “high-level, indepen-
dent, legally constituted, greatly respected officer” who will “look into
citizen’s dissatisfactions with government” (Gellhorn 1996).  The clas-
sical ombudsperson has the power to investigate, criticize, publicize,
and persuade, but not to reverse or dictate official actions.    While it is
true that the classical ombudsperson handles individualized com-
plaints, his primary concern is to use such grievances to identify and
correct flaws in the system, to minimize the likelihood of similar griev-
ances arising in the future.  As Gellhorn (1996) put it, the “primary
purpose of the external critic [ombudsperson] is to build for the future
rather than to exhume the past.”  To the extent the ombudsperson has a
client, it is the system itself, not the parties to the system.
An example helps illustrate the classic ombudsperson’s role.  A
police officer arrests a young boy at his school for shoplifting.  The
parents of the boy sue the police officer for what they claimed was an
unnecessarily embarrassing incident that stigmatized the child in the
eyes of peers.  The court dismisses the complaint because the officer
had a valid arrest warrant to seize the child.  As far as the courts were
concerned the matter was over.  If there was a classical ombudsperson
in the police department, however, he might have suggested to the
chief of police that such arrests in the future should take place in a
more private setting than the classroom. The ombudsperson would not
be concerned with whether the police officer was right in making the
arrest; rather, he would have been concerned about finding the most
satisfactory method for implementing the policy and easing the friction
between citizens and their government.
The organizational ombudsperson performs a similar function in
the private and corporate setting—although, unlike the classical
ombudsperson, the organizational ombudsperson has no authority to
engage in formal investigations or fact-finding.  Rather, their central
powers are the ability to persuade and publicize. Generally operating
outside traditional lines of authority and reporting to the highest levels
of the organization, the organizational ombudsperson is a designated
neutral or impartial dispute resolution practitioner whose major func-
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tion is to provide confidential information and informal assistance to
managers, employees, and/or clients of the employer (patients, stu-
dents, suppliers, or customers).  
As such, the organizational ombudsperson often serves as a confi-
dential first-stop clearinghouse for all types of complaints, seeking not
to solve problems, but rather to foster values and behavior such as fair-
ness, equity, justice, equality of opportunity, and respect.  The scope
and limitations of an organizational ombudsperson’s powers have
developed with an eye toward the preservation of the office’s core val-
ues of independence, neutrality, and confidentiality.  For example, they
may provide information, communications assistance, “look into”
problems, and provide options to complainants, but as a matter of inde-
pendence, have no obligation to assist anyone who contacts them.
Similarly, they may use their office to publicize and bring attention to
issues and to persuade parties and institutions, but in furtherance of
their neutrality, they do not have the power to change or dictate poli-
cies or to serve as a formal fact-finder, judge, arbitrator, or advocate.
Bolstering the confidentiality that is essential to the office, organiza-
tional ombudspersons generally do not keep case files, testify as wit-
nesses, or even answer questions from anyone, including senior
managers, about those with whom they have had contact.   
Problems in Alternative Dispute Resolution
A serious problem with ADR procedures is that an employer may
establish procedures rigged in its favor. For example, one law firm pro-
posed that employees give up their legal rights in return for the right to
use a company-designed dispute resolution program. This program’s
highest level of appeal was a partner from another large law firm
(Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations 1994).
It is likely that a young woman working in a law firm who accuses her
older male boss of sexual harassment will feel that an (older, male)
partner in a nearby large law firm is not a neutral decision maker. Com-
panies have established other ADR procedures that have maximum
penalties far below those permitted by law, and others have taken years
to resolve disputes. 
The Commission on Worker-Management Relations (1994) found
that both employers and employees generally agree on a set of stan-
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dards that ADR procedures must meet if they are to serve as a legiti-
mate form of private enforcement of public employment law.
Specifically, these systems must provide the following: a neutral arbi-
trator who knows the laws in question and understands the concerns of
the parties, a fair method by which the employee can secure the neces-
sary information to present his or her claim, a fair method of cost shar-
ing that ensures that all employees can afford access to the procedure,
the option for employees to have independent representation, a range
of remedies equal to those available through litigation, a written opin-
ion by the arbitrator explaining the rationale for the result, and suffi-
cient judicial review to ensure that the result is consistent with the
governing laws.  Some have also proposed that the process must also
lead to a timely decision. 
Some analysts have argued that union-management bargaining can
provide decentralized means to achieve the goals of regulations, what
John Dunlop has called an “internal responsibility system” (e.g., Bok
and Dunlop 1970).  
Union approval of the ADR system can potentially resolve many
concerns about ADR. The key insight is simple: unions will not
approve a procedure that systematically gives employers the ability to
act with no regard for the facts. In principle, the union can require pro-
tections such as a written record or access by lawyers when the
expected value to employees outweighs their cost.  In addition, unions
have incentives to have better information about workers’ rights; thus,
they can inform their members as they work their way through the
ADR process. In fact, the literature on workers’ benefits is consistent
with union members having better information about the system (Budd
and McCall 1997).  The repeated play problem is less serious because
arbitrators and other neutrals are in repeat play with the union as well
as management; thus, they do not face strong incentives to favor the
employers (who often pay the bills and who will be involved in select-
ing neutrals for future cases).  A goal of this study is to determine the
extent that unions can fulfill the oversight functions envisioned by pro-
ponents of this form of conditional deregulation.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Carve-outs were established with the intention of improving the
delivery of medical services and indemnity payments to workers who
were injured on the job.  The key element of the improvement in bene-
fits was to come from the ADR process.  With the help of an ombuds-
person, injured workers would be better able to navigate the workers’
compensation system and resolve disputes in a timely fashion.  If the
ombudsperson could not resolve a dispute, mediators and/or arbitrators
would be called upon to broker a resolution.  The injured worker
retained the right to appeal to the WCAB if he or she was not satisfied
with the outcome of the ADR process.  As will be discussed later,
unions and employer associations have established carve-outs with
varying success in participation levels.
The specific nature of construction and of workers’ compensation
in California will somewhat limit the generalizability of findings from
this study.  Jobs in construction are almost all fairly short.  As will be
seen, short-term jobs make carve-outs more problematic than do longer
term employment relations.  
Workers’ compensation in California is also distinct from much of
the nation.  Most importantly, almost 40 percent of California claims
involve permanent disability, which is far higher than the 15 percent
found in most states.  As disputes almost always involve this subset of
claims, carve-outs have greater scope for reducing dispute rates in Cal-
ifornia than in states with fewer injuries “at risk” for a dispute. 
With these cautions in mind, in the next chapter we outline the
carve-outs created in the first years of the new legislation.
Notes
1. California Insurance Code §11656.6 Employer organizations wanting insurance:
an insurer may issue a workers’ compensation policy insuring an organization or
association of employers as a group if such organization complies with a number
of conditions.
2. California Insurance Code §11656.7 Group policy members treated separately.
3. In order to obtain group status, the WCIRB and statute require groups to have
bona fide safety programs in place.  However, “[t]hese rules are largely ignored
by WCIRB member companies and have been for years.  The carriers simply file
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standard forms, and the Bureau accepts them at face value with no follow up”
(Workers’ Comp Executive 1998).
4. Until 1995, public agencies were restricted from insuring public projects under an
OCIP arrangement.  Each such project required separate approval by the Califor-
nia Legislature.  In 1995, Ab-791 was enacted allowing public agencies to insure
projects under an OCIP arrangement.  Prior to 1995, few public projects were
handled in this manner.  By reducing cost of these arrangements, however, Ab-
791 is likely to increase their frequency.  According to several insurers, opposi-
tion to this bill and introduction of OCIPs into public projects in general had cen-
tered on contractors’ associations.  Contractors on public projects usually charge
an overhead fee that is a percentage of costs.  Workers’ compensation insurance
premiums are an important component of labor costs in the construction industry.
To the extent that these costs are shifted to the project owner, contractors underly-
ing costs upon which overhead is calculated are reduced.
5. Based on the authors’ analysis of Audit Unit data.  Between 1994 and 1996, work-
ers in California filed an average of 1.1 million claims each year.
6. Personal communication to authors from the DWC.
7. For more details, see California Division of Workers’ Compensation (1997).
Rules and instructions for applying the rating schedule can be found in “Funda-
mentals for Applying California Schedule for Rating Permanent Disabilities.” 
8. California Labor Code §4552-4556.
9. California Labor Code §132(a).
10. Salary continuation for police and firefighters is often referred to as “4850” bene-
fits after the section of the Labor Code under which they are described.  Under
4850 certain peace officers and firefighters receive full salary for the first year
they are on total temporary disability resulting from an occupational injury or ill-
ness.
11. An exception to this rule is the Early Intervention program negotiated by the Cal-
ifornia Correctional Peace Officers Association and the California Department of
Correction and the California Youth Authority.  Among other issues, these groups
agreed to a restricted list of agreed upon medical-legal evaluations and rehabilita-
tion professionals.  This was an effort to reduce the cost of medical-legal evalua-
tions and rehab services and the frequency of medical-legal evaluations.  In turn,





Overview of Carve-Outs 
in California
The carve-out statute in California gives unions and employers
considerable leeway to negotiate an alternative to the highly regulated
workers’ compensation system.  Unions and employers can bargain
over most of the important elements of workers’ compensation includ-
ing medical treatment, medical-legal evaluation, vocational rehabilita-
tion, dispute resolution, and increases (but not decreases) to indemnity
benefits.
This chapter summarizes California’s first eight carve-outs, which
are those that existed in 1997.  By the end of our study period (2000),
16 carve-outs had been formed in California (see Table 3.1).
Each carve-out was established by an addendum to a CBA.  The
agreements typically established a joint labor and management Trustee
Committee composed of union and employer representatives to design
and oversee the dispute resolution mechanisms, the administration of
the carve-out’s funds, and the delivery of benefits to injured workers.
A small charge was included on top of workers’ compensation insur-
ance rates to pay for the administration of the carve-out and its dispute
resolution system.
MEDICAL CARE
Proponents of carve-outs expected substantial savings on medical
treatment by allowing the parties to negotiate extended employer con-
trol over the choice of physician providers.  Workers would be pro-
tected because the provider list is negotiated under collective
bargaining.  Ideally, both unions and management will agree to bar
high-cost physicians (many of whom may be operating on the margins
of fraud) as well as physicians that under-provide useful services.
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Table 3.1 Carve-Out Participants as of March 22, 2000
No./Type Union Company
Included in this study (that is, founded by 1997)
1/C CA Building & Construction 
Trades Council
Metropolitan Water Dist. of So. Ca. 
owns Eastside Reservoir Project 
(also known as Domengloni).  
Contractor was Parsons
2/B International Brotherhood 
Electrical Workers – IBEW
National Electrical Contractors 
Assoc. – NECA, a multi-employer 
group
3/B So. Ca. Dist. Carpenters & 19 
local unions
6 Multi-employer groups with a total 
of 1,000 contractors
4/B So. Ca. Pipe Trades Council 16 Plumbing & Piping Industry 
Council, a multi-employer group
5/A Steamfitters Loc. 250 Cherne—two projects completed in 
1996
6/A International Union of Petroleum 
& Industrial Workers
TIMEC Co. and TIMEC So. CA.
7/C Contra Costa Building & 
Construction Trades Council
Contra Costa Water District, owner 
of the Los Vaqueros project
8/B So. CA Dist. Council of 
Laborers
4 multi-employer groups—Assoc. 
Gen’l Contractors of CA, Bldg. 
Industry Assoc. of So. CA, So. CA 
Contractors’ Assoc. Engineering 
Contractors’ Assoc.
Additional carve-outs created during the study period
9/C Ca. Bldg. & Construction Trades 
Council
Metropolitan Water Dist. of So. CA. 
is owner of the Inland Feeder project.  
Parsons is contractor
10/C Bldg. & Construction Trades 
Council of Alameda County
Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory is owner of the National 
Ignition Facility project.  Parsons is 
contractor
11/B Dist. Council of Painters Los Angeles Painting & Decorating 
Contractors Assoc.
12/A Plumbing & Pipefitting 
Local 342
Cherne, contracting for construction 
of Chevron Base Oil 2000 project
13/C Los Angeles Building and 
Construction Trades Council
Cherne, contracting for construction 
of ARCO facility
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In each case the carve-outs established a list of care providers.  In
some cases, the lists involved a high proportion of the doctors in the
state.  Many lists also included the HMO and PPO the workers could
access for nonoccupational injuries.
Other lists were more limited.  For example, the list of providers
for the Carpenters’ carve-out was selected by the insurer and was small
and restricted.  The union reported that these restrictions were due to its
low bargaining power when establishing the carve-out.
At the same time, the list of providers was not static.  In the Car-
penters’ carve-out, subsequent negotiations expanded the network of
doctors, including a large workers’ compensation Preferred Provider
Organization and Kaiser (the largest HMO in the state).
The large chemical plant construction company, Cherne, also
negotiated very restricted lists of medical providers and medical-legal
evaluators.  These restrictions were an issue with the union when
Cherne was involved in the original Pipe Trades carve-out agreement
in Southern California that included other employers.  In later negotia-
tions, the union and management agreed on a more open list of medical
and medical-legal providers.
A later agreement between Cherne and Pipefitters Local 342 in
Northern California included only two doctors and fewer than twenty
medical evaluators.  Several expert reviewers familiar with California
medical-legal evaluators considered the list as including some middle
of the road evaluators and some that were likely to report injuries as
less serious than the average doctor.  These lists were prepared with the
assistance of an insurer (Hartford) and a nurse case management firm
(Occusystem).
No./Type Union Company
14/B Operating Engineers Loc. 12 So. California Contractors’ Assoc.
15/B Sheet Metal International 
Union
Sheet Metal & A/C Contractors 
National Association (SMACNA)
16/C Building & Construction
Trades Council of San Diego
San Diego County Water Authority 
Emergency Storage Project
NOTE: A: one employer, one union; B: one union, multiple employers (each employer
chooses whether or not to sign the carve-out); C: project labor agreement.
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The Cherne agreements also included provisions for extra benefits
when the injury was an acute, traumatic injury and not the employee’s
fault.  According to Cherne, however, no injuries had qualified for
these extra benefits by the end of the study period.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Proponents of carve-outs also expected these programs to reduce
disputes and shorten resolution times by allowing employers and
unions to negotiate ADR procedures.  These procedures always began
with an ombudsperson (usually chosen by the joint labor-management
board of trustees) who was expected to attempt to resolve disputes
quickly.  If the ombudsperson was not able to resolve the dispute, it
proceeded to mediation and then to arbitration.
These ADR procedures were expected to be more efficient than the
state-run statutory system that involves a lengthy and legalistic proce-
dure for dispute resolution, which confuses many workers (Sum and
Stock 1997).  Dispute resolution in the state system also costs employ-
ees and employers almost one-third of all disputed medical and indem-
nity benefits.  Moreover, claim resolution in the statutory system is a
long process—in California, half of all permanent disability claims are
unresolved three years after the injury and 20 percent remained unre-
solved after five years.  The carve-outs all specified maximum times of
six months or less for the first stage of conflict resolution, a maximum
that was below the average time of the first stage of the statutory dis-
pute resolution system (eight months).
A controversial component of most carve-out agreements, includ-
ing the two case studies discussed below, was the exclusion of lawyers
from participation at the ombudsperson and mediation stages of the
dispute process.  In the statutory system, workers are represented by a
lawyer in 80 percent of injuries resulting in permanent disability
(WCIRB Permanent Disability Survey 1994–96).  Many of the
employers and union leaders who participated in carve-outs believed
that the heavy reliance on attorneys was a main cause of the high cost
of litigation and delays in claim resolution.
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Disputes often require forensic doctors to report on issues related
to legal questions such as whether the condition is work related, the
extent of permanent disability, and the share of the impairment due to
prior injuries.  Carve-outs allowed the parties to negotiate a limited list
of medical evaluators whose opinions were acceptable to both sides.
At the time of 1993 reforms, most serious claims involved multiple
forensic reports from competing doctors who were often chosen by
lawyers for their conservative or liberal interpretation.  The cost of
these reports exceeded $500 million per year in the early 1990s.
Numerous statutory and regulatory measures had been adopted in an
effort to limit the incentive for parties to choose doctors that evaluated
in a partisan manner.  Much of the complexity of these regulations was
in place to protect injured workers, who could be less well-informed
than insurers on the selection of favorable evaluating doctors.
Carve-outs had to meet two requirements: they could not diminish
medical and indemnity benefits to injured workers, and they had to
make the final step of their dispute resolution system an appeal for
reconsideration by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board.  The
Board is also the last administrative law step of the standard system.
Parties may appeal a Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board ruling to
the State Courts of Appeal.
Early analyses of California’s carve-outs found fewer litigated dis-
putes, less participation by attorneys, and lower benefit payments per
injury (California Division of Workers’ Compensation 1996, 1997).
While employers were encouraged by indications of potential savings,
concern arose that savings on medical costs from restricting treatment
to an agreed list of medical providers could lead to lower quality medi-
cal care (Moscowitz and Van Bourg 1995).  Even more critically,
opponents contended that lower indemnity payments per claim could
mean that restrictions on access to lawyers was reducing benefits for
injured workers (memo to the authors from the California Applicants
Attorneys Association 1998).
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INFORMING INJURED WORKERS ABOUT THE CARVE-OUT
Construction workers received information about the carve-outs at
the time they started a project.  More often than not, this information
was forgotten when they became injured.  Thus, a crucial question is
how injured workers find out about their rights under the carve-out.  In
our surveys we found that some ombudspersons took a proactive role,
contacting each injured worker as soon as possible after the accident,
while other ombudspersons waited for the injured worker or another
party to contact them with a question or a dispute.
At the NECA/IBEW carve-out that covered electricians throughout
the state, the ombudsperson role evolved during the course of our
study.  Originally, the ombudsperson only responded to requests from
injured workers with questions or problems.  More recently, the
ombudsperson has adopted the proactive role of contacting injured
workers soon after the injury to supply information and establish com-
munication.  The ombudsperson reported that this has improved the
operation of the carve-out from both the worker and employer perspec-
tive.
VARIETY OF CARVE-OUTS
Carve-out programs in California come in three forms—a single
union bargaining with one employer, a single union bargaining with
multiple employers, or a single owner bargaining with multiple unions.
Single union/multiple employer carve-outs were established on an
ongoing basis, whereas single employer/multiple union carve-outs
were established for single large projects under PLAs.
When multiple employers negotiated with a single union, employ-
ers could opt out of the arrangements and workers at carve-out employ-
ers participated as a condition of employment.  The NECA/IBEW
carve-out was the most successful at achieving significant penetration
among the membership of an employers association.  This occurred in
part because, prior to the carve-out legislation, there was a long estab-
lished safety group, NECA West, that negotiated jointly for insurance
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coverage.  This group formed the basis for the subsequent carve-out.
None of the other single-union carve-outs signed up many employer
members during the study period.
The ombudsperson for the Laborer’s carve-out also actively
recruited other unions—Cement Masons, Operative Plasterers, and
Pipetrades working with landscaping—to join into a single, multiple-
craft, carve-out arrangement.  While this arrangement appears attrac-
tive, at the time this study was written, multi-trade carve-outs outside
large projects had not been successfully negotiated.
When a project owner bargained with several unions, the contrac-
tors and subcontractors were required to join the carve-out as a condi-
tion of participation on the project.  In California, two very large
reservoir projects used the single employer/multiple union model.
A final variety of carve-out deserves brief mention: The phony
carve-out.  Some employers have an incentive to set up sham unions
for the exclusive purpose of qualifying for a carve-out.  Since these
“unions” would lack any accountability to the workforce, the ombuds-
person, mediators, and arbitrators chosen solely by the employer would
presumably look favorably upon the company’s interests.  Appendix A
discusses California’s experience with sham carve-outs and the evolu-






We interviewed the six ombudsmen at the California carve-outs
that included ADR and operated during the study period.  These inter-
views were conducted by telephone using a structured interview, and
they revealed substantial differences among the ombudsmen according
to several important dimensions: their professional orientation (legal
vs. medical), the structure of their employment relationship with the
carve-out (employee vs. independent contractor), the functioning of
their offices (particularly whether they were proactive or reactive in
nature), the nature of the matters handled by their offices (especially
matters excluded), and their roles with respect to possible subsequent
mediations or arbitrations.  These interviews also underscored the deep
ambivalence that characterizes the relationship between applicants’
attorneys and carve-outs, as well as ombudsmen concerns about the
carve-outs and their suggestions for improvements.  This chapter
reports those findings.
Backgrounds of the Carve-Out Ombudspersons
The ombudspersons came from a variety of backgrounds, ranging
from rising up through the construction ranks to occupational nursing
to law.  None had any specific training to become an ombudsperson.
Three of them said they had taken related courses or training, such as
mediation training or courses in various aspects of workers’ compensa-
tion, generally taught by insurance organizations, such as ULICO (a
union-owned insurer) or the Insurance Educational Association.  They
did not, however, make any effort to discern the role or traditions of the
ombudsperson’s office or to learn the dynamics of negotiation, advo-
cacy, or many of the other functions they performed. 
Two of the three ombudspersons with legal backgrounds had asso-
ciations that suggest a proclivity that would favor injured workers: one
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was an attorney in an applicants’ workers’ compensation law firm,
while a second was a paralegal with membership in several workers’
compensation applicants’ bar associations.  In contrast, one of the
ombudspersons with a medical background provided consulting ser-
vices for a large hospital and a risk management firm, which might
suggest some bias in favor of employers. 
Structure of Employment Relationship 
Four of the six ombudspersons worked for, were paid by, and were
accountable to a joint labor management trust.1  In contrast, one
ombudsman worked directly for the employer and one worked for the
employer’s workers’ compensation insurance broker.  Despite the
potential for conflicts of interest that can arise when an ombudsperson
is accountable to a single stakeholder, we found no direct evidence of
partiality. To the contrary, one ombudsperson reported that when the
employer attempted to stop her from advising workers about the possi-
bility of wrongful termination actions under Section 132(a), and to
avoid lost-time classifications for injuries, she ignored these sugges-
tions. 
Three of the six ombudspersons said they worked as full-time
employees, earning between $75,000 and $87,000 per year.  Two other
ombudspersons reported part-time relationships with their projects,
working for and paid by the trust on an hourly basis ($85/hour and
$125/hour).  The other received a percentage (0.5 percent) of the work-
ers’ compensation premium as compensation, which produced an
income of $45,000 in 1997.  Only one of the ombudspersons had sig-
nificant staff support, although some of the others drew on other
resources within their organizations when necessary.
Significantly, none of the ombudsmen reported substantial case-
loads and all reported other duties or clients.  The three full-time
ombudspersons said their work as ombudspersons comprised only 5,
20, and 30 percent of their overall full-time positions; their remaining
time was spent developing and promoting the program or performing
other administrative functions for their employers.2  A similar pattern
was seen among the three part-time ombudspersons, with each having
significant client bases beyond their carve-out responsibilities: one per-
formed workers’ compensation ombudsperson services for other con-
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struction projects, one practiced law, and the third provided consulting
services in disability management for hospitals and risk managers.
Carve-outs remain in their infancy stage and many claims have not
matured sufficiently to enter the dispute processes.  Moreover, as time
passes, there are more years of claims that can enter the system (i.e., in
the first year, only these first-year claims can reach dispute stages; in
year three, claims from years one, two, and three can trigger disputes).
If the pattern of disputes over time matches the statutory system, then
we do not expect the process to reach its equilibrium rate of disputes
until about year five. This suggests that the interviews were conducted
one or two years prior to the average long-run rate of dispute activities
that the ombudspersons will be required to handle. 
General Functioning of Ombudspersons’ Offices
The ombudspersons were reasonably available and accessible to
injured workers, insurers, and employers.  Only one of the ombudsper-
sons had a permanent office on site, although four of the other five said
they could make arrangements for on-site meetings with injured work-
ers if necessary.  Moreover, all said they were available by phone dur-
ing the business day, and four maintained telephone hours well into the
evening; some also said they were available to injured workers any-
time, day or night.  The overwhelming majority of work was done over
the telephone, although three of the six ombudspersons surveyed said
they tried to meet in person with the injured worker at least once.
Two approaches characterized the ombudspersons’ first contact
with the workers: proactive and reactive.  Four of the ombudspersons
took a proactive approach—that is, they generally contacted the worker
as soon as they learned of the injury.  This model was taken by both
ombudspersons with a medical orientation and by two ombudspersons
with a legal orientation.3 The ombudsperson at the Eastside Reservoir
project did an examination of every injured worker and recommended
if the person needed further treatment at a hospital.  Since the work was
being performed at a single location, this allowed her to serve this tri-
age role.  The other two ombudspersons took a more reactive
approach—that is, they generally waited until the injured worker made
the first inquiry.
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Regardless of which model the ombudspersons followed, all but
one of the ombudspersons’ offices sent out information about the dis-
pute resolution process, either as the first contact or after the first con-
tact was made.4  This material typically included general information
about the role of the ombudsperson, the ADR scheme adopted by the
carve-out, and, in some cases, information about the worker’s legal
rights.  
The research team asked the ombudspersons to rate the frequency
by which they engaged in specific dispute resolution processes and cer-
tain other functions.  Providing information was listed as the leading
answer, followed by facilitation (“helping the parties decide their dis-
pute”), advocacy on behalf of workers, case management, fact finding,
negotiation, systemic improvements, and arbitration (“deciding the dis-
pute”). There was a relatively substantial break between the top four
choices and the bottom four.
The ombudspersons acknowledged some structural limitations on
their authority.  One limitation was the amount of time that the om-
budspersons have to resolve the dispute, which was acknowledged by
four of the six ombudspersons surveyed. This limit was typically estab-
lished in a CBA, with the number of days ranging from 7 to 15 days.
This limitation did not appear to be burdensome, as three of the four
affected ombudspersons said they were able to resolve issues well
before the allotted time period.  The medically oriented ombudspersons
said they were able to resolve most issues in two to three days, and the
fourth said that he would simply get extensions from the trust when
necessary.
A more significant limitation was on the nature of the authority of
the ombudsperson.  None of them said they have the power to direct an
actor in the process, whether it is a worker, insurer, contractor, or union
official.5  Rather, they said they only had the power to persuade. Even
then, however, most said that both parties typically abided by their rec-
ommendations and suggestions.  However, one of the medically ori-
ented ombudspersons acknowledged one instance in which it was
necessary to go over the adjuster’s head to get relief for an injured
worker.
Beyond these limitations, the ombudspersons had broad discretion
in how they conducted their work. This discretion was a function of the
ombudspersons’ independence, and the research team asked the
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ombudspersons what they viewed as being the most important safe-
guard of their independence. All four of the ombudspersons who
worked for joint labor management trusts said they viewed the fact that
they worked for the trusts, and could be rewarded, disciplined, or ter-
minated only by the trust—which essentially would require the agree-
ment of both the unions and management—as the most significant
protections of their independence. The two ombudspersons who
worked for employer/agents cited only personal integrity factors. 
When asked whether the employers or any other actors had asked
them to do anything that would compromise their independence or the
integrity of their office, the answers for both groups were not materi-
ally different. Neither group reported such interference to be a prob-
lem, although members of both groups acknowledged that it does
occur.  Reported instances included either insurers or employers asking
ombudspersons to stop giving counsel on serious and willful and unjust
dismissal claims, to perform acts described by the ombudspersons as
illegal, to deny claims, to encourage employers to hire nonunion work-
ers, and to convince workers with legitimate claims that those claims
were somehow invalid. There were no reported instances of a union
official attempting to interfere with the judgment of the ombudsper-
sons. 
Nature of Matters Handled by Ombudspersons
The research team asked several questions intended to discern the
ombudspersons’ philosophical approaches to their jobs, the various
roles that they perform, and the nature of the matters that they handled
in general, as well as some particular matters.  The ombudspersons
overwhelmingly agreed that legal knowledge was more important than
medical knowledge.  All six agreed that a substantive knowledge of the
workers’ compensation system and the law that governs it was neces-
sary to be able to handle more than 75 percent of the issues that they
dealt with; some put the percentage at over 90 percent.  By contrast,
only two of the six said medical knowledge was necessary to the reso-
lution of 75 percent of the issues they handle. 
Nearly all of the ombudspersons said they spend much more of
their time providing information to workers than they do actually
resolving disputes. Estimates varied from an information:resolution
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ratio of 90:10 to a low of 50:50.  The centrality of information dissem-
ination as a key ombudsperson function was corroborated by an open-
ended question asking for the ombudspersons’ perceptions of their
three most important functions: all five ombudspersons who answered
the question listed the delivery of information to workers among those
three—the only common single factor cited.  Similarly, when asked to
order a list of eight functions by the frequency with which they are per-
formed, “providing information” was rated either first or second by
every ombudsperson.   However, the ombudspersons reported that they
still spend a considerable portion of their time resolving disputes. Even
then, the role of information is crucial, for as one ombudsperson noted,
“They often come in thinking they have a dispute when what’s really
going on is that they need more information, and when they get that
information, they realize that there’s no dispute.”  Questions regarding
the tardiness of compensation or reimbursement checks were cited as
an example.
The ombudspersons were asked to categorize the types of disputes
they deal with according to their perception of the percentage of their
total time spent in actual dispute resolution, using the following cate-
gories: injury date, arising out of employment/caused out of employ-
ment, medical, compensation including temporary or permanent
disability, liens, apportionment, and penalties. By far, the most com-
mon disputes requiring resolution were those relating to medical issues
and compensation, in that order. AOE/COE was a very distant third,
followed more distantly by injury date, and even more distantly by
penalties, liens, and apportionment. 
In all carve-outs, ombudspersons reported problems with handling
serious and willful claims and wrongful termination disputes.  Two
carve-outs delegated these issues to the statutory system for resolution.
When handled within ADR, two ombudspersons said they did not
directly handle these issues but recommended that the injured workers
consult with private attorneys, and two ombudspersons assisted the
workers with these claims but preferred that they be delegated to the
statutory system.  Ombudspersons also said they would be likely to
recommend that a worker consult an attorney if the ombudsperson sus-
pected that a third party could have liability.
Interviews with Ombudsmen 53
Mediation and Arbitration
There were too few mediations or arbitrations at the time of the
survey to provide meaningful analysis.6  The research team asked the
ombudspersons about the criteria they felt would be important in
selecting a mediator or arbitrator, whether the same neutral could serve
as a mediator and an arbitrator in the same case, whether they have
ever or would ever refuse to certify a case for mediation (and why), the
role the ombudspersons would play in the mediation and arbitration,
and about the record that would be available to the WCAB if the arbi-
tration were appealed.
Regarding criteria for the selection of mediators and arbitrators,
five of the six ombudspersons agreed that legal knowledge of the
workers’ compensation system was more important than medical
knowledge or knowledge of the mediation or arbitration process.  Five
of the six ombudspersons said their CBAs prohibited a mediator from
serving as an arbitrator in the same case; the sixth one said the neutral
could switch roles if both parties consented. 
Only two of the ombudspersons said they have refused to certify a
dispute for mediation—that is, acknowledge that the ombudsperson
process was unsuccessful and in most cases, take affirmative steps to
arrange the later proceedings.  One of those two said the denial had
been issued because the worker was seeking a remedy that the ombuds-
person did not believe was available in mediation or arbitration
because it was not provided for under the law of workers’ compensa-
tion. The other said the denial was issued because the complaints that
the workers sought to mediate were more in the nature of a personality
conflict with the ombudsperson than a substantive dispute that could be
mediated or arbitrated.  Two of the remaining four said they would not
do so under any circumstances, viewing the right of a worker to go to
mediation or arbitration as absolute.
All of the ombudspersons said they do or would play a role in
mediation7 and arbitration. Three of the five ombudspersons that have
mediation components in their ADR processes said they were responsi-
ble for setting up the mediations and arbitrations. Beyond that, there
was some variation among the additional roles that would be played.
Three of the ombudspersons said they would answer questions and
provide information or testimony at a mediation; the two others said
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they would not provide information or testimony.  Similarly, four of
the six said they would be willing to provide information and testi-
mony at arbitration,8 while the other two said they would not.
Determining the record for appeal to the WCAB was more difficult
for the ombudspersons because only two said they had actually had
disputes go this far into the process. As a result, two ombudspersons
said they did not know what record would be available for the WCAB
and a third guessed that there would be at least taped minutes, a written
decision, and briefing for WCAB review.  One of the two who had
arbitrations said the WCAB would receive a copy of the opinion, and
the other said the WCAB would be able to review the arbitrator’s deci-
sion and a reporter’s transcript of the arbitration hearing, if the tran-
script was ordered by the WCAB.  The sixth ombudsperson said the
WCAB would be able to review the arbitrator’s decision, the reporter’s
transcript, and the case files. 
The Role of Attorneys
The research team asked a series of questions intended to assess the
ombudspersons’ perception of the relationship between attorneys and
the carve-out ADR process.  All six ombudspersons said that in every
case they tell injured workers that they have the right to consult with an
attorney, including at the ombudsperson stage (where direct representa-
tion is prohibited by all agreements except that of the laborers).  Indeed,
all six ombudspersons reported that they affirmatively recommend, at
least sometimes, that the worker see an attorney—most often when the
ombudsperson perceives the possibility of a third-party claim, serious
and willful violation of a health or safety law, or a wrongful termination
claim. This willingness to make such an affirmative recommendation
included ombudspersons who were accountable to employers/agents as
well as those employed by the joint labor-management trusts. At the
same time, the ombudspersons overwhelmingly agreed that workers
rarely requested to be represented at the ombudsperson stage.   Four
ombudspersons said they had “never” received such a request.9
To the extent that the agreements prohibit direct representation at
the ombudsperson stage—and the ombudsperson interviews indicate
that attorneys tend to drop injured workers as clients when they learn
of the carve-out—three ombudspersons offered anecdotes to demon-
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strate how this prohibition can be honored in the breach.  These
ombudspersons said they viewed lawyers as having a positive effect on
the carve-out process when drawn in as collaborators rather than kept
at bay as enemies. One said he often relies on attorneys to help him
“get through to skeptical workers,” noting the attorney can be very
helpful in conveying information, and sometimes advice, to workers
who would distrust that information coming from the ombudsperson.
Similarly, another ombudsperson tries to make the attorney a “part of
the team that is trying to help the worker” and draws upon the attorney
not only for purposes of facilitating communication with workers but
also for strategic advice and, occasionally, direct intervention.  The
third calls upon lawyers to preserve workers’ rights, for example, hav-
ing a lawyer write a request for administrative penalties and interest
when there has been a presumptively unreasonable delay in delivering
benefits. 
Not all of the ombudspersons had such sanguine feelings toward
lawyers as they relate to ADR in carve-outs. Two ombudspersons,
including one with a legal background, viewed lawyers as harming the
carve-outs, either because the lawyers were trying to sign up workers
as clients in spite of their knowledge of the carve-outs or because of
legal attacks on the validity of the carve-out program as an institution.
Another ombudsperson, with a legal background, said lawyers had nei-
ther a positive nor a negative impact on the carve-out system.
Beyond the ombudsperson stage, the surveys indicate that attor-
neys are or would be involved in mediations and substantially involved
in arbitrations. Two of the six ombudspersons said they would encour-
age workers to be represented by counsel at mediation, and all six said
they would encourage the workers to be represented by counsel at the
arbitration stage.  Of the four carve-outs that have had disputes go
beyond the ombudsperson to mediation, two of the four ombudsper-
sons reported that the injured workers were represented in more than
75 percent of the mediations. 
Ombudspersons’ Perceptions of Larger Issues
The research team asked the ombudspersons for their perceptions
of several larger issues: 1) the three functions they performed that they
felt were most important, 2) the extent of the union’s knowledge and
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support of the carve-out program, 3) the comfort levels of the various
parties with the carve-out program, 4) their biggest frustration about
the carve-outs, and 5) ways they would improve the carve-out pro-
grams.
All five of the ombudspersons who answered the question listed
“providing information” among the most important functions they per-
form.  Three also listed advocacy or protection of the injured workers,
three listed facilitating communications among the parties, and three
listed fact finding or clarification. The functions included only once on
this list of most important functions were helping the injured worker to
select and get to a physician and facilitating general improvements to
the system.
The ombudspersons were generally critical of the unions’ level of
knowledge or understanding of the carve-out program.  Only one
described the unions as “very informed.”  Four of the other five
ombudspersons rated union knowledge or understanding of the carve-
outs as low, a dynamic also reflected in part in the ombudspersons’
perceptions of union comfort levels. Three of the six described their
perception of the union comfort with the carve-out in less than favor-
able terms, such as “disenchanted,” “resistant but warming,” and
“maybe a 20 percent comfort level.”  The other three suggested that the
unions they work with seemed “very comfortable” with the carve-outs.
Similar equivocation could be seen in the ombudspersons’ percep-
tions of employee comfort levels with the carve-out programs. Again,
three of six said they felt employees had high comfort levels with the
program, while the other three used more cautious language, ranging
from “low comfort” to “some like it, some don’t,” to “pretty good—for
every one who doesn’t like it, two do.”
Employers and insurers, on the other hand, were perceived to be
generally favorably disposed toward the carve-out programs. Five of
the six ombudspersons said they perceived employers to be either
“comfortable” or “very comfortable” with the carve-out programs; the
sixth described employers as “resistant initially, but warming.”
The ombudspersons expressed frustrations with external aspects of
the carve-outs.  Four of the six expressed frustration with various
aspects of the medical profession, including the slow turn-around of
medical reports, concerns over the quality of medical care that physi-
cians were willing to provide, and a frustration with the operation
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(indeed, in a few cases the very existence) of provider lists.  Other frus-
trations noted included WCAB inconsistency in handling workers’
compensation disputes that were filed in the statutory system, disputes
arising from carve-outs, the lack of uniformity among carve-out pro-
grams, and belligerence of some workers toward the ombudspersons.
ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY AND INTERVIEW DATA
The principal benefit of the ombudsperson programs, at least for
injured workers, is that it gives the workers ready access to information
and personal assistance in the resolution of problems arising from their
workplace injuries.  This helps to prevent the unnecessary escalation of
conflicts that are essentially information-based from maturing into, or
being recharacterized as, conflicts that are rights-based and therefore
costlier for both the stakeholders and the system.  The carve-outs cur-
rently in place must be seen as first generation programs, each with
features that are both redeeming and troubling.  When the best of the
programs are pulled together into a single vision, one can readily see
how the ombudsperson office has the exciting and unique potential to
provide comprehensive services to injured workers.  The ombudsper-
son can be a personal shepherd to guide individual workers through the
system from injury to settlement, a clearinghouse for medical and legal
information (including references to both doctors and attorneys as
appropriate), and, ultimately, an agent of change to improve health ser-
vices while minimizing conflicts and improving workplace safety and,
possibly, culture.  If realized, such potential would not only call for the
continuation of carve-out programs in the construction industry, but it
would encourage the expansion of their availability to other industries.
Carve-outs might also act as a template for focusing expansion of
information and assistance efforts by the regulatory agency in the stat-
utory system.
The carve-outs have a long way to go before attaining this high
ideal.  The surveys reveal several flaws that must be corrected before it
is even possible.  In particular, the carve-outs today operate with a
great propensity for conflicts of interest and without regard for confi-
dentiality, require specialized ombudsperson training well above cur-
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rent standards, and are hampered by significant legislative ambiguities.
These problems may be readily remedied and should be corrected
sooner rather than later, while these institutions are still in the early
stages of formation.
Backgrounds of the Ombudspersons
The research team did not feel that any particular educational back-
ground was necessary for an ombudsperson to be effective and there-
fore expressed no preference between the legal and medical
orientations seen among the current carve-out ombudspersons.  While
the ombudspersons’ perceptions of the relative importance of substan-
tive legal knowledge of workers’ compensation over medical knowl-
edge might suggest a preference in favor of legal backgrounds, specific
and ongoing training can meet any deficiencies that may arise from
either orientation.  In this regard, however, there is cause for concern.
Job-specific training is uneven at best among the carve-out ombudsper-
sons in each of the three major areas in which it would be expected:
workers’ compensation knowledge, medical knowledge, and dispute
resolution process knowledge.
Some ombudspersons had workers’ compensation training pre-
pared and taught exclusively by insurers or a source closely aligned
with a stakeholder in the carve-outs.  The concern is less with the qual-
ity of the instruction than it is with the bias that could be built into the
process of educating a party designated to perform a neutral role.
Plainly, medical information, legal standards, and the like are capable
of different interpretations, depending upon one’s orientation.  For
example, insurers and employers may have a different view of what
constitutes an appropriate temporary or permanent disability rating
than may an injured worker or applicant’s attorney. More neutral
sources of training should be identified or developed.
Training on medical and safety issues appears to be similarly
uneven.  Medical knowledge is constantly changing and, while the
ombudsperson’s role does not call for it to “second-guess” qualified
medical examiners, a better appreciation of the current state of medical
knowledge—particularly with respect to the kinds of injuries fre-
quently observed within their specific carve-outs—would surely help
ombudspersons understand the nature and quality of the medical treat-
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ment being performed on workers, as well as the reasonableness of the
positions being asserted by insurers, employers, and injured workers.
More training in safety techniques would sensitize ombudspersons to
current industry standards, which would be useful in helping them play
a more proactive role on injury prevention, as well as in identifying
possible serious and willful violations for purposes of advising workers
and negotiating with insurers and employers.  
There appears to be a systemic lack of training in the many differ-
ent dispute resolution functions that ombudspersons perform, including
training specific to ombudspersons: mediation, negotiation, advocacy,
and case management, just to name a few examples. This is cause for
particular concern, given that the ombudsperson’s primary role is in
dispute resolution, with both workers’ compensation and medical
knowledge being properly understood as necessary background knowl-
edge.  Dispute resolution has become a specialty unto itself, as evi-
denced by the many nuts-and-bolts training programs in negotiation
and dispute resolution that are now widely available to working profes-
sionals, as well as the many universities and law schools that now offer
graduate degrees and certifications in the field.  The differences among
techniques are substantial, and a working knowledge of these differ-
ences, as well as the special skills required of each, should be an inte-
gral part of an ombudsperson’s training and would surely enrich the
work that they perform.  In particular, specific ombudspersons training
would help them better understand and apply to carve-outs the histori-
cal role of the ombudsperson as watchdog and servant for “the system”
as well as dispute resolution facilitator and counselor.
Carve-out ombudspersons have systemic differences from many of
the characteristics of traditional organizational or classical (govern-
ment) ombudspersons.  One difference is advocacy. Organizational
ombudspersons, of which the carve-out ombudspersons would be clas-
sified, are discouraged by ethical codes from advocacy on behalf of a
party, while several carve-out ombudspersons tended to view advocacy
on behalf of injured workers as a central part of their responsibilities.
Confidentiality is yet another point of departure.  Where organizational
ombudspersons are discouraged from keeping case files—out of con-
cern that the confidential information learned by the ombudsperson
during the course of handling a problem could be used against a griev-
ant—carve-out ombudspersons not only keep them routinely, but many
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are willing to offer this information in both the mediation and arbitra-
tion contexts. 
Carve-out ombudspersons said they frequently mediated disputes;
yet, relatively few said they have had a single mediation training ses-
sion, much less exposure to the wide variety of approaches and methods
currently being used by today’s mediators.  Indeed, one might reason-
ably question whether ombudspersons are in fact performing a media-
tive function, given that the survey revealed few face-to-face meetings
between the parties or between the parties and the ombudsperson before
settlement.  Rather, the current model for mediation by ombudspersons
may be more accurately described as a shuttle negotiation in which the
ombudsperson/mediator serves as a buffer through which the parties
can communicate, rather than a true mediation in which the ombudsper-
son/mediator facilitates communication between the parties.
Mediation training would help ombudspersons understand the dif-
ferences between mediation and shuttle negotiation.  At the least, it
would help expose the carve-out ombudspersons to the special skills
required of a mediator (e.g., active listening, reframing of issues, man-
aging power imbalances), to understand the differences among media-
tion styles (e.g., facilitative versus evaluative, and joint session versus
caucus), and, appreciate the debates among other mediation profes-
sionals (e.g., whether the mediator is responsible for the substantive
content of the mediation agreement) so that they will be better able to
apply these understandings as appropriate to the carve-out context. 
By raising these issues, it is not being suggested that the carve-out
ombudspersons are malfeasant in their duties.  To the contrary, workers
appear to be relatively well served.  It is simply being suggested that the
ombudspersons are not completely fulfilling their potential as dispute
resolution providers.  A better understanding of the traditional duties,
functions, and skills of ombudspersons in general will help the carve-
out ombudspersons better understand the nature of their positions and
how to adapt those principles to the unique needs of ombudspersons in
workers’ compensation carve-outs.
Structure of the Employment Relationship
Independence is perhaps the greatest single attribute, and neces-
sity, for an ombudsperson since it protects neutrality (Wilner 1997).
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This independence is traditionally preserved through the structure of
the employment relationship.  Perhaps the most salient structural
dimension of neutrality and independence is that of institutional loca-
tion—that is, for whom the ombudsperson works, reports to, and is
accountable to. Organizational ombudspersons typically report to the
highest levels of management, often the president, chief executive
officer, or board of directors’ chair.  Because workers’ compensation
carve-out ombudspersons do not work within a single organizational
context but rather work with multiple organizations such as employers,
unions, and insurers—each of which is a stakeholder in the dispute res-
olution process—special care must be taken to assure the independence
of the ombudspersons.
The majority of the carve-outs address this problem structurally by
making the ombudsperson an employee or independent contractor of a
trust that is jointly administered by the major stakeholders—employers
and unions.  Two of the carve-outs do not follow this model: In one the
ombudsperson is employed by and accountable to the employer, while
in the other the ombudsperson is employed by and accountable to the
employer’s workers’ compensation insurance broker. The problem
could also be addressed by incorporating specific contractual protec-
tions for the ombudsperson—either in the CBA or in the individual
contract of employment—that would specify grounds and procedures
for promotion, discipline, and termination of the ombudsperson.
Absent specific contractual protection for ombudspersons,
employment under an employer/agent is fundamentally inconsistent
with the concept of neutrality and independence that is essential to the
integrity of the ombudsperson. As a legal matter, the ombudsperson of
an employer/agent is under a fiduciary duty to act in furtherance of the
interests of that employer/agent while not owing a similar fiduciary
duty to the injured worker.  As a more pragmatic matter, employees
tend to act in the best interests of their employers.  Therefore, such a
configuration creates a conflict of interest and is in violation of indus-
try ethics for ombudspersons.   The possibility exists for the delivery of
misinformation or omission of relevant information.
Similar concerns regarding conflicts arising from the employment
relationship focus on the fact that the carve-out ombudspersons have
substantial responsibilities other than their carve-out duties.  For exam-
ple, one full-time ombudsperson we studied spent part of his time mar-
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keting the program to other prospective unions and employers as what
may be called an “ombudsperson entrepreneur.”  Such a responsibility
creates an incentive to act in a way that makes the program seem
attractive. This can be inconsistent with the neutrality required of an
ombudsperson, because one of the primary justifications for employ-
ers, insurers, and unions is the belief that the program lowers costs.
Because lower costs can be found by reducing benefits, there is poten-
tial for the ombudsperson try to reduce the injured workers’ benefits.
Such an incentive could be exacerbated in a situation in which the
ombudsperson works for the employer/agent rather than a trust.
For part-time ombudspersons, the other sources of income can raise
the potential for conflicts.  For example, one part-time ombudsperson is
a partner in an applicants’ workers’ compensation law firm and repre-
sents only injured workers. The attorney duties may cause the insurer or
employer to doubt the neutrality of the ombudsperson.  However, such
a background can help balance an employee’s inherent lower bargain-
ing power and ensure the ombudsperson is knowledgeable and provides
information to injured workers. 
It is possible for these competing tensions to be addressed ade-
quately through the collective bargaining process.  The CBA between a
contractor and a union to name or otherwise accept an applicant’s
attorney as an ombudsperson would seem to operate to the benefit of
the injured worker by leveling the imbalance of power between the
parties.  Therefore, such an arrangement should be permissible as an
example of how the ombudsperson institution may be adapted to the
unique environment of workers’ compensation.  However, it could be
problematic if the ombudsperson was an attorney affiliated with a
workers’ compensation defense firm because such an ombudsperson
could dramatically exacerbate the inherent power imbalance between
the parties to the substantial detriment of the weaker party, the injured
worker.  This should not be permitted, as it could frustrate the workers’
compensation system’s goals of providing adequate compensation for
workplace injuries.  It could be argued that the union representation in
the bargaining over such an agreement would sufficiently protect the
rights of the individual worker, although the interests of union repre-
sentatives in a collective bargaining context can be at odds with those
of individual workers at times.
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These are three examples of conflicts that are readily identifiable
from the current carve-outs.  Others may arise, particularly as the
carve-outs mature.  But rather than engage in speculation, the research
team feels it prudent to alert the community to the possibility of con-
flicts so that it may be sensitive to these issues and the need for addi-
tional regulation as particular problems arise.  Beyond the concerns
raised by such conflicts of interest and their attendant threats to the
ombudsperson’s neutrality and independence, there appears at this time
to be little reason for concern in the employment relationships between
ombudspersons and stakeholders.  The ombudspersons were compen-
sated enough to reasonably assure an adequate allocation of time and
effort.  They also had access to sufficient support staff to be able to
accomplish their duties as ombudspersons.
General Functioning of Ombudspersons’ Offices
All six of the ombudspersons’ offices appear to function in a man-
ner that operates to the benefit of injured workers. Indeed, the institu-
tionalization of a person assigned to provide information and
assistance to the injured worker—in effect, to shepherd the injured
worker from injury to conflict resolution—may be the chief benefit of
the ADR programs for workers, even though the lack of training
among ombudspersons to date limits the ability of the ombudspersons’
function to reach its full potential in this regard.
Injured workers in the statutory system often lack basic informa-
tion and have difficulty getting assistance (Sum and Stock 1997).
These problems arose even for injured workers who were assisted by
an attorney. 
Quite the opposite effect may be seen in carve-outs.  Rather than
complaining about the lack of information, nearly every employee
interviewed said they were happy with the information made available
to them by the ombudspersons, as well as the dignity with which they
were treated by the ombudspersons.10   Indeed, they tended to be happy
with the overall process.  This is consistent with the ombudspersons’
own perceptions of the comfort level of the parties with the process and
is consistent with the findings of dispute satisfaction in other informal
methods of dispute resolution.   This particular process may have been
satisfactory to workers because it is information-oriented, highly
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responsive to workers, and is collaborative rather than adversarial in
nature.  The majority of reported problems apparently were resolved
with relative ease and on a schedule that operated to the convenience of
injured workers, rather than lawyers, doctors, or the courts.
The ombudsperson/worker relationship is crucial to the successful
operation of the ADR component of the carve-outs.  All six
ombudspersons said they spend at least half of their time simply
providing workers with information about their cases or about the
workers’ compensation or carve-out systems.   Most estimated that
number to be much higher, around 70 percent, and one said 90 percent.
All six ombudspersons cited the provision of information as one of the
most important functions they perform—the only common factor cited
by all of them.
Much of the information disseminated is routine information
regarding workers’ compensation or ADR processes.  In some cases,
however, the ombudspersons also provided information on medical
issues—helping workers select physicians from provider lists, inter-
preting “med-speak,” or sometimes making sure that the worker was
able to get to his or her medical appointment.  Similarly, in half the
carve-outs, the ombudspersons were also involved in the return-to-
work plan in cases of injuries involving modified work arrangements;
the two ombudspersons with medical orientations were more involved
in these arrangements, either participating in the drafting of the return-
to-work plan or overseeing its implementation.   The ombudspersons
were also able to get information from parties who—because of the
adversarial nature of the WCAB process—might be reluctant to pro-
vide information directly or in a timely fashion to workers, such as
claims adjusters, employers, and physicians.  The availability of such
information is significant, as the ombudspersons generally agreed that
more often than not workers wanted to know the answers to such ques-
tions as “where is my reimbursement check,” “what does this medical
report mean,” and “what are the next steps in my case.”  As several
ombudspersons reported, getting the right information and making it
available tends to solve a lot of the problems.  This may help provide
one reason why the ombudspersons said they were able to resolve most
matters and to do so quickly.  Many of the workers’ complaints in fact
were questions reflecting the workers’ lack of sophistication or infor-
mation that the ombudspersons could answer on their own or after
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some inquiry with an appropriate party on the worker’s behalf.  The
ability of ombudspersons to provide information to workers quickly
and personally, resolve information-based disputes quickly, serve as an
ongoing resource for the worker, and operate on a schedule convenient
to workers should be seen as a significant benefit of these programs for
injured workers. 
Nature of the Disputes Handled by Ombudspersons
To the extent that ombudspersons handled actual disputes, they
were primarily those relating to either medical issues or actual com-
pensation issues, followed very distantly by whether the injury in ques-
tion arose out of employment, date of injury, penalties, liens, and
apportionment.11 The medical issues were generally considered the
more difficult to resolve, in large part because of the delay in getting
access to medical reports and because of the inconsistency in medical
evaluations.  All but one ombudsperson refused to handle serious and
willful, wrongful termination violations, and third party claims, prefer-
ring to recommend that injured workers with those possible claims
consult with private counsel.
The research team does not view these results as surprising, given
the pervasiveness of medical- and compensation-related claims, medi-
cal office management practices, the disparity in views in medical
treatment, and the statutory ambiguity regarding the proper jurisdiction
for serious and willful, wrongful termination claims, and third-party
claims.  These findings, however, do underscore the need for training
and continuing education in the areas of workers’ compensation, medi-
cine, and safety.
Mediation and Arbitration
A troubling aspect of carve-outs was the willingness of the
ombudspersons to participate in the mediation and arbitration pro-
cesses as potential witnesses or providers of information or records.
While it is true that they cited desire to help injured workers as a rea-
son for their willingness to participate, the actual and potential prac-
tice of such participation raises serious questions about the
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confidentiality of the ombudsperson process and, ultimately, its integ-
rity and credibility. 
As an initial matter, uninhibited communication between the
ombudsperson and an injured worker about sensitive medical, legal,
and personal issues is often necessary to identify and resolve prob-
lems. It should not be inhibited by the possibility of disclosure by the
ombudsperson in a subsequent hearing. Moreover, it must be remem-
bered that the mediations and arbitrations at which the ombudspersons
said they would provide information and testimony occur after the
ombudspersons’ own efforts have failed. It is plausible that any frus-
trations or disappointments experienced by the ombudsperson could
color perception of the facts and, as testimony from a neutral who pre-
viously attempted to resolve the dispute, unduly influence mediation
or arbitrations. 
For these reasons, confidentiality is considered by professional
ombudspersons in other contexts to be “the bedrock upon which all
ombudspersons programs are built” (Howard and Gulluni 1996).
Breaches of this confidentiality at the more formal levels of dispute
resolution can undermine the attractiveness of the program as a safe
place to discuss personal matters, in addition to the ombudsperson’s
credibility as a confidential resource within the carve-out. Legitimate
questions may be raised about whether confidentiality in workers’
compensation carve-outs should be as unyielding as it is in other con-
texts, such as the general refusal of most ombudspersons to maintain
records. However, disclosing information, which was reasonably
expected to be confidential, in the more formalized dispute resolution
proceedings that take place after failure of the ombudsperson’s efforts
can threaten to subvert the credibility of the programs.  
The Role of Attorneys
One goal of carve-outs is to reduce employees’ use of attorneys.
Such a reduction can lead to savings in cost and time, but can also lead
to a number of problems (Ozurovich 1997). 
Employees’  rights
One concern is that the carve-outs’ ADR structure violates
employees’ rights.  In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (415 U.S. 36
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1974) the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a union generally may not
collectively bargain away the rights of individual workers to bring a
statutory discrimination claim before a public court or administrative
agency.  While the ruling is ambiguous on the question, many practic-
ing lawyers view the case as permitting a statutory discrimination
claim to be brought under the collectively bargained ADR mechanism,
to be handled in a public law process involving both administrative and
judicial forums, or both.
The validity of Alexander was called into question by a more
recent Supreme Court ruling, Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson-Lane Corp.
(500 U.S. 20 1991), upholding the mandatory arbitration of an Age
Discrimination in Employment Act claim in a non-collective bargain-
ing context.  If by implication Gilmer overruled Alexander, employers
and unions would be free to include statutory discrimination claims
within the scope of mandatory ADR mechanisms, such as the Califor-
nia workers’ compensation carve-out ADR processes, thus barring
individual workers from filing such claims in a court of law.  The U.S.
Supreme Court has acknowledged this tension between the two cases,
but appears reluctant to overrule Alexander, and has cited the case with
approval since Gilmer (Wright v. Universal Maritime Services Corp.
1998).
In the only California Court of Appeal decision on the workers’
compensation carve-outs to date, the appeals court rejected a broad
constitutional and statutory challenge to the validity of the carve-outs
by the applicants’ attorney bar, in Costa v. Workers’ Compensation
Appeal Board, 65 Cal.App.4th 1177 (1998).  In particular, the court of
appeals held that compelling workers into the multi-step carve-out
ADR process did not constitute an unconstitutional “incumbrance” to
the constitutionally compelled system of workers’ compensation.
To the contrary, the court said the constitutional provision was
merely intended to “remove any doubt about the constitutionality of
the workers’ compensation legislation, not to limit the Legislatures’
authority to enact additional appropriate legislation to protect employ-
ees,” such as legislation authorizing the carve-out structure.  The court
also specifically rejected an argument that Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver, as applied in California (Torrez v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp. 1997), mandates invalidation of carve-outs.  The court again
relied on the legislature’s plenary power over workers’ compensation,
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and noted that the carve-out in issue (IBEW/NECA) specifically autho-
rized claims for workers’ compensation benefits to be filed—initially
in the carve-out with a right of the worker to appeal to the statutory
system.
Costa suggests that California’s courts are likely to uphold their
general validity.  However, many questions regarding their specific
scope and application may still require judicial resolution.  By giving
the employee the power to decide whether to proceed to the next phase
or tier of the carve-out ADR process, including a right of appeal to the
public statutory system, the carve-out agreements negotiated by the
employers and the unions appear to operate within the zone of author-
ity recognized by Alexander v. Gardner-Denver.  Workers reserve pub-
lic law rights, albeit subject to the completion of certain procedural
steps (completing the ombudsman, mediation, and arbitration phases).
However, limitations to this power of the workers—such as the refusal
of an ombudsman or an employer to permit an employee to proceed to
mediation, arbitration, or to appeal back into the statutory system if
dissatisfied with the ombudspersons’ efforts—could raise serious legal
questions under the doctrine of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver.
Practical issues
Another concern is what procedures apply if an injured worker
experiences problems after the expiration of the carve-out.  In addition,
questions remain about advising workers on the proper determination
of average weekly wages, vocational rehabilitation eligibility and ben-
efits, applicable penalties, and other benefits and damages that might
be available outside the workers’ compensation system (for example,
the applicability of other state and federal laws, such as the federal
Equal Pay Act).
Rule of law
The general relationship between the law and the informal dispute
resolution processes in the carve-outs is unclear. Under principles of
informal dispute resolution processes, there is no relationship because
positive law standards do not necessarily apply in ombudsperson pro-
cesses, mediations, or arbitrations.  The workers’ compensation carve-
outs are unique entities in that they only partially privatize the ADR
process because they provide for appeal from arbitration to the WCAB.
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In this context, carve-outs may be viewed as being similar to the non-
binding court-annexed arbitration and mediation programs established
by the California Legislature or by local court rules.12  Thus, the carve-
outs could arguably be seen as governmental in nature and therefore
subject to such constitutional requirements as due process and public
access to hearings (Reuben 1997).
Under current law, however, that is an unlikely result because the
carve-outs are merely authorized by statute and actually created as a
matter of volitional contractual choice through collective bargaining.13
Therefore, the informal dispute resolution processes would only be
subject to public law standards to the degree that the authorizing legis-
lation, California Labor Code Section 3201.5, compels or the CBA
itself delineates.  Unfortunately, the statute gives little guidance in this
regard, providing only that the carve-outs may not result in a diminu-
tion of compensation, and says little about how that broad principle is
to be implemented. The carve-out agreements themselves are uni-
formly silent on rule of law issues.14
Similarly, the legislative and collective bargaining silence also
raises serious questions about the relationship between the rule of law
that guides the WCAB system and the informal process that is arbitra-
tion or the degree of deference that WCAB should give arbitration
awards.  For example, would an arbitration decision that ignored the
presumption of correctness of a medical report be subject to reversal by
the WCAB on that ground? Under the standard law of arbitration, the
answer would be no. Arbitrators are not bound to apply substantive
law, and their awards are generally not subject to substantive review.
On the other hand, if the nature of review of arbitration awards was less
deferential, then it would appear to be reversible on substantive
grounds, in this example, for failure to apply the presumption upon
review.  Because the statute calls for arbitration awards in carve-outs to
be treated in the same manner as the decision of a workers’ compensa-
tion judge, as a Request for Reconsideration, it is probable that the
WCAB would request formal clarification of the arbitrator’s reasoning.
If it did not include the presumption, and the presumption in fact
should have been employed, the arbitration decision would likely be
reversed and remanded on substantive grounds.  Greater clarification
of what, if any, substantive and procedural workers’ compensation law
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applies during the arbitration, and the standards to be applied by the
reviewing court, would ease this problem.
Attorney fees
Finally, but only by way of example, the statute is silent on the
availability of attorney fees for counseling during the ombudsperson
and sometimes mediation phases, where workers may consult attorneys
but may not have formal representation.  The availability of compensa-
tion is an integral part of the right to counsel.  The applicant’s bar is
concerned that the current structure does not provide the financial
incentive necessary to ensure that injured workers in carve-outs have
access to quality representation.  Existing law would appear to permit
the establishment of compensation systems established by contract,
either through the CBAs or in private contractual arrangements
between applicant’s attorneys and individual injured workers.  To the
extent there is currently confusion over this question, such authoriza-
tion should be made explicit. 
Problems in practice
In the survey of ombudspersons, they suggested that the relation-
ship between attorneys and carve-outs is more complex and nuanced in
practice than at the policy level and even then is in only the early stages
of formation.  This may suggest that the workers may be more inter-
ested in getting their problems resolved than in maximizing their legal
rights.  All six ombudspersons said that it was rare for a worker to
request to be represented by counsel at the ombudsperson stage.  They
said workers tend to understand that this is an early phase, and they
attempt to resolve the problems informally and without the interven-
tion of lawyers.   Several ombudspersons stressed that many injured
workers just want to get back to work and put the whole matter behind
them.  This perspective seemed to be corroborated in the injured
worker interviews.  Nearly all said the ombudspersons’ process served
them well, without regard to legal standards.
This point of view cannot be said to be uniform among all injured
workers because most ombudspersons reported being contacted by
attorneys purporting to represent injured workers.15  Moreover, all
ombudspersons reported that they perceived some workers had con-
sulted with an attorney during the ombudsperson stage.  More telling,
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however, is that several Applications for Adjudication of Claim were
filed by workers despite the existence of the ADR systems.16 
The ombudspersons uniformly said they would recommend that
the worker consult with a lawyer if they detected the possibility of a
third-party claim, a wrongful termination claim, a serious and willful
claim, or a case involving future medical needs.  In this regard, at least
two ombudspersons said they would regularly send workers to specific
firms in such situations and, as noted previously, a third ombudsperson
made such recommendations in open defiance of the employer’s pref-
erence not to raise such options to injured workers.  Similarly, while
two of the six ombudspersons said they would not necessarily recom-
mend that a worker be represented by counsel at a mediation, all six
agreed they would make such a recommendation at the arbitration
stage.  However, there were several troubling reported instances of
workers going into a mediation or arbitration without representation,
while the employer or insurer was represented.
Finally, but critically, several ombudspersons said they did not
view attorneys as necessarily excluded from the carve-out process.
Several expressed a willingness to work with attorneys to help injured
workers at the ombudsperson stage, viewing them as possible partners
in the furtherance of the rights of the injured workers.  In this way, the
prohibition on direct representation of workers before the ombudsper-
sons can be “honored in the breach.”  Similarly, two of the ombudsper-
sons said lawyers can help ADR processes in carve-outs because they
might be able to be more effective in developing a strategy to help the
injured workers or in helping them understand the sometimes unfortu-
nate realities of their cases.17
OMBUDSPERSONS’ FRUSTRATIONS 
AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Predictably, ombudspersons were reluctant to criticize the system.
However, several themes alluded to in the foregoing discussion surfaced
again in this portion of the survey.  In particular, several ombudspersons
cited various frustrations with medical providers, noting that it was dif-
ficult to get reports in a timely manner.  They said they would welcome
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a rule compelling medical providers to do so. Frustration was also
expressed about the reticence of doctors, jaded by prior experience with
unpaid workers’ compensation claims to provide comprehensive medi-
cal reports.  The ombudspersons called for greater education of the med-
ical profession in this regard. One ombudsperson went so far as to
suggest the elimination of the provider list altogether, a view echoed by
several others.
On the legal side of the carve-outs, there was considerable frustra-
tion with the ambiguity of the statute, particularly as it applied to juris-
diction over wrongful termination and serious and willful claims.
Applicants’ attorneys were criticized for their ongoing efforts to fight
the carve-outs rather than work with them. Similarly, unions were also
criticized for their lack of knowledge on the ADR components of the
carve-outs.
DISCUSSION
The ombudspersons working for carve-outs in California come
from a variety of backgrounds without uniform training for their jobs.
There is a dichotomy in their experience with many coming from either
medical or legal backgrounds.  Medical backgrounds appear suited for
large construction projects at a single site because the ombudsperson
can perform a triage role and evaluate the need for medical treatment.  
Even the ombudspersons with medical training were not perform-
ing true disability case management.  Case management typically
involves integrating medical care, rehabilitation, return to work, and
many other elements.  Ombudspersons tried to help injured workers
navigate the workers’ compensation system, but their role was not
designed to address the many other service providers a seriously
injured worker can encounter. 
The lack of specific training to serve as an ombudsperson is a trou-
bling aspect of carve-outs.  Uniform criteria for training in the medical
and legal arenas of workers’ compensation could reduce the potential
for injured workers to be misinformed of their rights.  We found no
evidence that workers were made worse off by their interactions with
the current ombudspersons; in fact, workers appear to be better off than
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they would be in the state run system.  However, the potential remains
for serious problems without greater specificity of the duties, responsi-
bilities, hiring practices, and training of ombudspersons.
Notes
1. At least one lawyer-ombudsperson insisted on working for the trust as a condition
of employment.
2. One performs “administrative oversight” and serves as an ombudsperson on
another project; another performs public relations, educational, and evaluative
duties for the program and the trust; the third performs public relations and educa-
tional functions.  It should be noted that all three full-time and one part-time
ombudspersons spent time working on procedures, manuals, and other publica-
tions that serve the program.
3. One of these two legally oriented ombudspersons actually changed this practice
from a more reactive model to a more proactive approach during the course of the
study.
4. All ombudspersons reported that they believed the workers received information
about workplace injuries from their employers at the time of hiring, consistent
with the employers’ statutory obligations.
5. One ombudsperson, however, said he once issued an order directing an insurer to
take a certain action because the company was being difficult in negotiations.
The insurer reportedly dismissed it summarily.
6. Only three ombudspersons reported that they had cases move to mediation or
arbitration: one had 15 mediations and 15 arbitrations, a second had five media-
tions and no arbitrations, the third had four mediations and one arbitration.  One
project had actually eliminated the mediation phase of its dispute resolution pro-
cess as an accommodation to disgruntled applicant’s attorneys, replacing it with a
Joint Labor Management Safety Committee chaired by the ombudsperson.
7. In the project with the Joint Labor Management Safety Committee, the ombuds-
person chairs the committee, explains the dispute to the committee, and serves as
an advocate for the injured worker.
8. One limited this availability to the employer.
9. These comments should be considered within the context of comments from the
interviews with injured workers.  Most workers, at least during the initial phase of
their claims, understood the carve-out to prohibit representation by an attorney.
10. Surely, the sampling of workers was arguably biased, in that the research team
was dependent upon stakeholders to provide us with names of injured workers to
contact.  A more random sampling could lead to different results.
11. One ombudsperson reported a high instance of wrongful termination disputes, 70
percent of that carve-out’s overall disputes.
12. See, for example, California Civil Procedure Code §1141, et seq. (requiring that
civil cases worth less than $50,000 be arbitrated as a condition for trial).
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13. Id.
14. California Labor Code  §3201.5 (b) provides: “Nothing in this section shall allow
a collective bargaining agreement that diminishes the entitlement of an employee
to compensation payments for total or partial disability, temporary disability,
vocational rehabilitation, or medical treatment fully paid by the employer as oth-
erwise provided in this division.  The portion of any agreement that violates this
subdivision shall be declared null and void.
15. In fact, one attorney was reported by an ombudsperson to be particularly aggres-
sive in soliciting business from injured workers, leading the ombudspersons to
ask the union to persuade the attorney to cease the practice, a request with which
the union complied.
16. The research team assumes that such Applications for Adjudication of Claims
were filed in ignorance of, or in defiance of, the ADR provisions of the carve-
outs.
17. By contrast, two ombudspersons had no opinion regarding the impact of lawyers
on the carve-outs, while two had a negative opinion, citing repeated challenges to
the carve-outs by the applicant’s bar, as well as the efforts of some attorneys to
recruit clients despite the existence of the carve-outs.
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Eastside Reservoir Project 
Carve-Out
The Eastside Reservoir Project (ESRP) is an effort of the Metro-
politan Water District (MWD) of Southern California to construct a
reservoir in the Diamond and Domenigoni Valleys, near Hemet, Cali-
fornia. It is a $2 billion project, the largest construction project in the
Western United States, and will take five years to complete. Once built,
the reservoir will double the freshwater storage capacity in Southern
California.
The ESRP PLA is between the project owner and multiple unions
and covers the several hundred contractors and subcontractors on the
project. The PLA contains an ADR program for the resolution of work-
ers’ compensation issues. The project’s owner also covers workers’
compensation and liability insurance for all contractors and subcon-
tractors (known as a “wrap-up” or owner controlled insurance pro-
gram, OCIP).  
HISTORY OF THE ESRP CARVE-OUT
The ESRP carve-out emerged as a result of a belief shared by the
national and state building trades and the MWD that the ESRP was the
ideal situation for a PLA involving an ADR process (Gallagher 1997).
The most important motivation for the owner to operate under a PLA
was to avoid problems surrounding contracting with the multiple trades
over time.  Each trade has a separate contract with renegotiation dates
that are staggered over the duration of the project.  The Eastside Reser-
voir would be under construction for five years, and most contracts in
the building trades last three years.  Therefore, the primary goal was to
avoid disruptions in the construction schedule.1
Several participants to the negotiation indicated that setting up a
carve-out arrangement  was the deciding factor for MWD to negotiate
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a PLA.  In 1993, California removed the prohibition on public agencies
assuming the risk associated with workers’ compensation under an
umbrella policy covering contractors and subcontractors on a public
project, that is, arranging insurance as an OCIP.   Assuming the work-
ers’ compensation and liability risk on a project allows the owner to
avoid inclusion of these costs in the budgets of contractors and subcon-
tractors on which the contractors’ overhead is based.  Also, since large
projects tend to be safer than the average risk, the project owner might
be able to negotiate lower premium rates for the same risk profile
among contractors.  However, choosing an OCIP arrangement meant
assuming the risk for related losses.  The use of a PLA allowed for the
inclusion of a carve-out arrangement.  On the basis of discussions with
their broker (Sedgewick of California) and representatives of the
National Building Trades, MWD believed that substantial savings on
workers’ compensation costs could be achieved by using a carve-out
arrangement (Gallagher 1997; Uehlein 1997; Goerz and Sedgewick
1997).  Previous experiences using PLAs and carve-outs, like the con-
struction of the Trans Alaska Pipeline and the Pioneer Valley Project in
Massachusetts, encouraged this approach.
On the employer side, Larry Gallagher (Risk Manager to MWD)
believed that the workers’ compensation carve-out process had the
potential to lower costs. He realized that it had to be implemented in
the context of a CBA or a PLA.  The water district had no experience
with PLAs, so there was some reticence to get involved in union agree-
ments or PLAs.  The expectation of cost savings in workers’ compen-
sation premiums, combined with a no strike clause helped convince the
project owner to implement the ADR in the context of a PLA.2  Gal-
lagher’s initial estimates of cost savings for the ADR were in the 25–30
percent range, although he knew that there was great uncertainty about
that figure.  According to the MWD as of August 1997, the actual cost
saving has been in the expected range.
The National as well as State Building Trades union leaders were
very much in favor of carve-out programs. They originally brought the
concept to the attention of Mr. Gallagher and the MWD (Uehlein 1997;
Balgenorth 1997).  This favorable attitude strongly facilitated the set-
ting up of the carve-out and the negotiation of other areas of the PLA.
From the unions’ perspective, carve-outs had the potential to bring
down the cost of union labor because of reduced workers’ compensa-
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tion premiums.  In addition, PLAs had the potential to restrict competi-
tion with nonunion labor for jobs on the project because workers can
only be covered by a carve-out if they are union members.  The water
district is a public entity and was thus required to pay the prevailing
wage to all workers on the project, and the prevailing wage was the
union scale. This took wages out of competition.  All else being equal,
the owner would prefer the carve-out arrangement if restricting non-
union labor led to cost savings on workers’ compensation insurance
premiums.
Once the MWD chose the construction management contractor and
the insurance broker for the project, negotiations began with local
unions to set up a carve-out.  In September 1994 all parties signed the
PLA for the ESRP that contained an ADR system and allowed for a
specific list of medical providers and vocational rehabilitation profes-
sionals.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ESRP CARVE-OUT
In addition to the project owner (MWD), the carve-out has many
different participants.
Project Contractor
The water district hired Southern California Associates, a joint
venture of Harza Engineering Company of California and The Parsons
Corporation, to provide construction management support services.
Southern California Associates is the legal successor of ARB Inc., the
original signatory of the PLA. The project contractor executes the PLA
and monitors the compliance with the agreement by all parties
involved, in particular by the contractors and subcontractors to the
project.
Unions 
A number of unions and union organizations signed the PLA,
including the Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-
CIO, the Building and Construction Trades Council of California, the
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Building and Construction Trades of San Bernardino and Riverside
Counties, and 17 affiliated local unions.
Insurance Providers
The insurance broker is a joint venture of Sedgewick of California
Inc. and Dickerson Insurance Services. This joint venture acts as the
broker for insurance of all risks involved with the project. The insur-
ance broker marketed the project with individual insurance companies
for bids on different risks involved on the project. Ultimately all insur-
ance under the OCIP was carried by ITT Hartford Specialty Risk Ser-
vices.  The water district and each individual contractor are separately
insured under the umbrella of the OCIP.
ITT Hartford/Specialty Risk Services is the workers’ compensa-
tion insurer and claims administrator.  The company was selected
through a competitive process by Sedgewick of California and the
MWD from among four workers’ compensation insurance companies
(Gallagher 1997).  Among the main reasons for selecting this firm were
its experience,3 good reputation, and its willingness to significantly cut
the workers’ compensation insurance premium if a carve-out process
was implemented. Hartford offered a 25 percent discount on the pre-
mium for the inclusion of the carve-out arrangements (Lott 1997).  As
the policy included a very large deductible, the project owner was
largely self-insuring the project.  Thus, the 25 percent discount on
Hartford’s premium represented less than a 25 percent cut in all work-
ers’ compensation costs.
Construction Contractors
There were over 200 contractors and subcontractors on the East-
side project, and the number fluctuated with the different stages of the
project.  They were all covered under the same workers’ compensation
insurance policy.  All construction contractors and subcontractors
involved in the project were required to agree to the ADR system and
to the rules governing the hiring of construction labor through the local
labor council’s referral system.
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Construction Contractor Employees
The PLA set out rules describing who could work as an employee
of a construction contractor involved in performing, monitoring, or
overseeing the work covered by the agreement. The PLA established a
job referral system by which contractors could hire up to 15 percent of
the total crew per craft from a contractor’s “core” employees
(Domenigoni Valley Reservoir PLA; Article III, Section 10).  The
remaining employees were hired from the local union’s hiring hall out-
of-work list for the various crafts. There were about 700–1,500 work-
ers on the project at any time.  The PLA also established an agreement
by both sides to forego strikes and lockouts  (DVRPL, Article VI, Sec-
tion 1).
Joint Labor-Management Workers’ Compensation Committee
The PLA established a Joint Workers’ Compensation Committee,
which met quarterly to oversee the carve-out (DVRPLA, Article XII,
Section 6.a).  The power of the committee was exercised through the
agreement of the union and contractor parties, with each party having
one vote. The project construction management contractor designated
no more than five contractor representatives, and each local union or
district council signatory was able to appoint a representative (but no
more than one per trade): The signatory State and Local Building
Trades Councils also had one representative. The ombudsperson and
representatives of the owner, carrier, and/or providers of medical care
were available to attend the committee meetings and furnish informa-
tion as requested by the committee. 
The parties were empowered to jointly designate and remove,
under the auspices of the committee: 1) a list of authorized health care
providers and medical evaluators to provide all medical treatment and
evaluation, 2) organizations which may be affiliated with the preferred
health care provider, to provide prescription medicine, 3) an authorized
list of vocational rehabilitation evaluators/service organizations, medi-
ators, and 4) arbitrators.
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Safety Committee
The PLA established a Joint Safety Committee as a subcommittee
of the Joint Workers’ Compensation Committee. The project construc-
tion management contractor and the unions each designated five repre-
sentatives to sit on this committee, which was jointly chaired by the
site safety representative of the project contractor and an official of the
signatory local Building Trades Council appointed by the union. The
safety committee received reports on safety programs instituted by the
owner, the project contractor, and the individual contractors on the
project site and discussed and advised the parties to the PLA with
regard to recommended safety programs and procedures (DVRPLA,
Article XII, Section 6.b).  This committee met regularly each month
and was an integral part of the overall project safety effort.
Authorized Providers
As of November 1997, the authorized list of medical providers
included the Community Care Network, which included a large num-
ber of medical providers throughout California. This provider network
was selected by the insurer, Hartford, in conjunction with the owner,
MWD. Hartford then negotiated a pricing agreement for services pro-
vided by the Community Care Network.  According to Hartford, they
were able to obtain savings relative to usual charges because the lim-
ited provider list available for all medical treatment for the life of the
claim meant Community Care Network could expect to maintain con-
trol of patients for longer periods than under the standard workers’
compensation arrangements (Lott 1997).  Participating members
agreed to the established charges.
In addition, each union was allowed to include its Health Benefit
Trust preferred provider network as authorized medical providers.
Each union had one or more HMO preferred provider networks (often
including Kaiser). This resulted in an extensive list of medical provid-
ers who worked within managed care organizations.  It also meant that
workers were likely to have access to their regular treating physician
for occupational injuries and illnesses. 
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Ombudsperson
The ombudsperson was selected by the insurance broker,
Sedgewick of California, after review of the applicant’s qualifications
by the Joint Workers’ Compensation Committee. According to the
PLA, the person appointed was required to have the minimum follow-
ing qualifications: five years of work experience with knowledge of the
workers’ compensation laws and familiarity with workers’ compensa-
tion claims and case management and/or experience and certification
in occupational health practice.  In addition, the person could not have
had a prior employment relationship with any party to the agreement,
the owner, the owner’s insurance broker, or the insurance carrier, or
with any direct affiliate of these organizations or of a party to the
agreement. The ombudsperson was required to be available at reason-
able times, upon reasonable notice, at the project site for the conve-
nience of the employees. The ombudsperson is employed and
compensated by the insurance broker, Sedgewick of California. The
duties of the ombudsperson are part time and the ombudsperson is
responsible for management of Sedgewick of California operations at
the site.
Mediator and Arbitrator
The mediator for any dispute was selected in rotation from a per-
manent panel of five mediators, established by joint agreement of the
parties. The arbitrator for any dispute was selected in rotation from a
permanent panel of five arbitrators, established by joint agreement of
the parties. All arbitrators were retired workers’ compensation judges
who were compensated by the insurance carrier.
OUTCOMES AT THE CARVE-OUT
In what follows, we present views on the conduct and performance
of the various parties involved in the carve-out.  These included the
owners, contractors and subcontractors, unions, broker, insurer/claims
administrator, ombudsperson, and a subset of injured workers who had
complex disputes.  
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Goals
We interviewed numerous participants on the owner’s side of the
carve-out, and they identified expected cost savings as the main moti-
vation to setting up a carve-out.  Reference was often made to the expe-
rience of the Pioneer Valley Project in Massachusetts.  The water
district originally estimated losses to be 55 percent of the expected
losses for similar projects, for savings of $11 million.4  Because the
insurance policy for the project would have a large deductible, these
savings would be realized directly to the MWD. 
For the unions, the carve-out strengthened their argument for a
restrictive policy towards nonunion labor, even when nonunion
employers won contracts.  The unions negotiated a restriction to no
more than 15 percent nonunion labor for nonunion contractors, the
lowest level consistent with labor laws.  In addition, because all work-
ers in a carve-out are required to be union members, even nonunion
“core” employees of nonunion contractors were required to establish
nominal union membership.  These “temporarily unionized workers”
and/or their employers paid dues and contributed to the Health and
Welfare Trust and Pension Funds.  This arrangement is the model
adopted almost verbatim by several later carve-outs (Inland Feeder
Pipeline, Los Vaqueros Reservoir, and UC Berkeley’s Lawrence Liv-
ermore Laboratory’s National Ignition Facility). 
During our interviews, the owner, unions, and broker/insurer
expressed satisfaction with the carve-out.  In the following section we
present different issues on which parties commented concerning the
evolution and functioning of the carve-out.
Alternate Dispute Resolution Processes
The owner, general contractors, and insurance broker all saw that
eliminating lawyers from the initial stages of a workers’ compensation
claim was a major advantage.  They expected the ombudsperson, per-
ceived as a neutral party, to reduce litigation costs. The model used at
the Eastside project was for the ombudsperson to call all injured work-
ers as soon as possible after their injury to help with questions of medi-
cal treatment and other benefits.  The owners saw this issue as
particularly relevant because they felt, “The problem which causes
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workers to seek attorneys is related to one of two things: either the
employee doesn’t have proper medical care or the claims unit of the
insurance company is not timely in making their payments.  The
ombudsman can take care of both of these things” (Gallagher 1997).
Lawyers are not allowed to be involved at the ombudsperson stage
nor can they speak for the injured worker during mediation. At the
same time, workers can hire a lawyer and the lawyer can be present at
any conference or hearing.  In practice, this policy has acted as a pro-
scription against the presence of lawyers at mediation.
In the negotiation of the PLA, labor was not in favor of this formal
limitation on attorney involvement.  Union negotiators argued workers
would go to lawyers only when they think that there has been unfair
treatment.  So, the option to allow a lawyer at the different stages of the
ADR process would be valuable, even though it would be seldom used.
The then-president of the Laborers’ Union Local was troubled by
the limitation on lawyers and aggressively pushed workers from any
union to go to an attorney. However, according to the current president
of the Laborers’ local, “The Laborers have done a 180 degree about-
face on the carve-out . . . .  Now we feel that the ombudsperson is doing
a really good job” (Bell 1998).
Injured workers interviewed appeared well informed about the lim-
itation on attorney participation and how to obtain access to an attorney
when needed. Every worker we interviewed was unaware they were
covered by a carve-out at the time they were injured. They relied upon
the ombudsperson and their local union to provide them with informa-
tion about the ADR process.  In most cases, the ombudsperson initiated
the contact, informing the worker of the processes related to their
claims. 
The reduction in attorney involvement accelerated time frames
dictated by the ADR addendum, and the proactive approach of the
ombudsperson was expected to speed up claims resolution.  The
ombudsperson was expected to resolve most problems quickly, either
through better information or negotiation between the parties.  This
and the proscription against lawyers during the early stages of dispute
resolution were expected to resolve many disputes.  The remaining




Sharlene Horn was appointed as the ombudsperson.  She holds a
degree in psychology, is a registered nurse, and has run her own voca-
tional rehabilitation firm. Horn has also taken and was still taking
classes on insurance, largely through the Insurance Educational Asso-
ciation.
Horn contacts the injured workers as soon as possible after an
injury, at least all disabling injuries.  She sees this as a major strength
of the ADR program, “I think it’s a great program because the injured
party knows a half hour after they’re injured what to expect.  They
know right away that I am the person that they can come to as their rep-
resentative.  I think that is a big strength of the program.  The other
strength is that Metropolitan has given me authorization to go outside
the workers’ compensation benefits and provide additional benefits, lit-
tle minor things, that in the long run save a lot of money, but keep an
individual happy and gets them back to work quicker.  For example,
workers on the project are from all over the country and often living in
motels or apartments and without local family.  We have provided pet
care until a family member arrived, work boots following foot injuries
to assist with quicker return to work, extra clothing when there has
been clothing cut away in the ER, transportation services not covered
under workers’ compensation, and on occasions a waiver of the 3-day
waiting period for temporary disability in unusual circumstances.  We
have also gone outside the approved list of providers when it was in the
best interest of the injured worker or on attorney request” (Horn 1997).
Horn says she was attracted to this position because it would com-
bine her knowledge of the workers’ compensation system with her
medical training.  Horn says about the job, “You really do need to have
good negotiation skills, because the goal is to try to resolve issues
yourself, prior to going to mediation, and I do that quite frequently . . .
you have to be able to really walk a fine line sometimes.  Sometimes,
when I am obligated to tell an employee, you have the possibility of a
serious and willful claim [i.e., a case when the employer is liable for
higher penalties due to willfully negligent safety behavior], it can cause
repercussions from the employers and carrier.  The insurance company
is saying, ‘Why did you tell them that,’ and the employer is saying,
‘Why did you tell them that?’ That is my role to make sure that all
Eastside Reservoir Project Carve-Out 85
injured workers know their benefits. You have to be able to recognize
those fine parts of the labor code and not be afraid to offend any of the
parties because the first obligation is to the injured worker.”
It was common to see this tension between the neutrality of the role
as ombudsperson and the protection of the rights of the workers who
are often poorly informed about the workers’ compensation system.
Ms. Horn was comfortable saying in the same paragraph of a discus-
sion, “I am a neutral party” and “I am an advocate for the worker.”  At
least in her experience, these were not contradictory statements. 
Each respondent among the owner, insurer, broker, and union lead-
ers (other than the Laborers’ Union) showed a high degree of satisfac-
tion with the ombudsperson. All agree that the medical background
improved “case management” (meaning here management of all dis-
putes, not complete medical case management).  However, several
observers were concerned that the legislation did not impose any restric-
tion or qualifications on being an ombudsperson, and among the injured
workers interviewed, there was a mixed reaction to the ombudsperson.
One respondent felt she was too close to the owner and another thought
he was given bad advice about his case. 
Issues concerning the ADR process
The Eastside project experienced what all parties perceived as a
high level of disputes about wrongful terminations of injured workers
(violations of Section 132(a)).  The explanation for this was variously
attributed to a single difficult employer, aggressive participation by the
ombudsperson in making all options clear to injured employees, a spe-
cific problem union, and a second union’s aggressive business agent.
All of these explanations are consistent with the problems experienced
at the Eastside project. 
There was a lot of uncertainty on how wrongful termination and
“serious and willful” disputes should be handled within the ADR pro-
cess.  These violations involve an uninsurable liability with substantial
penalties that are placed on the contractor and subcontractor, not the
owner or insurer of the project.  It is not clear “whether or not the
project labor agreement contemplated going through the process of
ombudsperson, mediation, and arbitration before going to the WCAB”
with these issues (Govan 1997).
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Another perceived weakness of the ADR system from the perspec-
tive of some on the employer’s side was,  “we always thought arbitra-
tion should be final and binding. It shouldn’t be appealed to the appeals
board and from the appeals board to the court. We thought the [ADR]
system should be sufficient” (Govan 1997).   For example, a teamster
was injured while operating equipment in conditions that his attorney
later argued were negligently dangerous. After release to return to
work, he was fired.  With the help of an attorney, he brought a dispute
to the arbitration stage of the ADR process.  The arbiter decided in his
favor on the wrongful termination issue but did not find a willful safety
violation.  In this case the teamster appealed the serious and willful
claim and the employer appealed the wrongful termination.  Both of
these disputes went to the WCAB, the appellate level at which carve-
out disputes enter the administrative law system.
Lack of clarity about access to lawyers led to some problems.  One
worker filed a grievance when his employer claimed his injury was not
work related and a wrongful termination claim after his subsequent ter-
mination.  Horn discouraged him from filing because she said his claim
was weak.  He was unaware of his right for monetary compensation
and asked the mediator to award him his job back.  The mediator was
able to broker this outcome. The worker subsequently sought indem-
nity payments for his time away from work.  He wanted a lawyer to
represent him; however, no lawyer would take the case because the
worker signed an agreement at mediation.  Prior to mediation, the
worker was unaware he could contact a lawyer because the documenta-
tion he received said there were no lawyers allowed at mediation. The
worker thought his union would represent him at the mediation.  How-
ever, he said they were of no help during the proceedings.
MEDICAL SERVICES
Employer, insurer, and union interviewees showed satisfaction
with the quality and timing of the medical services.  When asked about
the main benefits of the carve-out system from the perspective of the
owner of the project, the greater cost control of a closed list of pre-
selected medical service providers was mentioned often. “The insur-
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ance industry develops confidence when the physicians and the trusts
are treating the employees properly and giving employers a fair shake
financially and on billing.  They know that they can enter into these or
be part to these kinds of agreements with unions or collective bargain-
ing units and that there is a credible medical service out there that’s not
out to rip off the industry” (Gallagher 1997). 
It was also suggested that a preferred provider list also limits collu-
sion between lawyers and doctors if there is litigation. Some partici-
pants felt that in the statutory system, lawyers guided injured workers
to doctors who gave a favorable medical-legal evaluation. As discussed
in the background section, the treating physician’s opinion has a pre-
sumption of correctness when challenged by a second opinion in a dis-
puted case.
Preselected medical service providers were thought to give injured
workers less leeway, resulting in quicker return to work after an injury.
Another reason to expect this result was the active role of the ombuds-
person.  The owners felt that the ombudsperson facilitated the efficient
provision of medical services and monitored the treatment and recov-
ery of the injured worker, a process that reduced the number of days off
work. In particular, the quick initial response and advice of the ombud-
sperson seem to have reduced the extent of minor injuries that could
have evolved into more serious chronic ones (Gallagher 1997).  How-
ever, no evidence was presented to confirm this belief.  It was also
noted by a number of respondents that, by construction standards, the
Eastside project was a long-term job with good pay and a regular 60-
hour week.  Workers were not anxious to receive only $490/week on
temporary disability versus $1200–1800/week when working.  Hence,
they were highly motivated to return to work and work was usually
available when they were able to return.
The fact that the worker could choose the doctor, from the defined
list, from the very first day was seen as a positive aspect of the carve-
out process.  Trust in the doctor was expected to increase when the
worker was able to choose the doctor from the first day of injury, rather
than having the doctor assigned by the employer. This was expected to
reduce unnecessary costs due to second opinions (Balgenorth 1997).
As it turned out, all of the workers interviewed received their treatment
through the company-selected network, and all remained within that
network for the length of their treatment. 
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Safety
None of the interviewees perceived that the existence of the carve-
out had resulted in increased safety or reduced injury rates compared to
the standard for this kind of project. The existence of a safety commit-
tee and a common safety policy was considered the usual practice on
large projects of this type (Dixon 1997).  According to the ombudsper-
son, the project remains below the national average for lost time acci-
dents and just above the national average for total incidence. At least
early in the project, the National Building Trades representative was
concerned that the accident experience was above average for similar
construction projects.
Joint Labor-Management Workers’ Compensation Committee
We were able to attend one of the meetings of the Workers’ Com-
pensation Committee. The issues discussed were related to problems
with medical services providers, the discussion of procedures for
ombudsperson’s review, 132(a) and serious and willful violations, and
vocational rehabilitation procedures. There were presentations by the
ombudsperson and reviews of ADR mediation sessions to date, injury
statistics and incidence rates, list updating of medical providers and
claims procedures manuals.5  We witnessed the consensual elimination
of one doctor from the list of qualified medical evaluators because he
did not report timely as outlined in the Labor Code, which effectively
held up an injured worker’s benefits.  We also saw discussion of the
quality and timing of medical reports from one large HMO.
Management interviewees felt the existence of the PLA and the
ADR had improved communication and labor-management coopera-
tion. The safety committee and the Joint Labor-Management Workers’
Compensation Committee were both institutions where union and
management representatives met frequently and discussed issues and
problems. The close contact and the incentives to both parties set by
the job referral system are factors that seem to explain a relatively high
degree of communication. This was confirmed in our interviews with
union representatives.
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Benefits
None of the interviewees thought that workers received lower
indemnity benefits under the ADR process than the statutory system.
All of them mentioned the quicker payments of the compensation. For
example, Sharlene Horn said, “Some cases initially go on Claim Delay
but with assistance from the Ombudsperson, often the decision can be
made quicker because of access to the parties involved. The circum-
stances of the injury can be evaluated quicker and a decision often
made within 1 day of a delayed claim. Many employers want to delay
all claims so educating them is important in relation to timely benefit
delivery.”
However, except to the extent that the benefits might be delivered
more quickly, none of the respondents raised the possibility of expand-
ing indemnity benefits for workers who were disabled. These workers
were very highly paid given the mandatory overtime (60-hour weeks).
None of the union representatives interviewed felt that workers were
receiving lower benefits as a result of the carve-out.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The ESRP carve-out was formed with the hope of reducing work-
ers’ compensation costs on a very large construction project.  The com-
bination of a PLA with a carve-out made it attractive for both unions
and the project owner to agree to set up the program.  Employers bene-
fitted from the no-strike clause in the PLA and unions benefited from
the restrictions on nonunion labor.  Employers and injured workers
were expected to benefit from quicker return to work due to the ADR
process, which facilitated dispute resolution.  Our interviews showed a
high degree of satisfaction with the program.  Actual cost savings from
the project were difficult to measure at this time.
Notes
1. The Operating Engineers’ locals did strike during the period of ESRP construc-
tion.  However, the 11-week strike did not affect the dam construction.  Without
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the no-strike clause, this strike would have shut down nearly all work on the
project. 
2. Several interviewees commented that an additional incentive to establish a PLA
was the opportunity to negotiate a drug testing protocol (Southern California
Associates 1994).   The Ontario Airport construction project, which was similar in
many ways, was not handled under a PLA and thus did not have drug testing.  The
safety manager on the Ontario Airport project felt that this was a major weakness
in controlling safety risks at Ontario (Stringer 1997).
3. Hartford’s wrap-ups include the construction of the Ontario Airport in California
among several other projects in other states in which Parsons is also the general
contractor.
4. Larry Gallagher made it clear that these were just estimates since there was no
experience against which to estimate the impact of carve-outs.
5. MDW Workers’ Compensation Committee Meeting. June 12, 1997.
91
6
The National Electric Contractors 
Association/International 
Brotherhood of Electric Workers 
Carve-Out
The National Electric Contractors Association (NECA) and the
International Brotherhood of Electric Workers (IBEW) have been
operating a carve-out since 1994. The carve-out covers approximately
10,000 of the 38,200 electricians in California and all of the IBEW
locals are participants in the agreement.  About 260 contractors are
members of NECA and are covered by the carve-out  (Menicucci
1997).1
HISTORY OF THE NECA/IBEW CARVE-OUT
The origins of the NECA/IBEW carve-out go back to 1961 when a
group of NECA contractors formed a workers’ compensation safety
group—NECA West. This group formed to help members improve
safety and to permit employers to negotiate like very large employers
for workers’ compensation rates below the regulated level.
Thus, the safety group had in place an organizational arrangement
for jointly negotiated workers’ compensation and met the minimum
requirements of annual workers’ compensation premiums of at least $2
million.  This greatly facilitated the establishment of a carve-out agree-
ment.  The NECA/IBEW carve-out began its formal existence on Octo-
ber 1, 1994, when the ADR agreement was signed. The safety group
had a long-term relationship with California Casualty, which was cho-
sen as the insurance carrier. 
The promoters of the carve-out had the task of signing on NECA
contractors and the IBEW locals in California.  According to Bob Men-
icucci, owner of ARC Electric and Chairman of the carve-out, it was a
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difficult task.  The union wanted to share in any cost savings, and the
employers needed to be convinced that they would actually save
money.  Another issue in the initial debate was to define the list of
authorized medical service providers. This was an important issue
since previously workers had to go to doctors chosen by the employer,
and the union wanted to allow workers to choose their doctors  (Cake
1997).  According to Robert Menicucci, the union finally decided it
would be in their interest to join because their members would get back
to work sooner. Menicucci said, “I think the main point was returning
the men back to work sooner.  These guys were making close to $50
per hour in wages and fringes.  If they’re not working for 5, 6 months,
and they’re just getting workers’ compensation, that’s only $250 or
$300 a week.2  So the goal was to get the employees back to work.  Get
rid of all these nuisance claims.  Get rid of these lawyers that wouldn’t
answer a phone call.  And I think that was the main issue in selling the
contract to them.  Also, I think all the IBEW locals signed up because
they didn’t want to be known as the only local union in California not
to go along with a good program” (Menicucci 1997).  This view was
confirmed by Chuck Cake, Business Manager of the International
Brotherhood of Electric Workers (IBEW) Local 340 in Sacramento,
and secretary of the carve-out.  Cake also noted the union hoped to
reduce costs enough that it would be possible to increase indemnity
benefits.
A factor that impeded development of the carve-out, according to
Chuck Cake (1997), was that many of employers and union business
agents did not want to join the carve-out because it would mean break-
ing long-standing relations with their insurance carrier, insurance bro-
kers, and lawyers.
Despite these impediments the NECA/IBEW has been the most
successful multi-employer/single trade carve-out in California, and
probably the nation.  All 23 locals in the state joined the agreement.
Half of the 500 NECA contractors joined, representing 95 percent of
the NECA West Safety Group.  Overall, approximately 10,000 of the
roughly 20,340 union electricians in California (IBEW 2001) were
covered by the carve-out.  No other multi-employer/single trade carve-
out has achieved as much as a 5 percent penetration of the employer or
union market.
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The board of trustees of the Workers’ Compensation Fund set by
the agreement negotiated the group insurance coverage for all employ-
ers in the carve-out safety group. In addition, very large electrical con-
tractors (premium in excess of $250,000/year) could opt into the carve-
out while remaining separate from the safety group. As of May 1998,
five employers had created “stand-alone” carve-out arrangements
using the same structure negotiated by NECA West Safety Group. 
The union and management associations negotiated the carve-out
addendum to the CBA.  This addendum established a Workers’ Com-
pensation Trust Fund to fund the ombudsman activities and the admin-
istration of the ADR program. The employers paid the fund a yearly
contribution of an additional 2 percent of their workers’ compensation
insurance premium, about $60 per full-time employee per year (IBEW/
NECA 1994).
The agreement also established a board of trustees with three mem-
bers representing NECA, and three members representing the union.
In case of deadlock, the matter in dispute was to be referred to the
American Arbitration Association, although no matters have been.
Technically, stand-alone employers could establish different agree-
ments; however, all were operating under agreements identical to those
for the NECA West contractors and operated under the board of trust-
ees.
The Board of Trustees of the NECA/IBEW Trust Fund had the
power to appoint the administrator and ombudsman of the fund.  They
chose Richard Robyn, President of American Ombudsman Enterprises,
to serve as both the administrator and ombudsman.  The administrator
managed the paper flow, the filing system, and kept track of all the pro-
cesses within an individual file.  He also corresponded with the arbitra-
tors, mediators, and raters, and he sent letters of explanation to the
workers regarding qualified medical examiners (Robyn 1997).  His
ombudsman duties will be described later in this chapter.
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LABOR-MANAGEMENT SAFETY AND 
HEALTH COMMITTEE
The NECA Vice President for District 9 and the IBEW Interna-
tional Vice President for District 9 each appointed three members to
this Labor-Management Safety and Health Committee. The committee
participated in advising the parties on the implementation of safety
programs.
Preferred List of Medical Services Providers
All medical and hospital services required by employees subject to
the ADR agreement as the result of compensable injury were provided
by members of a preferred list of medical service providers. This list
included the local health and welfare trust preferred-provider network,
a list selected by the employer of health care professionals and facili-
ties, and any physician designated by a worker prior to the date of
injury (predesignation). The board of trustees for the NECA/IBEW
Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund could change the list at any time.
Any health care professionals not listed on the approved list of autho-
rized providers could be submitted to the board of trustees for review
and inclusion. In case of an emergency, when no authorized provider
was available, the employee could seek treatment from a health care
professional or facility not otherwise authorized by the agreement. 
Thus, employees had more choice about the treating physician for
the first 30 days than they would have under the state system (except
for the very small number who predesignated under the state system3),
including the option of using their regular physician.  At the same time,
the carve-out limited employees to one change of doctors after the 30-
day period.  In the state system, the worker has full choice of doctor
after the first 30 days in nearly all cases. 
Vocational Rehabilitation Providers
The parties to the ADR agreement developed an exclusive list of
vocational rehabilitation providers. The Board of Trustees of the
NECA/IBEW Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund could make
changes, including additions and/or deletions at any time. 
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Workers’ Compensation Insurance Carrier
The board of trustees selected the insurance carrier. Originally,
California Casualty acted as the insurer for carve-out employers that
did not “stand alone” (i.e., did not choose their own insurance carrier).
At the time of our interviews, the insurance was handled through
Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., an insurance broker. For the current policy
year, starting October 1, 1997, the insurer was Ulico Insurance.
All payments that were required to be made by the employer, pur-
suant to the agreement and in accordance with California law, should
have been made by its workers’ compensation insurance carrier. The
employers who decided to opt-in the carve-out (i.e., were signatories of
the ADR agreement) and whose annual workers’ compensation pre-
mium was $250,000 or more could stand-alone. The employers whose
annual workers’ compensation premium was less than $250,000, had
to join a safety group to participate in the carve-out. At the time of our
interviews, they all had the same insurer. However, there was a ques-
tion concerning whether this was required by statute or not (Lopez
1997).  The employer had the option of suspending the agreement on
projects where the owner, developer, or general contractor supplied
project wrap-around insurance that included workers’ compensation
insurance.
Alternate Dispute Resolution Process
The ADR agreement signed between NECA and IBEW establishes
a three-stage dispute resolution system that includes an ombudsman,
mediation, and arbitration.  As of August 1998, there had been approx-
imately 450 disputes in which the ombudsman had been involved.
Eleven of them had moved to mediation and none  to arbitration.
Ombudsman
The NECA/IBEW Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund selected
and paid the ombudsman.  Upon request the ombudsman assisted
injured employees in attempting to resolve disputes with the workers’
compensation insurer or employer. If the issue was not resolved to the
satisfaction of the employee, the ombudsman could, upon request of
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the employee, assist him or her in filing a request for mediation or arbi-
tration related to alleged work-related injuries.
Mediation and Arbitration
Mediators and arbitrators were assigned by the trust from an
approved list of mediators. The mediators had to be experienced and
knowledgeable in the workers’ compensation industry.  All mediations
to date have been carried out by former Workers’ Compensation
judges.
The mediator or the arbitrator could, at his or her sole discretion,
appoint an authorized health care professional to assist in the resolution
of any medical issue. The insurance carrier pays the cost of this health
care professional, unless voluntarily paid by the employer.
Neither party was permitted legal counsel at mediation. The fact
that an employee or employer representative or its workers’ compensa-
tion insurance carrier’s representative had legal training or was a
licensed attorney did not bar him or her from participation in mediation
unless he or she sought to participate on the basis of a lawyer-client
relationship (NECA/IBEW ADR Agreement Article IV).  This provi-
sion was not intended to limit any party’s right to obtain legal advice.
Any party had a right to legal advice at such party’s own expense. The
participation of legal counsel was limited to the arbitration.
The arbitrator had to have experience and be knowledgeable in the
workers’ compensation dispute process and had to have been at one
time a certified specialist in workers’ compensation law or a California
Workers’ Compensation Judge. 
DISCUSSION OF NECA CARVE-OUT
Employer Perspective
Interviews with representatives of the employer side in the ADR
suggested that expectations on cost savings were the main motivation
to set up a carve-out. The generalized perception that abuses in the stat-
utory system increased the employer’s cost and premiums for workers’
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compensation provided the incentive to set up an ADR system and a
restricted list of medical and rehabilitation providers.
In the employers’ opinion, contractors opting for the carve-out had
experienced significant workers’ compensation insurance premium
reductions compared to what they would have obtained without the
agreement. We could not get employers to cite solid figures of the per-
centage savings, but all interviewees pointed out that they were large
enough to make it worthwhile to participate in the agreement.  Officers
and trustees of the carve-out were concerned that the change to an open
rating system in the workers’ compensation insurance industry that
went into effect in the beginning of 1995 was eroding the relative
advantage of the carve-out. The premium rates charged all employers
had gone down, and insurance companies had been selectively reduc-
ing their rates in aggressive competition for low injury rates employers
(Englehart 1997).  Both employers and union representatives men-
tioned that “predatory” pricing practices by the insurance companies
could tempt employers to leave the agreement, lured by lower short run
premium rates. However, our data indicate that participation by NECA
employers in the carve-out has increased gradually and the subsequent
addition of two of the largest electrical contractors in the state as stand-
alone members has substantially expanded the number of covered
employees.
In general there was satisfaction on the employer side with the evo-
lution and performance of the ADR system. Employers also felt that
workers were satisfied with the ADR agreement. Robert Menicucci
pointed out, “My personal opinion is that they feel it’s their own pro-
gram and it is benefiting them.  They will not abuse a program that is
developed for their benefit, and they see this as being developed for
their benefit” (Menicucci 1997). In part this expectation by employers
of employee preference for the carve-out was based on the expectation
that the carve-out would significantly improve the quality of the medi-
cal services that workers receive when injured.  Two aspects were
thought to influence such an outcome.  1) The existence of a closed list
of medical providers reduced the scope for collusion between lawyers
willing to increase litigation and doctors willing to “game the system,”
when compared to the statutory system (Menicucci 1997).  2) By
allowing workers to use their personal doctor from the Health and Wel-
fare Trust for occupational injuries, the quality of and satisfaction with
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medical care might improve (Menicucci 1997).  A wider choice of phy-
sicians during the initial 30 days of treatment was expected to increase
workers’ satisfaction and trust. 
At the same time, employers expected to cut costs by limiting later
medical treatment on the small number of expensive cases to employer
preferred providers and union HMOs.  Employers felt such care was
likely to be less expensive and extreme than if delivered by a doctor
selected by an attorney.
The elimination of lawyers and litigation at the beginning of a dis-
pute was the main vector mentioned by interviewees by which the
ADR exhibited significant advantages compared to the statutory sys-
tem.  This was expected to be accomplished through three improve-
ments.
1) By restricting the role of the legal counsel early in the ADR-pro-
cess, issues could be resolved quickly without the escalation
thought to be part of the adversarial process.
2) By reducing the possibility of collusion between lawyers and
doctors, medical treatment duration would not be artificially
extended either to support larger indemnity demands or for the
direct enrichment of providers.
3) By stressing communication among the parties involved, with the
assistance of the ombudsperson, parties were more likely to reach
mutually agreeable solutions. 
During the carve-out’s start-up, problems arose because of an ini-
tial lack of awareness of the ADR by some parties.  One issue was the
lack of awareness among attorneys in California of the scope of ADR
within the carve-out. The workers’ attorneys sometimes tried to get the
claim into the state system, and the ombudsman tried to get it into the
ADR. The board of trustees tried to solve this problem by hiring an
attorney who represented the board and explained to the other attor-
neys the ADR process and the legal issues involved.4  This lack of
awareness of the new procedures extended to the union locals.  Work-
ers we interviewed contended that business managers at the local level
were generally unaware of the carve-out procedures and often recom-
mended that the worker seek an attorney.
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During the course of our study, the role of the ombudsperson
within the NECA/IBEW carve-out evolved substantially.  Initially, the
ombudsperson did not communicate with the worker until the worker
first contacted the ombudsperson with a question or problem.  As the
carve-out matured, the ombudsperson’s approach evolved into a more
proactive mode of contacting each worker after notification of a dis-
abling injury.  This initial contact involved communication of the
ombudsperson’s role, information on the workers’ compensation sys-
tem, and help with any initial problems.  The ombudsman, Richard
Robyn, has subsequently been hired to act as ombudsman on the
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory/National Ignition Facility, a large con-
struction project carve-out in Northern California.  Robyn has intro-
duced the proactive ombudsperson model on that project.
None of the interviewed employers were able to identify aspects of
the carve-out that would improve industrial safety compared to the
statutory system. Mike Engelhart suggested that, under the carve-out,
insurance companies became a little more involved in advising and
helping to improve safety, but he was not sure if there had been a sig-
nificant difference in terms of safety. It seemed to him that the insur-
ance companies’ safety people were doing the same practices as
before. He also argued that there had been not many changes in terms
of the safety programs induced by the carve-out. In fact, NECA West
had had a safety program, as required by statute for safety groups, long
before the ADR was implemented. 
Worker Perspective
We interviewed five injured workers to better understand if the
carve-outs were functioning in the manner the ADR addendum stipu-
lated. We asked the ombudsperson to identify workers who had dis-
putes that had resulted in them filing for mediation or arbitration. The
workers were chosen based upon suggestions made by the ombudsper-
son.  The ombudsperson first contacted the workers to get approval for
our interview.  Thus, the sample of workers we interviewed was biased
towards those individuals who had “tested” the system.  We did not
interview any workers who did not have a dispute or whose dispute
was rapidly and successfully handled by the ombudsperson.  Because
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the point of the ADR is to avoid mediation, our interviewees are an
extremely unrepresentative sample. 
All of the interviewees were males injured during 1995–1996.
Four of the electricians were in their early fifties and one was in his
thirties at the time of injury.  The older electricians had more than 20
years in the trades and the younger had 13 years of experience.
None of the electricians we interviewed knew he was covered by a
carve-out prior to injury.  The ombudsperson did not know how to
address this problem because “the injured worker is not interested in
the information [about the carve-out] until they’re injured" (Robyn
1997).  After being informed by the insurer that they were covered by a
carve-out, three of the electricians called their local union halls to get
information about the carve-out.  However, no one at the local knew
about the program. 
We heard no concerns about the quality of care for the treatment of
the electricians’ injuries.  Although employee choice about medical
care expanded under the carve-out, four of the five workers inter-
viewed used an employer-selected physician or clinic for their treat-
ment.  Consequently, their treatment was identical to the treatment they
would have received if the employer had not been a carve-out partici-
pant (unless the company improved the quality of its designated ser-
vice provider when employee choice expanded). 
Each of these injured workers had a complicated claim, and each
contacted one or more lawyers. In each case they pursued their claims
until the point when the lawyers they contacted advised them to drop
the matter, at which time four out of the five injured workers had
received substantial benefits and had their claims resolved to their sat-
isfaction.
However, each of those four was concerned that they may have
been able to get more in the traditional system.  Every electrician
expressed a high degree of satisfaction with the ombudsman.  They all
felt confident in his ability to inform them of their rights.  None of the
electricians actually ever met Robyn in person as all contact was con-
ducted over the phone.  In all of the interviews there was a tension
between the workers’ respect for the ombudsperson as a neutral and the
desire for someone to play the role of an advocate, to “fight” or “be
more aggressive” on their behalf.  
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Ombudsperson
Richard Robyn  is a former Workers’ Compensation Judge who
has practiced law since 1970.  Prior to his appointment as the ombuds-
person, the trustees of the carve-out asked Robyn’s help in drafting
their application to the DWC for the authorization to become a carve-
out.  He also advised the parties on the draft of the ADR agreement.
Robyn took the job of ombudsperson on the condition that the program
function essentially the same as the state system but shortening the
time frame for settling disputes. 
The ombudsman worked part time for the trust. Robyn saw his role
as, “trying to help the parties move through the process of a workers’
compensation system—provide them with information, suggestions, so
that they can make decisions.  I certainly give my opinion when I think
one party is being unreasonable under the circumstances.  I would say
most of my discussions are in the form of questions as to why the
insurance company may be doing this, and getting an explanation from
them, and explaining their explanation to the worker so that he can
understand it” (Robyn 1997).
Robyn did not have formal medical training. However, he pointed
out that it was advantageous for an ombudsperson to know the medical
field, “You’ve got to have some type of experience with the medical
profession. I think it is necessary that you be able to read a medical
report carefully and try to understand it and see if it is reasonable and
the conclusions are rational. And in the workers’ compensation system
you want the end conclusion to meet the substantial evidence test.
Thus, you need to have an understanding of what a legally sufficient
medical report looks like, and certainly a medical background would
help with that” (Robyn 1997).
The ombudsperson reported that he always told the workers that
they could hire a lawyer to represent them but an attorney could not
participate directly at the ombudsperson stage. He also mentioned that
on occasion he had affirmatively recommended that an injured worker
consult an attorney (Robyn 1997).  The workers were also advised that
if they hired an attorney, went to arbitration, and were determined to be
the prevailing party, they would receive their attorney’s fees over and
above their award.  This is different from the state system in which the
injured worker almost always pays his or her attorney fees out of the
102 Chapter 6
settlement.  Robyn pointed out that the ADR process includes the
issues of wrongful termination 132a, and serious and willful claims.  In
these cases, the employee was referred to an attorney for litigation of
the claim (Robyn 1997).  Third-party claims were also referred to an
attorney for litigation outside the ADR system.
Robyn  identified the best features in the ADR process as the com-
pression of time spent dealing with and resolving issues, resulting in
the quicker delivery of compensation and benefits to the injured
worker.  He also included the involvement of the injured worker in a
proactive situation, where the worker learned as much as possible
about his situation, his injury, and would communicate well with the
doctor.  If problems arose with the doctor, the treatment, or the medical
report, the worker had someone (the ombudsman) to discuss them with
and help work them out. However, Robyn said the most common prob-
lem he had seen was, “The timeliness of expense—travel expense
reimbursements—checks not arriving when they are expected.  Those
little checks, for 35 or 40 dollars are very big money to an injured
worker when you don’t have an income, and you’re shelling out that
kind of money to make various appointments” (Robyn 1997).5
The major weaknesses that Robyn found in the ADR system were
the absence of standards with respect to record keeping and the lack of
information about the whole process that injured workers had prior to
the injury. The ADR system tried to make up for this last issue after an
injury occurred,6 but Robyn thought that most of the problems hap-
pened because of this lack of information.  In his perception, the local
union officers seemed to be, on average, very poorly informed about
the carve-out and the ADR process. Some did not want to be part of it.
Others had not educated their staffs about it (Robyn 1997).  However,
this problem had improved by 1998 and continual improvement was
expected.
Another source of frustration was the timeliness of the doctors in
turning over medical reports. The slow production of reports slowed
down the delivery of ombudsperson services and, in the end, the
injured worker suffered.  According to the ombudsman, there was a
need for the claims examiner, the nurse case manager, or the ombuds-
man to do an immediate follow-up with the doctors to determine the
timing of the medical reports.   Unfortunately he felt the doctors were
often quite dilatory and did not respond to follow-up requests.  A
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related issue was to get the treating physicians to come up with treat-
ment plans, “One of the most common deficiencies I see with doctors
is they don’t set out a treatment plan.  If you are going to treat some-
body over a period of time, it seems to me that you would have an idea
of what you are going to treat them for and that you ought be able to
write a report that states the course and length of treatment.  [This lack
of information] is where disputes over medical issues come into play,
because the insurance company wants to see the medical treatment
come to a conclusion.  But if the doctor doesn’t ever indicate that it’s
going to come to an end, then they get concerned, they want to cut off
the treatment and send the employee to another doctor” (Robyn 1997).
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The NECA/IBEW carve-out has been the most successful program
in California in terms of recruiting employers and union locals to join.
Part of this success was driven by the pre-existing safety group that had
experience in negotiating workers’ compensation arrangements with
insurance companies.  The NECA/IBEW carve-out has substantially
benefited from its choice of ombudsman.  They were able to hire an
individual with immense knowledge of the workers’ compensation
industry who received no criticism from the injured workers we inter-
viewed about their interaction with him.  The president of the Califor-
nia Building Trades commented that the ombudsman is the linchpin
that makes a carve-out work (Balgenorth 1997).  In the two case stud-
ies we conducted we verified this statement by observing two well-
qualified individuals performing their jobs to the satisfaction of injured
workers.  It remains to be seen how a carve-out will function with an
ombudsperson that is not viewed favorably by injured workers with
grievances.  The forthcoming chapter will give a quantitative evalua-




1. Members of the NECA West, the safety group, and members of the carve-out
agreement were identified with the assistance of Ron Rinaldi, President of NECA
West.
2 Temporary Disability payments are two-thirds of the injured workers’ average
weekly wage up to a maximum.  These maximums have increased substantially
from $266/week thereafter.
3. Approximately 4 percent of injured workers receive their initial treatment from a
physician that was predesignated (California Workers’ Compensation Institute
1998).
4. According to Robert Menicucci, the legal counsel to the board of trustees is pro-
vided by Mark Lipton, “. . . a very respected trust attorney who works for all the
IBEW chapters welfare and health funds.”
5. As indicated by the California Division of Workers’ Compensation (1998), these
types of problems are quite common.  In 1997, for audited files, 21 percent had
late first payment of temporary total disability, 31 percent had late first payment
of permanent partial disability, and 16 percent had late subsequent indemnity pay-
ments.
6. Upon being notified of an injury, the ombudsman provides written information to
the workers describing the ombudsman’s role, the ADR process, and the worker’s
legal rights, including the role of an attorney in the ADR process.  Upon being




of the NECA/IBEW Carve-Out
This chapter presents an analysis of data from the first two years of
operation of the NECA/IBEW carve-out. We compared the record of
carve-out participants with their experience prior to formation of the
carve-out.  We then compared these findings to changes over the same
period in the experience of NECA members who did not join the carve-
out and with the experience of non-electricians at carve-out employers.
Non-electricians at carve-out firms were not covered by the agreement.
Comparing both participants and nonparticipants over time is crucial
because participants in the carve-out were not chosen at random. An
evaluation of outcomes without a comparison group(s) could mislead-
ingly find that carve-outs are beneficial or harmful based on pre-exist-
ing differences in the carve-out and non-carve-out samples. Comparing
rates of change serves as a control for unobserved differences between
employers who opted for the carve-out and those who did not.  Also,
without comparison groups, pre–post comparisons might interpret sys-
tem-wide or industry trends as the impact of carve-outs. As described
below, all of the tests are subject to concerns regarding small sample
sizes and the possibility that carve-outs may have different patterns of
claims filing.
PROBLEMS WITH EARLY ANALYSIS OF CARVE-OUTS
Early enthusiasm for carve-outs was based on experience reported
for the Pioneer Valley Project in Massachusetts (Chapter 1) and the
reports on California carve-outs published by the California DWC.
These earlier evaluations suffered from methodological limitations that
could lead to biased results. For the Pioneer Valley project, the pre–
post improvement may be the result of commonly observed improve-
ments in safety measures on the later phases of a large construction
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project as the type of work becomes less hazardous.  Both studies’ con-
clusions are limited because the carve-out claim experience is viewed
for substantially less time after injury relative to the comparison
groups.  For the Pioneer Valley study, pre-carve-out claims were eval-
uated at an average maturity of 20 months, and post-carve-out claims
were valued at an average maturity of 12 months. The DWC studies
evaluated data at the end of the calendar year in which the injuries were
reported and compared these with fully developed claims in similar
industries (Table 7.1).
Unfortunately, estimates of future costs as reported in incurred
data often rise substantially over time.  According to our analysis of
data from the Self-Insured Plans Unit of the DWC, incurred indemnity
costs double, medical costs rise 43 percent, and total costs rise 71 per-
cent from the end of the calendar year when the injury occurred (the
measure the DWC report used) to fully developed experience at the
end of the fifth calendar year after the injury.  Thus, the approach used
by the DWC will substantially understate total costs and overstate sav-
ings. 
Both previous studies involved data gathered during a period of
rapid reduction within the overall workers’ compensation systems in
claim rates, litigation frequency, and many cost measures.  Compari-
sons over time that do not have control groups will incorrectly attribute
these improvements to the effect of carve-outs. 
Table 7.1 Incurred Losses in Carve-Outs versus “Expected” Lossesa
Category 1995 1996 1997
Incurred losses at carve-outs per $100 payroll $2.31 $2.24 $2.67
“Expected” losses per $100 payroll based on 
non-carve-out workers’ compensation costs 
of all California insurers reporting 
construction occupations in recent years
$3.92 $4.31 $5.87
Incurred losses at carve-outs / expected losses 0.59 0.52 0.46
a Data are valued as of December 31 of the calendar year in which the injury occurred
and reported to DWC on or before March 31 of the following year.  Data do not
include loss adjustment expenses.  
SOURCE: California Division of Workers’ Compensation 1996–1998.
Quantitative Analysis of the NECA/IBEW Carve-Out 107
The same problems arise in the data on the ADR process and fre-
quency of disputes. Many disputes occur long after the date of injury.
Early DWC reports looked at the incidence of disputes very early in the
life of claims. In addition, no data were presented to indicate how often
disputes occurred on similarly severe claims in the statutory system
during a comparable period.  For these reasons, a more rigorous
approach using difference-in-differences methodology and control
groups was undertaken to evaluate the impact of carve-outs on employ-
ers’ costs and injured workers’ benefits.
CONTROL GROUPS
All employers in the analysis were unionized electrical contractors
who were members of the NECA.  Of the approximately 500 NECA
contractors in California, about half joined the carve-out and the
remainder opted out. 
The only electricians covered by a carve-out were those working at
NECA employers who had signed the carve-out agreement.  We com-
pared the experience of electricians at NECA employers that joined the
carve-out with two control groups.
The first control group was unionized electricians at NECA
employers who did not join the carve-out.  These groups are very
closely matched in terms of skill, pay, job duties, and injury risks.
They differ in that unionized electricians at NECA employers in the
carve-out were subject to the carve-out arrangement, while unionized
electricians at NECA employers outside the carve-out were subject to
the usual statutory workers’ compensation system.  This allowed us to
control in the pre–post comparison for system-wide trends in the work-
ers’ compensation system and industry-specific trends that led to
changes over time, independent of the impact of the introduction of
carve-outs.
The second comparison group was non-electricians at carve-out
employers.  This group  controlled for changes in the firms’ experience
after joining the carve-out that would differ from non-carve-out firms.
At carve-out firms, only union electricians were covered by the carve-
out.  All other workers at these firms were covered by the usual statu-
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tory workers’ compensation system.  Consequently, differences over
time at carve-out firms that are the result of firm-specific characteris-
tics should have similar effects on both union electricians and all other
employees, while the differences between these two groups in the pre–
post comparison should again be the result of the effect of carve-outs.
Applying the difference-in-differences methodology to these con-
trol groups allows us to analyze the effect of carve-outs on outcomes
that a time-series or cross-sectional analysis might miss.  For example,
if the injury rate of electricians in the carve-out was ten prior to the
carve-out and five after the carve-out was started, we observe a 50 per-
cent reduction in injury rates that might be attributable to the carve-out.
However, this time-series result could be attributable to other factors
besides the carve-out.  Another misleading statistic could result from
looking at a cross section of injury rates among carve-out electricians
and non-carve-out electricians.  Suppose we observe that injury rate
was five in the carve-out and eight outside the carve-out.  Again, we
might mistakenly conclude that electricians inside of carve-outs are
better off due to the existence of the carve-out.  The difference-in-dif-
ference method avoids these problems by analyzing the starting and
ending points of our control groups relative to the carve-out.  For
example, if injury rates went from ten to five in the carve-out and
twenty to eight outside the carve-out, it would be difficult to conclude
there was a correlation between the carve-out and reductions in injury
rates.
HYPOTHESES
This chapter analyzes a number of outcomes of carve-outs, includ-
ing reported injury rates, medical and indemnity costs, and litigation
frequency. Before analyzing these outcomes, we look first at whether
the employers who joined the carve-out were representative of all
NECA members. 
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Selection of Carve-Out Employers
Employers opting to join the carve-out may have differed in char-
acteristics such as the type and seriousness of injuries or frequency of
disputes related to injuries. Employer choice of insurer or claims
administrator may affect the handling of claims in areas such as
defense legal expenditures, attitude toward settlement of disputed
issues, or the timeliness of dispute resolution. The difference-in-differ-
ences methodology highlights differences between employers prior to
the formation of carve-outs, and it reduces the effect of this heteroge-
neity on measurement of the impact of carve-outs.
It is possible that safety-conscious employers were more likely to
join the carve-out. This could occur because members of the group
tried to exclude less-safe employers, because of the requirements of a
safety group, or because the insurer attempted to discourage bad risks.
If employers joining carve-outs differed in their safety records from
those who did not join, then the difference-in-differences analysis will
more accurately assess impact of carve-outs. Adjusting for the mix of
occupations (known as “class codes”), the assumption of positive
selection into the carve-out implies the following hypothesis:
H1: Carve-out employers had better safety records as defined by
claims frequency before joining the carve-out than the non-carve-out
employers.
Safety—Injury Rates
The experience at Pioneer Valley suggested that carve-outs could
greatly reduce reported injury rates (see Chapter 1). The improvement
could be due to better union-company cooperation on safety issues,
fewer fraudulent claims, or elimination of the small portion of fraudu-
lent plaintiffs’ lawyers, doctors, and medical-legal evaluators from the
process.1  Conversely, the improvement could be due to fewer legiti-
mate claims filed because of fewer employees having access to legal
assistance. 
Claim frequency declined rapidly in the statutory system around
the time carve-outs were introduced. If carve-outs reduced reported
injuries, comparing electricians at carve-out and non-carve-out
employers can control for this system-wide trend. 
110 Chapter 7
Furthermore, it is possible that carve-out employers had faster or
slower improvements in safety due to programs unrelated to the carve-
out (e.g., if they were disproportionately likely to implement a com-
pany-wide safety program).  If so, those programs should also affect
non-electricians of those employers. We can measure electricians’
rates of safety improvement relative to other employees as a control for
such company-wide changes. This leads to the following hypothesis.
H2: Electricians at carve-out employers have a greater rate of
reduction in reported injury rates than either control group.
Cost Impact—Medical and Indemnity Costs
Employer expectations for carve-outs were fueled by reports of
large reductions in costs, for example the Pioneer Valley project and
early DWC reports. Carve-outs were expected to control medical and
indemnity costs through better case management, improved return to
work, greater provision of modified or alternate work, additional con-
trol over the treating physician, and possibly by reducing medical treat-
ment given to increase benefits. This reasoning leads to the following
hypothesis.
H3: Employers within the carve-out experience greater reductions
in medical and indemnity costs as a percentage of payroll for electri-
cians covered by the carve-out than for either control group.
Dispute Resolution Frequency
One of the key motivations for carve-outs was the potential to
reduce litigation and litigation-related costs. The ADR process was
expected to prevent disputes and to facilitate dispute resolution. The
ombudsperson was expected to resolve issues at the earliest stages,
thereby avoiding problems that could lead to litigated disputes. Con-
trolling the treating physicians and the evaluation process was
expected to reduce medical treatment disputes, disputes over the level
of permanent disability, legal expenses of parties, and medical-legal
evaluation charges. Carve-outs were also intended to reduce the need
for attorneys, partly through the role of the ombudsperson and partly
through restrictions on participation by attorneys at early stages.
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For comparison purposes, we make the strong and possibly unreal-
istic assumption that the mandatory settlement conference and hearing
stages of the regulatory system can be compared to the mediation and
arbitration stages of the ADR process.
If ADR reduces formal disputes, this strong assumption leads to
the following hypothesis.
H4: Electricians at carve-out firms have greater reductions in the
frequency of litigation per claim, as measured by mediations and arbi-
trations in the carve-out period, than the control groups do as mea-
sured by mandatory settlement conferences and hearings.
The assumption that mediation equals mandatory settlement con-
ference and arbitration equals hearing is quite strong. To the extent that
one process or the other costs less to initiate, workers, employers, or
attorneys would be more likely to initiate a formal dispute. This would
tend to make the more open process appear to have more disputes,
holding other factors constant. In addition, the statutory system permits
expedited hearings on some issues that do not have mandatory settle-
ment conferences. In contrast, nearly all carve-outs require mediation
as the first step if the ombudsperson cannot resolve the dispute. This
could raise the frequency of the first stage of dispute resolution  (medi-
ation) in the carve-out while lowering the frequency of the second
stage (arbitration) relative to the statutory system.
Dispute Resolution Cost
Early studies of carve-outs did not evaluate the costs associated
with dispute resolution.  However, expectations among the many par-
ties interviewed for this project were that reducing the number of dis-
putes, controlling the medical-legal process, and limiting attorney
involvement would all work to decrease legal costs.  This leads to the
following hypothesis.
H5A: Electricians at carve-out firms have greater reductions in
the total cost of litigation per claim, measured by combined applicant
and defense legal costs and medical-legal costs, than either control
group.
Controlling litigation cost was thought to depend in part on limit-
ing the participation of lawyers.  The NECA/IBEW carve-out, like
most carve-outs reviewed, placed several restrictions on attorney par-
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ticipation at the early stages of dispute resolution, suggesting the fol-
lowing hypothesis.
H5B: Electricians at carve-out firms have greater reductions in
the portion of cases represented by attorneys than do either control
group.
DATA
Cost and injury incidence comparisons were developed from
WCIRB data submitted by insurers for the Unit Statistical Report and
Individual Case Records.2  The WCIRB is a quasi-public organization
that collects data and publishes summaries to help the Department of
Insurance set rates and insurers set premiums. Insurers are required by
statute to report according to uniform standards. Data were released to
the research team in a fashion that protected employer and employee
identities.
Incidence and Cost Data
We report rates per $1 million exposure, where “exposure” equals
the total payroll (excluding wage premiums such as overtime or shift
bonuses) subject to premium in that occupation for the period of the
policy up to one year.  When the comparisons are with other union
employees, exposure is an accurate measure of time at work—there is
very little variation in hourly wages for IBEW locals across the state,
especially across the two main employment areas, the Los Angeles
Basin and the San Francisco Bay Area. Thus, changes in rates per
$1million exposure capture changes in rates per full-time equivalent. 
Insurance companies report data on five occasions, as valued at 18
months after the policy inception date—that is, 6 months after the
annual policy ends—and at 12-month intervals thereafter (30, 42, 54,
and 66 months).  As indicated in the discussion at the start of this chap-
ter, data on cost and incidence are sensitive to the timing of the report-
ing.  To control for the issue of timing, the study used data reported at
the third report level (42 months) for the 1992 and 1994 policy year
claims and the second report level for the 1993 and 1995 policy year
Quantitative Analysis of the NECA/IBEW Carve-Out 113
claims.  Adjustment was made to control for small differences in the
ratio of 1992/1993 (pre-carve-out) and 1994/1995 (post-carve-out)
exposure and claim frequency. 
Employers primarily care about total workers’ compensation costs
or costs as a percent of payroll. Injured workers, in contrast, tend to
care about benefits per injury.  The two trend similarly (given the
approximate stability in the relative rate of reported injury in the carve-
out and comparison groups).  Thus, when results favor one group for
costs reduction as a percent of payroll, they will also favor that group
for reductions in benefits per reported injury. 
Adjusting for Change in Occupational Mix
The distribution of exposure among various occupations for each
of the groups under study can change over time. For example, among
electricians, the ratio of apprentices to journeymen may change.
Among the non-electrician occupations, the ratio of office workers to
laborers may change. These changes will affect expected claims fre-
quency and premium costs relative to exposure and average indemnity
and medical costs per claim.
Different occupations or class codes have different premium rates
that reflect the differences in expected losses. We adjusted for changes
in the occupational mix by using the pure premium rates published by
the Rating Bureau. For each separate employer, we calculated an aver-
age premium rate for exposure under all class codes for both the pre-
period and post-period of the carve-out. These averages are based on
the premium rates published for the period beginning January 1994.
Then the premium and claims frequencies for each employer for the
post-period were adjusted to reflect the change in the distribution of
exposure among class codes relative to the pre-period.
In practice, the mix of journeymen and apprentice electricians is
similar at both carve-out and non-carve-out employers, both pre- and
post-period.  This constancy in both levels and changes supports the
hypothesis that electricians in non-carve-out NECA members are a
good control group. 
In contrast, the occupational mix of non-electricians shifted during
the period of this study to substantially fewer non-electrician crafts and
relatively more clerical workers. The occupational shift would have
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made carve-out non-electricians appear increasingly safe over time,
which emphasizes the need for the adjustment that we perform.3
Litigation Frequency
The WCAB on-line system tracks all litigated and permanent dis-
ability claims except those that are adjudicated within the carve-out
programs. For purposes of this evaluation, the relevant data are dates of
application for adjudication, declaration of readiness, mandatory settle-
ment conferences, hearings, continuances, and decisions. The on-line
system keeps a record of all such events. 
These data were obtained for the NECA employees with reported
injuries for 1991 through 1996. The WCAB data was searched even for
workers injured at carve-out employers after introduction of ADR pro-
cesses, but this search was not expected to yield cases for carve-out
related claims. Litigation information for the carve-out mediations and
arbitrations was collected through telephone contacts with the NECA/
IBEW ombudsperson and checked against available records.
Discussion of the Method
Our method implicitly adjusts for all factors that affect all employ-
ers in the state, as well as all factors that are time-invariant at an
employer.  Moreover, when we have data on individual characteristics
such as occupation, carve-out, and non-carve-out, employers are quite
similar.  It is always possible that safety or other trends at carve-out
participants would have differed from those at the control group even
without the introduction of the carve-out.  Nevertheless, although we
do not have data on the many other company and individual character-
istics that affect injury rates and workers’ compensation outcomes, we
are confident that our difference-in-differences methodology permits
us to identify the effect of interest.  
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RESULTS
Selection of Carve-Out Employers 
One motivation for using the difference-in-differences method is
that it corrects for selection bias if employers opting to join the carve-
out differed from those not choosing to join. To test for this selection,
we examined the following measures of employers’ experience with
workers’ compensation prior to formation of the carve-out: accident
rates, experience modification, and premium.
Claims rates (Table 7.2) were slightly lower for electricians at
NECA employers that joined the carve-out (4.43 claims per $1 million
exposure) compared with employers that did not (4.96 claims, Table
7.2).  This difference was statistically significant at nearly conven-
tional levels (t = 1.89, P < 0.06).4
An employer’s “experience modification” is calculated by the
WCIRB to summarize the employer’s recent history of workers’ com-
pensation costs and to assist insurers in adjusting premiums.  The expe-
rience modification of the non-carve-out employers improved more
quickly in the early 1990s.  However, the average experience modifica-
tion for carve-out employers was statistically indistinguishable from
that of non-carve-out employers for the year 1995 (8.92 vs. 8.99). The
experience modification for 1995 reflects the safety experience of the
employers across all occupations for the years 1991–1993.
Premium data, a measure of the insurance underwriters’ estimation
of employers’ safety, suggested that employers who opted to join the
carve-out differed from employers who did not join. Premium rates for
electrician class codes were significantly different for these two groups
of employers (pre–post carve-outs percent of payroll, 0.0509 and
0.0334; non-carve-out, 0.0487 and 0.0298; t = 2.46). Reported pre-
mium may be affected by factors other than the safety expectations of
the insurers.  These data give mixed results regarding whether there is
positive selection of systematically safety-conscious employers in the
carve-out. At the same time, the higher premiums but better safety
record of electricians at employers who would soon join the carve-out
is strong evidence that it is important to control for unobserved hetero-
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a
Pre-carve-out Post-carve-out Change (%) Absolute Std. error of diff. t-stat
Electricians (at carve-out firms)
Claim incidence 4.43 3.27 –26.2 –1.16 0.264 –4.40
Medical incurred $10,153 $9,711 –4.3 –$441 1,811 –0.24
Indemnity incurred $14,491 $11,584 –20.1 –$2,907 2,565 –1.13
Electricians (outside carve-out)
Claim incidence 4.96 3.83 –22.6 –1.12 0.261 –4.30
Medical incurred $9,800 $9,874 0.8 $74 1,858 0.04
Indemnity incurred $15,074 $14,030 –6.9 –$1,044 2,650 –0.39
Non-electricians (at carve-
out firms)
Claim incidence 2.78 2.27 –18.1 –0.502 0.240 –2.10
Medical incurred $8,190 $5,216 –36.3 –$2.974 1,222 –2.43
Total indemnity incurred $12,498 $9,642 –22.8 $2,844 2,341 –1.21
Difference-in-differences Mean Std. error t-stat
Electricians: carve-out firms minus non-carve-out firms
Claim incidence –0.038 0.371 –0.102
Medical incurred –$515 2,594 –0.19
Total indemnity incurred –1,863 3,688 –0.50
117
Within carve-out firms: electricians minus non-electricians
Claim incidence –0.658 0.356 1.846
Medical incurred $2,533 2,185 1.15
Total indemnity incurred –$63 3,743 0.01
a All figures are per $1 million exposure, with adjustments for changes in occupational mix.  ($1 million on exposure translates to roughly
twenty full-time equivalent employees.)
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geneity in analyses of carve-out effects by using the difference-in-dif-
ferences methodology. 
Safety
Electricians in the carve-out experienced a reduction in reported
injury rates (claims per $1 million of exposure) of 26 percent from two
years before carve-out startup to two years after it (decline significant
at P < 0.01; Table 7.2). This rate of improvement was slightly, but not
statistically significantly, better than the 23 percent reduction for elec-
tricians at the non-carve-out employers. Within carve-out employers,
injury rates for non-electricians fell 18 percent, which is less, but again
not significantly less, than for electricians at the same firm.
In results not shown, we looked separately at the incidence of
claims that resulted in time off work.  Union electricians showed statis-
tically significant declines in disabling injuries. Rates of disability
claims also fell faster (32 percent) for the carve-out electricians than
for non-carve-out electricians (20 percent), but the difference was not
statistically significant. The decline for carve-out electricians was sig-
nificantly faster than for carve-out non-electricians (32 percent versus
15 percent, P < 0.05).
Looking at the most serious claims, those resulting in permanent
disability, we again found across-the-board declines in the rate of per-
manent disability claims per $1 million of exposure. Though the
decline for carve-out electricians was again more rapid than for the two
comparison groups, the difference-in-differences comparisons are not
significantly different.
Considering each of the three classifications of claims, carve-out
electricians showed slightly greater reductions in the number of claims
per $1 million of exposure. Although this is consistent with hypotheses
that carve-outs can improve safety, the evidence is weak (a lack of
effect also suggested by the case studies). In addition, other explana-
tions have been proposed for the decline in claims reported, including
the absence of attorney representation to inform the worker that a claim
may exist.
Quantitative Analysis of the NECA/IBEW Carve-Out 119
Indemnity and Medical Costs
Carve-out electricians had greater declines in both medical and
indemnity costs incurred as a percent of payroll than did electricians at
non-carve-out employers.  Electricians covered by the carve-out had
smaller declines in costs than non-electricians at carve-out employers
(who were not covered by the carve-out program). These results sug-
gest that any declines for carve-out electricians relative to their non-
carve-out electrician counterparts may have more to do with firm-spe-
cific characteristics, independent of carve-out programs. The evidence
gives additional support for using difference-in-differences methodol-
ogy to help control for such selection bias.
Incurred costs (what the insurer expects to pay out over the life of
the claim) should be interpreted cautiously. To the extent that insurers
factor in an expectation of a positive effect of carve-outs on the costs of
claims, this is reflected in lower reported incurred costs. More time is
needed to see if any such optimism affected insurers’ reserving prac-
tices and whether the optimism was warranted.
We also evaluated paid data (not shown here) that are only avail-
able on the more serious claims.  These individually reported claims
included all permanent disability and a small number of costly tempo-
rary disability claims.  These data were compared on the basis of aver-
age paid amounts per claim—the natural metric when looking for
declining benefits (as hypothesized by many critics of carve-outs).  The
evidence for the effect of carve-outs from paid data was similar to that
of incurred data.  Average medical costs paid per injury declined
slightly for injuries to carve-out electricians and also for non-carve-out
electricians and for non-electricians at carve-out firms. While average
payments differed across these groups in both periods, the proportional
change between periods was virtually identical.
In contrast to medical costs, average indemnity payments rose for
all three groups.  This is consistent with statutory increases in benefit
levels and with system-wide trends.  Indemnity paid per disability
claim was nearly identical for carve-out electricians as well as non-
carve-out electricians for both the pre- and post-periods. The non-elec-
trician occupations showed greater increases in indemnity paid per dis-
ability claim than electricians within the same carve-out firms (the
difference was not significant). Changes in costs per injury for carve-
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out electricians were consistently in the middle of the two comparison
groups, emphasizing the lack of significance of any changes.
Paid benefits per claim grow rapidly as claims age and mature.
Thus, if carve-out programs change the speed with which payments are
made, they will affect the comparison between carve-outs and non-
carve-outs at any point prior to the settlement of all claims. Speeding
up (or slowing down) the payment of indemnity, for example, by set-
tling cases more quickly (or slowly) will make it appear that carve-out
costs are higher (or lower), even if total costs will eventually be the
same.
In results not shown we examined the time required to return to
work after an injury. Mean weeks of temporary total disability, condi-
tional on an injury resulting in an indemnity claim reported through the
individual case record, declined for carve-out electricians by 0.3
weeks.  This decline was smaller than for non-carve-out electricians
(2.9 weeks, difference-in-differences t = 0.79) and for carve-out non-
electricians (12.5 weeks, difference-in-differences t = 2.96).  Median
weeks of temporary total disability rose for carve-out electricians but
not for the two comparison groups.  These findings provide no evi-
dence for hypothesis that carve-outs would show a greater rate of
reduction in time to return to work than non-carve-outs. This is consis-
tent with the case studies. 
Dispute Resolution Frequency
Table 7.3 presents data on the use of formal dispute resolution
mechanisms.  For the statutory system, these mechanisms include man-
datory settlement conferences and hearings.  For carve-outs, formal
dispute resolution mechanisms are Mediation and Arbitration.  Com-
parisons with carve-out non-electricians and non-carve-out electricians
are given. For brevity, we discuss only the latter comparison group.
The number of mandatory settlement conferences/mediations and
hearings/arbitrations held is small for both groups when measured as a
fraction of claims, even three to four years after injury.  However, the
frequency of usage of the first stage of formal dispute resolution mech-
anisms was not significantly different in the carve-out and control
groups.  Because settlements reached by joint agreement at mediation
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are generally thought to be superior to decisions imposed by a judge or
arbitrator, this would suggest a positive effect from ADR.
Arbitration showed a different pattern.  Workers in the carve-out
did not have disputes move beyond the more informal mediation stage
into arbitration, while a roughly constant 7 to 8 percent of cases pro-
ceeded to hearings in the statutory system.
In terms of injuries for carve-out electricians during the post-carve-
out period, there was a surprising level of activity reported in the
WCAB system. This included both mandatory settlement conferences
and hearings reported for the same Social Security Number and date of
injury. These cases were not included in the table.  If these were
included, the percent of carve-out claims with mediations or mandatory
settlement conferences would have been 12.2 percent and the percent
with arbitrations or hearings would have been 4.9 percent.  There are a
number of possibilities why carve-out claims might be adjudicated in
the statutory system. The insurer and injured worker  may have chosen
to ignore the carve-out process or the employee might have challenged
the carve-out process, which resulted in a mandatory settlement confer-
ence or hearing; or a cumulative injury may have involved more than
Table 7.3 Use of Formal Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (as a percent of 
serious injuries, specifically, those individually reported claims 












Electricians (carve-out firms) 7.0 7.3 6.3 0.0
Electricians (NECA non-
carve-out firms)
7.1 7.6 7.1 8.4
Non-electricians (carve-out 
firms)
18.3 1.9 6.1 5.6
Non-electricians (NECA non-
carve-out firms)
12.8 7.5 8.3 9.5
a These data refer to the dispute mechanisms involving individually reported claims
that also included the Social Security Number of the injured worker, allowing match-
ing to WCAB databases. MSC = mandatory settlement conferences, the first stage of
formal dispute resolution in the statutory system.  Hearings are the second stage of
formal dispute resolution in the statutory system.
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one employer, one of whom was not in the carve-out, and the employ-
ers and worker jointly agreed to adjudicate the claim within the statu-
tory system.5 
These data should be viewed cautiously. Mandatory settlement
conferences are not directly equivalent to mediations, and hearings are
not directly equivalent to arbitrations. We make these comparisons
solely to get a qualitative feel for whether dispute rates have increased
or decreased dramatically. Moreover, only a small percentage of the
injuries lead to disputes, so we do not have a large enough sample to
make meaningful comparisons of statistical significance.  Finally, to
the extent that the carve-out has increased or decreased reporting of
controversial claims, or decreased or increased reporting of claims that
would not lead to dispute, the carve-out dispute rates are biased up or
down.
Introduction of the ADR mechanism and increased control over
medical-legal evaluators under the carve-outs was anticipated to
reduce legal and medical-legal costs.  This was expected to be the
product of both fewer disputes and lower transaction costs when dis-
putes arose.  Average total dispute resolution costs—legal costs as well
as medical-legal costs for both applicant and defense —fell 6.5 percent
for carve-out electricians (Table 7.4). The rate of reduction in dispute
resolution costs was not better for carve-outs, given that the non-carve-
out electricians experienced a 14.5 percent decline and non-electricians
at carve-out firms experienced a 38 percent decline. Thus, we found no
support for the hypothesis that legal costs are lower in carve-outs.
Interestingly, the total legal cost for carve-outs at this stage of
claim maturity is under $50,000 for all claims per year.  It is unlikely
that reducing dispute costs will ever suffice to pay for maintaining
ADR unless there are other benefits to employees or employers. 
The NECA/IBEW carve-out imposed certain restrictions on the
involvement of attorneys at various stages in the claim resolution pro-
cess.  The ombudsperson was meant to replace some of the informa-
tional aspects of the attorney role and to resolve minor disputes that
might have led to the applicant hiring an attorney.  The NECA and
IBEW intended these services to reduce legal costs.  While total legal
costs were not reduced within the carve-out relative to the control
groups, the fraction of disability claims represented by an attorney
declined significantly faster for carve-out electricians than for non-
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Table 7.4 Dispute Resolution Cost of Disability Claims (per $1 million of exposure)
Pre-carve-out Post-carve-out % Change Difference
Std. error 
of diff. t
Electricians (at carve-out firms)
Average legal cost (paid) $880 $823 –6.5 $57 269 –0.21
Fraction of claims represented 0.374 0.193 –48.4 –0.181 0.049 –3.67
Electricians (outside carve-out)
Average legal cost (paid) $1,525 $1,305 –14.5 –$221 257 –0.86
Fraction of claims represented 0.355 0.320 –9.9 0.035 0.041 –0.87
Non-electricians (at carve-out firms)
Average legal cost (paid) $1,449 $897 –38.1 $551 432 –1.28
Fraction of claims represented 0.384 0.318 –17.2 0.066 0.081 –0.82
Difference-in-differences Mean Std. error t
Electricians: carve-out firms minus non-carve-out firms
Average legal cost/disability claim $163 372 –0.44
Fraction of disability claims represented –0.146 0.064 –2.28
Within carve-out firms: electricians minus non-electricians
Average legal cost/disability claim $494 372 0.44
Fraction of disability claims represented –0.115 0.095 –1.21
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carve-out electricians.  The difference was large relative to the non-
electrician control group, but the small number of presented claims in
the control group sample did not lead to a statistically significant find-
ing at conventional levels.
DISCUSSION
These results are quite preliminary, covering only 180 serious—
that is, individually reported—injuries within the carve-out. The results
may be sensitive to differences in injuries leading to claims and claim
maturity, the speed of closure for costly cases, and to the appearance of
a few high-cost claims.  Nevertheless, the general pattern is fairly clear.
There is evidence that employers joining the carve-out had better
safety records than did the non-carve-out electrical contractors. Claims
frequency relative to exposure was lower across injury types, but pre-
miums were significantly higher and experience modification levels
were similar. To the extent this weak evidence is correct, that carve-out
employers were systematically different before joining the carve-out,
then valid comparisons among carve-out and non-carve-out partici-
pants require the difference-in-differences methodology used here.  
The evidence for any effect of carve-outs on safety is weak. Claims
frequency relative to exposure declined slightly more rapidly among
carve-out employers, an effect more pronounced for more serious inju-
ries. While none of these comparisons was statistically significant, the
sign of the differences was consistent, with slight improvements in
safety or slightly reduced reporting of injuries. 
What is clear is that declines in frequency of claims were large for
all groups of employees for the policy years under study. This trend
emphasizes that analyzing carve-outs using a pre–post comparison
requires a control group and the difference-in-differences methodology
used here. Because the workers’ compensation system went through
massive changes in California in the mid-1990s, failure to use a control
group would lead to a serious overestimation of the carve-out’s effects
on safety.
There is no evidence to suggest that carve-outs reduced medical or
indemnity costs. Incurred costs as a percentage of exposure declined
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for all subgroups for both medical and indemnity costs. An exception
was non-carve-out electrician medical costs, which were essentially
unchanged. Rates of declines in incurred costs for electricians covered
by the carve-out always fell between those of non-carve-out electri-
cians and non-electricians within carve-out firms. In any case, no dif-
ferences were statistically significant. 
Comparisons of changes in paid data also provided no support for
early expectations that carve-outs would reduce costs. Similarly, the
time between injury and return to work as measured by weeks of tem-
porary total disability paid did not decline more quickly for injured
workers within carve-outs. 
The lack of effect of the NECA/IBEW carve-out on workers’ com-
pensation benefits carries implications both favorable and unfavorable.
On the unfavorable side, because benefit payments are the major cost
of workers’ compensation, there is no evidence to suggest that the
carve-out substantially reduced employer costs. This result may reduce
the enthusiasm of employers for forming new carve-outs. On the favor-
able side, there is no evidence to suggest that the carve-out reduced
benefits to which injured workers were entitled. In addition, reducing
the use of lawyers, if settlements are the same, can increase the level of
benefits paid to workers.  Lawyers receive 12 to 18 percent of a
worker’s settlement. This result may reduce concerns of organized
labor.
Cost reductions were most anticipated in the area of dispute resolu-
tion. Though medical and indemnity benefits are only indirectly
affected by carve-out mechanisms, the ADR process directly affects
resolution costs. Total legal and medical-legal costs declined for all
three subgroups. However, costs did not decline as rapidly for claims
by electricians in the carve-out as for the other subgroups. Increases in
defense legal costs offset the advantages of lower medical-legal and
applicant legal costs.
Legal costs are to some extent driven by the level of disputes.
There is little evidence that dispute frequency has been reduced by the
ADR process and ombudsperson. Strong assumptions are required to
compare dispute incidence between the ADR process and the statutory
system. However, there are no big changes in the frequency of first-
stage dispute resolution (mandatory settlement conference or media-
tion).  Contrary to conclusions drawn in earlier reports, disputes are not
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eliminated. Rather, they are infrequent in either system at early levels
of claim maturity and relative to the large number of claims, including
medical only, that are resolved quickly and simply.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Selection bias of safer employers joining the carve-out is a possi-
bility and changes in the workers’ compensation system were great
during the period of our study.  For both of these reasons, we employed
a difference-in-differences approach.  Even with this approach, the
analysis is hampered by small sample sizes and young claims that yield
inconclusive results. Moreover, these data come from a few years of
experience at a single carve-out and may not represent the experience
of other carve-outs. With these caveats in mind, there is no evidence to
suggest that carve-outs resulted in reduced costs of workers’ compen-
sation to employers or that carve-outs reduced the benefits received by
workers.
Notes
1. Three very large insurance companies that were interviewed reported rates of 5, 7,
and 10 percent for the portion of indemnity claims that are investigated by their
fraud units.
2. Data for medical-only claims and closed indemnity claims up to $2,000 are usu-
ally reported as a group by class code and the data include number of claims and
incurred medical and indemnity amounts.  Similarly, open or resolved temporary
indemnity claims less than $5,000 or closed temporary disability claims between
$2,000 and $5,000 are reported in the same detail but individually.  All other
claims are reported individually with all data indicated in the analysis.
3. At the same time, the shifting occupational mix of non-electricians is a concern
because the adjustment relies on additional assumptions and increases measure-
ment error.  Thus, we did not perform the most theoretically compelling analysis,
comparing the rates of change of carve-out electricians versus carve-out non-elec-
tricians with the same groups at non-carve-outs.  This difference-in-differences
analysis controls for common factors that affect all firms over time, all electri-
cians over time, and all carve-out employees at a given time.  It is also very sensi-
tive to measurement error.  Analysts with larger data sets may want to use this
method.
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4. Comparing the relative safety of non-electricians at carve-out and non-carve-out
employers prior to the introduction of carve-outs was also done.  However, these
comparisons required substantial adjustments for the mix of occupations and their
related frequencies of injury, and interpretation was therefore more difficult.  The
data are available from the authors upon request.
5. The authors have evaluated this issue with respect to cumulative injuries, and
based on the limited data available identifying cumulative injuries, found no evi-





In this chapter, we first summarize the study and note some of its
limitations.  We then present several recommendations and conclude
with a discussion of possible future research.
SUMMARY 
Structure of Carve-Outs
The structure of carve-outs varies enormously, even within the
limited experience of California’s first eight carve-outs.  Conclusions
about carve-outs in general need to be considered with this variation in
mind.  For example, our two case studies had very different structures.
The ESRP involved a one-time agreement of fixed duration for a single
large construction project.  The agreement was between a single self-
insured owner and all 17 construction trades for the local area.  Con-
tractors and subcontractors were required to participate in the carve-out
as a condition of bidding on project work. The agreement between the
NECA and the IBEW involves a periodically renegotiated agreement
that is consequently of indefinite length.  The agreement covers all
IBEW locals statewide;  NECA contractors can choose whether or not
to participate in the carve-out. 
In addition, carve-outs are new and continually evolving. Large
projects have fixed PLAs covering carve-out arrangements, but each
new large project builds upon past structures and the experience of the
participants.  Agreements that involve periodic renegotiations evolve
internally as parties improve their understanding of the arrangements
or come to understand the trade-off between the carve-out addendum
and other parts of the collective bargaining process.
Finally, as carve-outs have become better understood and more
common, new participants have become involved with new ideas and
possibly a different balance of interests in negotiations.  These partici-
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pants not only involve new employers, projects, and union locals, but
also different insurers and service providers.  A larger number of insur-
ers, especially the introduction of multiple insurers offering coverage
within the same carve-out, is likely to improve premium experience for
employers that participate in carve-outs through safety groups.  Simi-
larly, provider networks may offer products especially tailored for
carve-outs.  In particular, with unlimited medical control, forms of cap-
itation that would be less workable under the statutory system become
possible within carve-out arrangements. 
The statutory system is a “one-size-fits-all” approach. A valuable
aspect of the diversity in structure among carve-outs is the opportunity
to evaluate different innovations, innovations that may be useful to the
statutory system as well as to other carve-outs. Different carve-out
structures may result in different “best practice” solutions for different
situations.  For example, we have noted a dichotomy in the ombudsper-
sons’ backgrounds (medical versus legal) and approaches to the job
(proactive versus reactive) that roughly match the distinction between
single-owner, geographically limited projects and multiple-employer,
statewide carve-outs.  The differences in background and approach
offer learning through experimentation, and differences relative to
project structure offer insight into how the carve-out structure can
allow customized solutions to fit different situations. 
Overview of Preliminary Results
The data we collected on the NECA/IBEW carve-out is very pre-
liminary.  Nevertheless, it permits two gross generalizations to be
made.  First, the most optimistic predictions about the effects of carve-
outs on increased safety, lower dispute rates, far lower dispute costs,
and significantly more rapid return to work have not been realized.
Second, the most pessimistic predictions about effects on reduced ben-
efits and access to representation have not appeared.  Given the prelim-
inary state of the data and the fact that it involves only a single carve-
out, it is possible that one set of predictions will receive further verifi-
cation.  Additional data is also likely to give us a more nuanced view of
the effects of carve-outs.
Because the data are new and include a limited number of claims,
and because, as mentioned previously, the changes are not large, each
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comparison is not likely to be statistically significant.  However, this
does not mean that there are no smaller positive (or negative) changes
that will become apparent as the data mature.  Looking across all of the
measures, there is weak evidence that the NECA/IBEW carve-out
might be moderately successful at accomplishing some of its main
goals.
Across all types of claims (all claims, disability claims, and perma-
nent disability claims), the NECA/IBEW carve-out showed larger
declines in claim frequency than the two control groups.  These differ-
ences were small but consistent across each of the three claim types.
Considering indemnity benefits paid per claim, workers in the
carve-out had indemnity benefits that increased more (permanent dis-
ability) or declined less (total temporary disability) than the two con-
trol groups.  Again, the differences were small but consistent across
benefit types.
These data provide weak support for positive safety effects and
weak evidence that workers’ benefits were protected.  A second inter-
pretation would be that some characteristic of the carve-out such as
ADR or restrictions on attorneys reduced the reporting of minor
claims, leading to fewer reported claims and higher average benefits. 
The consequence of fewer claims but higher average benefits paid
per claim is that workers’ compensation costs did not decline as a share
of payroll more rapidly for carve-out members than for comparison
groups. Here the carve-out electricians are in the middle of the two
control groups on each category of benefit (medical and indemnity)
and on total benefits.  This result is consistent—all three groups experi-
enced nearly identical decreases in premiums. 
Finally, the data on legal costs under ADR are mixed and inconclu-
sive at this stage.  Carve-outs had lower medical-legal and applicant
legal costs than both control groups. Total legal costs improved less
than for either control group because defense legal costs increased
under the carve-out while they declined for both control groups. Attor-
ney representation showed a much larger decline for carve-out work-
ers, suggesting that applicant legal costs will remain low as these data
mature.  However, the rate of claim closure declined more rapidly for
carve-out claims, resulting in a higher percentage of open claims at the
time of the study. As more claims are resolved, applicant and defense
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legal costs, medical-legal costs, and the number of disputes on this set
of disability claims are likely to increase.
These data are based on young claims and encompass only two
years experience prior to and two years experience after formation of
the carve-out.  While there is no evidence of the large changes antici-
pated by early proponents of carve-outs, there is some evidence that the
NECA/IBEW carve-out demonstrated modest positive results.  The
comparison of carve-out electricians to non-carve-out electricians,
which attempts to control for occupation-specific characteristics, is
more convincing than the comparison between electricians and non-
electricians at carve-out firms, which attempts to control for firm spe-
cific characteristics.  Consequently, characteristics specific to firms
opting to join the carve-out may have been responsible for the small
(and not statistically significant) improvements in safety.
Safety 
Perhaps the most hopeful evidence for carve-outs was the decline
in injury rates at the initial Massachusetts site, Pioneer Valley (see
Chapter 2).  In contrast, evidence from the case studies in California
would not lead to expectations of improvement in safety. That is, both
NECA employers and the contractors at ESRP appeared to follow good
procedures with active safety committees and so forth.  At the same
time, no respondent claimed an improvement in safety due to coopera-
tion on workers’ compensation issues. 
Reported injury rates declined substantially at both carve-out and
non-carve-out employers in California during the study period.  Con-
sistent with the case study, our preliminary data analysis for the
NECA/IBEW carve-out did not indicate significantly more rapid
declines in reported injury rates for electricians within the carve-out
than for the groups.  
It is possible that the impressive reduction in reported injuries at
Pioneer Valley was due to better safety, but it may also have been due
to random fluctuation, normal improvement in safety as the project
progressed, reduced fraud, or discouraging legitimate claims due to
reduced attorney representation. 
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Medical Treatment and Evaluation
Employees had access to a large list of medical providers at the
case study sites (and at some other California carve-outs).  The use of a
large list of approved doctors increases choice of doctors during the
first month of treatment (when medical choice is usually restricted
under the statutory system).  At the same time, choice of doctors is
restricted after the first month of treatment (when medical choice is
nearly unrestricted under the statutory system).  Given the size of the
lists, we did not expect to see any reduction in medical costs. 
In fact, at the NECA/IBEW case study, preliminary data analysis
indicates that the rate of decline in incurred medical costs as a percent
of payroll was between the rates of change at the two control groups.
Similarly, paid medical costs per claim fell at a rate between the two
control groups. Thus, these findings do not support the hypothesis that
this carve-out substantially reduced medical benefits for employees.
There is also no evidence, however, that the carve-out arrangements
resulted in any savings on medical costs for participating employers. 
For the NECA/IBEW carve-out and most others, medical control
(restriction to the agreed list of medical providers) continues for the
life of the claim.  Medical costs are driven by a small percentage of
high cost claims, usually of long duration.  Consequently, carve-outs
might realize cost savings in the long run that are not apparent in these
early data. All cost data we analyzed relied on either a subset of pay-
ments or on insurers’ estimates; thus, they will change over time.
Importantly, we did not examine employees’ satisfaction with care.
Medical-legal costs per claim declined more quickly for carve-out
electricians than for the other two control groups.  However, the differ-
ences were not statistically significant.  In addition, a lower percentage
of carve-out claims had been resolved at the time of the study, suggest-
ing that medical-legal costs are likely to “develop” more quickly in the
carve-out as the remaining claims are resolved.
Indemnity Benefits
Opponents of carve-outs have expressed concerns that possible
limitations on due process and restrictions on the involvement of law-
yers would reduce indemnity payments received by injured workers.
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Indemnity payments did not decline disproportionately for covered
employees at the NECA/IBEW carve-out (California Applicant Attor-
neys Association 1998).  This result is subject to cautions because paid
benefits are evaluated early in the process and incurred benefits depend
on employers’ possibly biased estimates of future benefits.  Moreover,
we can do only limited adjustments for the severity of injuries. 
At the same time, if indemnity benefits declined slightly in a carve-
out and the use of lawyers declined substantially, then employees’ net
benefits (after paying roughly 12  to 18 percent of their award to a law-
yer) may actually increase.  Conversely, even if injured workers’
indemnity benefits, net of legal costs, are similar or higher within
carve-outs, workers could still miss a range of benefits that were not
evaluated here (e.g., serious and willful or wrongful termination viola-
tions or penalties for unnecessary delays in payment of benefits). In
addition, other benefits (e.g., through the Americans with Disability
Act) or third-party claims against employers that are outside the system
could be reduced by lack of representation.  These potential benefits
were also not part of the data we evaluated.
Identifying High-Quality Caregivers
The early results provide no evidence for any difference in the
speed or quality of care or of more rapid return to work.
The selection of medical doctors and vocational rehabilitation pro-
viders offers an opportunity for integrative bargaining by unions and
management.  Specifically, the two parties can bargain for a list of pro-
viders that restricts the most egregious “company doctors” or “appli-
cants’ doctors.”   Ensuring a mainstream choice can improve care and
cut costs because the primary treating physician has a presumption of
correctness in medical-legal evaluation and treatment decisions. 
In the detailed case studies, as well as in the survey of carve-outs,
we did not find unions and employers making such a bargain.  At
ESRP and NECA/IBEW, a very large list of medical doctors was pro-
vided.  The bias against employees was low, but the cost savings may
have been foregone.  In contrast, at the Cherne carve-outs, the com-
pany chose a tightly restricted list of treating doctors and qualified
medical examiners.  This process may have lowered costs but at the
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risk of treatment and evaluations biased against employees.  Again, the
integrative solution was not chosen. 
One obstacle to the integrative solution is that unions often do not
have the detailed knowledge of doctors that might be useful when
negotiating the carve-out.  Applicant lawyers may have this knowl-
edge, but they might not share it with the unions, with whom they have
an adversarial relationship over the issue of carve-outs.   Several carve-
out administrators acknowledged reluctance to seek the assistance of
the applicant and/or defense bar in selecting physicians.  Employers
have access to this knowledge through the carve-out insurer.  Given
this asymmetric knowledge, it is logical that the provider lists were rel-
atively unrestricted (maybe sub-optimally for both groups) and the pro-
vider lists were sometimes highly restrictive favoring the employee
where labor’s position was weaker.
To some extent the failure of cost reduction may be due to carve-
outs’ lack of use of the tools at its disposal.  Carve-outs provide a natu-
ral model for integrating occupational and non-occupational care. This
powerful model ensures employees a choice of physician,  probably
including their own non-occupational physician.  It also may improve
unions’ and employers’ incentives to pick high-quality medical doc-
tors, as the preferred provider organization of medical doctors is used
for both industrial and other care. 
Permitting employees to visit their own doctor is a powerful check
on employers’ incentives to pick “company doctors.”  At the same
time, at the geographically remote ESRP and for the small number of
employees the research team interviewed for the NECA/IBEW case
study, most employees received all of their care from the doctor to
whom they were initially directed by the employer at the time of injury. 
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Alternative dispute resolution can potentially improve both effi-
ciency and process.  Efficiency arguments supporting ADR are that it
is a faster, and therefore less expensive, process than traditional litiga-
tion.  Efficiency rationales are by far the most commonly cited justifi-
cations for the adoption of ADR in workers’ compensation carve-outs.
However, the quantitative analysis (with its very small sample size) did
not support the efficiency rationale.  The process was not significantly
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cheaper and the claims closed somewhat more slowly.  The limited
data on dispute resolution time frames does suggest that while claims
close more slowly, the process is quicker in the carve-outs once a dis-
pute reaches the formal resolution stage (mediation in a carve-out,
mandatory settlement conference or a hearing in the statutory process). 
Process rationales suggest that ADR processes are more satisfying
and produce better outcomes through less contentious methods of dis-
pute resolution. The position of ombudsperson is critical to much of the
process rationale.  The ombudsperson plays an important role as a
source of information to avoid disputes and as an early negotiator
between parties to resolve disputes before they reach the more formal
stages of mediation or arbitration.
The role of the ombudsman
The classic ombudsperson is a “staff” position.  For example, stan-
dard disputes in a workplace go up the managerial chain of command,
while the ombudsperson provides an alternative avenue for dispute res-
olution that is not part of the standard process.  Moreover, the ombuds-
man has a role in working for systemic changes to avoid future
disputes and inequities. 
The organizational ombudsperson is a designated neutral or impar-
tial dispute resolution practitioner whose major function is to provide
confidential information and informal assistance to managers, employ-
ees, and/or clients of the employer (e.g., patients, students, suppliers, or
customers).
Within carve-out ADR, the ombudsperson is a hybrid of the classi-
cal and the organizational traditions.  In addition, the ombudsman is
the first line in all dispute resolution and has a role that is written into
both statute and the CBAs.  Corresponding to the greater role in all dis-
putes, the ombudsperson is not a consultant to the organizations’
heads; thus, the ombudsperson’s job description does not include
working for systemic change.  At the same time, the case studies and
interviews presented a number of examples where an ombudsperson
has made important contributions to the evolution and improvement of
a carve-out agreement. Consequently, many comments on early drafts
of this report argued that the term ombudsperson was misleading and
should not be applied to this hybrid position even if the term was used
in the originating legislation.  At present the ombudsperson duties
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often involve both the classical and organizational traditions with the
addition of new responsibilities.   This combination of roles is not with-
out problems.  
An implication of the nontraditional role that the carve-out
ombudspersons played is a weaker attachment to the professional
norms of the ombudsperson role; most importantly, the norm of confi-
dentiality.  The code of ethics of the American Ombudspersons Asso-
ciation requires written permission before the facts of any case are
discussed. In contrast, some of the ombudspersons we interviewed
would have been willing to testify at arbitration. The extreme version
of the confidentiality norm probably should not apply in carve-outs: if
an employee asks for help getting a late check, it does not make sense
for the ombudsperson to require written permission to discuss the situ-
ation with the insurer. Nevertheless, it is essential that employees in
disputes know their discussions will be held in confidence. 
Some ombudspersons also face the problem of an appearance of
impropriety, which can arise in two fashions.  Some work directly for
the employer, which reduces the credibility of neutrality.  Others are
formally independent but are looking for more employers and unions
to sign up with them.  To the extent these “carve-out entrepreneurs”
have a harder time signing up employers than unions, they have an
incentive to reduce costs—potentially at the expense of employees.  (In
California during this study employers tended to be more difficult to
sign up than unions.  The incentives for ombudspersons would be
reversed in cases where employers wanted carve-outs more than
unions did.)  These incentives to reduce costs can be especially trouble-
some for cases of severe injuries or for potential serious and willful
violations, where the employer (not the insurer) pays any penalty.
An important motive for establishing carve-outs was to reduce
employees’ confusion about the workers’ compensation system, partic-
ularly relating to dispute resolution.  Carve-outs, because they are
novel, can actually worsen the confusion if an injured employee
receives mixed information from colleagues, union officials, and/or
lawyers.  Several employees and union officials provided examples of
such confusions, particularly because employees did not appear aware
of the carve-out prior to injury and in a number of cases, the officials of
the union locals were likewise uninformed. 
138 Chapter 8
The expanded role of the ombudsperson within carve-outs, espe-
cially the critical role as information source, highlights two important
dichotomies that were detailed earlier: a proactive versus reactive
approach to contacting workers, and a medical versus legal back-
ground.  Given the promise of the informational role, the proactive
ombudsperson—that is, one who contacts each employee at the time of
injury—appears more appropriate than a reactive ombudsperson—one
who awaits contact from an employee.  This proactive model appeared
to be the direction towards which most carve-outs were evolving dur-
ing the study period.
The dichotomy of medical versus legal background was more diffi-
cult to judge.  Carve-out ombudspersons with medical and case man-
agement backgrounds were closely associated with early, large projects
with on-site medical care.  Newer large project carve-outs have split
over this approach. For example, the National Ignition Facility opted
for an ombudsperson with a legal background while the Inland Feeder
project opted for one with a medical background.  
The tendency has been to move toward a legal background.  The
survey and case studies conducted by the research team revealed legal
issues to be the most common questions and important areas of dispute
faced by ombudspersons.  However, ombudspersons with medical/case
management backgrounds were responsible for the innovation of a pro-
active approach.   It remains to be seen if the proactive approach
becomes the norm and if the background of the ombudsperson is
important to implementing this aspect of their role effectively.
The role of lawyers
We found a gap between 1) employees’ perception of access to
lawyers and 2) ombudspersons’ claims of informing workers and let-
ters sent by insurers.  The ombudspersons all claimed to inform work-
ers of their rights to an attorney, and the letters that we have seen from
two of the insurers were clear on the issue.  At the same time, virtually
all of the injured workers reported that they were told they could not
have an attorney.  Apparently, the message is not being communicated
successfully. 
We also found a set of injuries that involve gray areas of the law.
For these, it is unlikely that an employee will be well served without a
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lawyer to push his or her claim.  It was appropriate for the ombudsmen
to refer employees to lawyers in such cases, as they sometimes did.
This carve-out system has several difficulties with respect to law-
yers.  To the extent that lawyers will be involved only in the most diffi-
cult cases, they may not be able to support themselves on the
customary level of fees.  Conversely, if lawyers become involved in
cases that are fairly clear-cut, their customary level of fees will out-
weigh their value to employees. 
The role of arbitrators
Given the short history of the carve-outs, we have no evidence on
which to base an analysis of arbitrations.  Arbitrators in ADR are tradi-
tionally permitted wide latitude to achieve substantive justice, even if
they do not follow precedent.  On the one hand, this flexibility permits
solutions to best fit facts.  The entire goal of carve-outs is to increase
flexibility and promote decentralization.  On the other hand, arbitrators
should follow WCAB precedents to avoid inequity, increase predict-
ability, and ensure that (as required by law) the ADR process does not
harm workers. 
One important advantage of arbitration in other contexts was not a
potential advantage in carve-out ADR.  Traditionally, arbitration
allowed parties to choose an arbitrator with a specialized knowledge of
the subject area in dispute.  There is no reason to see this as an advan-
tage in carve-outs or for that matter as an alternative to other adminis-
trative law processes.  The alternative to ADR arbitration is a hearing
before a workers’ compensation administrative law judge who special-
izes in this particular area of administrative law.  In fact, the arbiters
chosen to date by carve-outs have all been retired Workers’ Compensa-
tion Judges.
Dispute rates
Proponents of carve-outs hoped that they would greatly reduce dis-
pute rates and costs.  Opponents of carve-outs feared that lower dispute
rates would largely indicate a lack of benefits and access to representa-
tion. Differences in definitions of a dispute and of a “level” of dispute
resolution, the small sample of cases, and the fact that we analyzed
data from only two carve-outs limit our confidence in the generaliz-
ability of our findings.  Nevertheless, so far dispute rates are not sub-
140 Chapter 8
stantially different between carve-outs and the statutory system.
Representation by lawyers is significantly lower in carve-outs, but it is
still common. Thus, we do not support the hypothesis that employees
have no recourse to appeal ombudsman and insurer decisions.  The
downside of these findings is that dispute resolution costs within carve-
outs do not appear lower than in the statutory system.   
Wrongful termination, serious and willful, and 
third-party claims
Carve-outs are intended to deal with workers’ compensation
claims.  The situation is complicated, however, because many workers’
compensation claims, particularly the most serious, can involve wrong-
ful termination, serious and willful violation claims, or third-party
claims.  These put the ombudsperson, for example, in a conflict of
interest; he or she is hired in part by the employer but can be helping an
employee sue the employer for a serious safety violation. 
Third-party claims are more complex.  At some work sites, the
third party would be (for example) an equipment maker, and the
ombudsperson would have no conflict of interest.  On a PLA, in con-
trast, the third party might be another subcontractor whose liability
costs (including third-party claims) are paid by the project owner under
a large-deductible, owner-controlled insurance policy. When the
ombudsperson’s employment (either at this site or at future sites)
depends on satisfying the project owner, such third-party claims can
present a conflict of interest.
Some ombudspersons would prefer to move these issues to the
statutory system.  However, this leads to problems of jurisdiction shop-
ping (if the entire claim moves to the statutory system) or to delays and
extra hearings (if the case must be heard once in the carve-out ADR
and once in the statutory system). 
The role of unions
The principle of carve-outs is that employers and unions can create
a better alternative than the state-run system.  A presumption is that
both sides will know if the new system is meeting their members’
needs. A critical component of a successful internal responsibility sys-
tem is careful scrutiny by both sides.
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In fact, few union leaders were following the progress of the carve-
out.  As far as we could tell, no union leader surveyed or systematically
spoke with injured employees about the impact of the carve-out. In the
case study of the NECA/IBEW carve-out and several interviews with
union officials, it was consistently mentioned that there was very little
understanding or even knowledge of the existence of carve-outs at the
level of the union local.  
The statutory system evolved incrementally through a balance of
political forces representing various coalitions of interest groups.  The
balance of power among interest groups varies over time, but any
change is still usually incremental.  Carve-outs are more experimental
and subject to wider structural variation.  Consequently, the balance of
power between the negotiating parties and the resulting agreements
have potentially more impact on outcomes for injured workers.  Pre-
liminary work (shown in Appendix B) suggests that the favorability of
current carve-outs for injured workers may reflect in part the strength
of union and management bargaining power when the carve-out was
negotiated.   When unions are strong and well-informed relative to
management, the agreements are more favorable to injured workers.
If this is true and workers are risk averse, unions may be less willing to
enter into new agreements unless the benefits are clear.  Knowledge
gained through monitoring of current agreements can improve the like-
lihood that carve-outs benefit workers and, thus, the willingness of
unions to participate.
The Problem of Boundaries
“Carve-outs” cannot fully carve out a new system that handles all
the problems of injured workers.  In our cases, we saw interactions of
carve-outs with unfair termination, serious and willful claims, third-
party claims, the WCAB, and the court system.  Injured workers also
can receive benefits from State Disability Insurance, Social Security
Disability Insurance, and Department of Rehabilitation.  Employers
must contend with rules from Cal-Occupational Safety and Health
Agency, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act.  Problems may arise when employees
switch among employers, particularly after a carve-out ends.  The cre-
ation of 24-hour care reduces some complexities, but it adds new forms
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of interaction concerning payments for long-term medical care
between the workers’ compensation insurer, the worker (if he receives
a lump sum payment for a work-related injury), and the union-manage-
ment health and welfare trust. 
Each of these interactions has its own complex logic and history.
For example, few argue that employers and unions should be able to
opt out of the protection of the Americans with Disabilities Act.  At the
same time, the linkages limit the ability of the participants in the new
system to create a coherent alternative system for injured employees.
That is, too often participants think about an alternative system of
workers’ compensation but, from the injured employees’ perspective
(or that of a small business), workers’ compensation is but a piece of
the puzzle they confront.  
Related to the complexities of the interactions we described above,
the workers’ compensation system remains incredibly complex even
after a carve-out.  Carve-outs can help streamline some aspects that
facilitate coherence from the injured workers’ perspective (e.g., per-
mitting employees to use their regular doctors).  At the same time, the
system remains incomprehensible to most participants.  From the per-
spective of injured workers and of all but the largest employers, creat-
ing a simpler system is crucial to providing proper incentives for
prevention and appropriate care and incentives after an injury. 
Limitations of This Study
A preliminary study such as this one is subject to a number of lim-
itations. 
Most obviously, the qualitative study covered a sample of two and
the quantitative study (though it covered hundreds of employers and
thousands of injuries) covered only one carve-out.  Given the encour-
aging (if less carefully estimated) reports coming from other states, the
general lack of effect of NECA/IBEW carve-out may not be represen-
tative.
The quantitative analysis is subject to its own limitations.  The
sample size of serious injuries was (fortunately for employees) small,
and we do not have true medical or indemnity cost data on claims. It is
crucial to understand if the carve-out changed injured employees’ entry
into the workers’ compensation system.  Any system can look good by
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reducing the proportion of injuries that are reported, and we did not
measure changes in reporting practices.
Carve-outs are new and better practices may evolve over time,
implying that future carve-outs may have fewer problems and better
results than the initial ones. The initial costs of starting a carve-out
(writing contracts, and so forth) should decline as these documents
become more standardized and as litigation declines after courts clarify
their legal status.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Subject to the many qualifications noted above, this section pro-
vides recommendations to the parties involved in carve-outs, including
unions, employers, insurers, lawyers, ombudspersons, and the state. 
The Bottom Line
Overall, we found no evidence that carve-outs operating in Califor-
nia in 1997 made employees worse off.  Thus, we did not find evidence
that carve-outs should be curtailed.  Moreover, we found no evidence
against expanding carve-outs to other industries in settings where both
employers and unions agree they can be mutually beneficial. 
At the same time, the logic of decentralizing the workers’ compen-
sation system requires that employees be represented in designing the
alternative system.  Thus, expanding carve-outs to nonunion settings
seems quite problematic. 
Moreover, the same logic implies that employees are less likely to
benefit from carve-outs unless unions actively monitor the experience
of their members with providers and the dispute resolution process.
We did not observe much evidence of such monitoring. 
We also found little evidence that the few carve-outs we studied in
detail successfully reduced costs.  Given the anecdotal and (limited)
quantitative evidence from other states that do suggest substantial cost
savings, future research is clearly called for.  In the meantime, we
describe below several possible policies unions and employers can
adopt to realize cost savings without reducing quality of care.  These
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recommendations may raise costs, but they may also improve the qual-
ity of decision making and care.
Identifying High-Quality Caregivers
Unions and employers should work together to eliminate the few
doctors, medical examiners, and vocational rehabilitation providers
with records of extremely high-cost or limited service.  Eliminating a
modest number of service providers from the list of potential providers
should permit both higher quality care and lower cost. 
Develop a Comprehensive Regulation
California should develop a comprehensive regulation that would
bring uniformity to some elements of the carve-outs while still permit-
ting adaptation experimentation in individual carve-outs. It should
address the issues presented below.  To the extent that no regulation
covers these topics, CBAs should ensure that employees have the
appropriate protections. 
Create standards for the ombudsman
The regulation and any CBA should require that ombudspersons
demonstrate familiarity or a plan to acquire familiarity, as well as pro-
vide a plan for continued learning for the following topics: ombudsper-
sons’ role, mediation, negotiation, workplace safety, workers’ compen-
sation, occupational medicine, and ethics.
A requirement could be written using minimalist criteria, requiring
only a demonstration of competence. Competence could be demon-
strated from prior job descriptions (e.g., a vocational nurse can show
competence in workplace safety from past professional duties, a retired
workers’ compensation judge has familiarity with workers’ compensa-
tion) or from completion of a class within the last six months.  Contin-
ued learning could be shown with subscriptions to relevant
publications, participate in relevant conferences and professional asso-
ciations, or classes taken annually.
Alternatively, training standards could be mandated in more detail;
for example, with a continuing education requirement included in
reporting to DWC. 
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An important part of the qualifications for the ombudsperson job is
knowing what they do not know.  Unions and employers should ask
ombudsperson candidates to describe some of the gray areas of the
workers’ compensation law.  It is important that ombudspersons under-
stand that, for some difficult cases with potentially large settlements, it
is appropriate and important to recommend that the injured worker
seek legal consultation with an attorney.  
Remove appearance of ombudsman partiality
The regulation and/or CBA should require all ombudspersons to
work for joint management-labor workers’ compensation trusts (as
opposed to directly for employers), or to be protected by specifically
enumerated contractual terms that include rules to ensure neutrality
and avoid the appearance of conflicts of interest in hiring, training, and
retention.
As long as the ombudsperson is marketing the carve-out, he or she
will have a strong incentive to focus on the needs of the party who is
most leery of the new processes.  Thus, limitations on marketing may
also be appropriate.
Improve confidentiality
The regulation and/or CBA should prohibit ombudspersons from
disclosing information to any of the parties without consent. Such con-
sent would be implied when an employee asks for assistance in matters
such as a late check, but confidentiality should be guaranteed in mat-
ters of conflict. 
The ombudsman should not be permitted to testify during the
mediation and arbitration stages without the written consent of all par-
ties. 
Wrongful terminations, serious and willful, and
multiple-employer disputes
The interaction of carve-outs with wrongful terminations and seri-
ous and willful claims is not easy to resolve.  At a minimum, the steps
described above to improve ombudsman neutrality are called for. 
Some CBAs specifically exclude these areas as issues. When they
are not excluded from ADR, the ombudspersons were generally in
favor of moving these disputes to the statutory system.  The ombuds-
146 Chapter 8
persons’ discomfort is due in part to the statutory provisions that the
penalty on any award for serious and willful, or wrongful termination
violations on any award, is paid by the employer, not the insurer.
Unfortunately, the movement of some or all of cases to the statutory
system creates problems of its own.  
It would be possible to pursue these issues in the statutory system
while the case-in-chief was pursued in the carve-out.  The process
could require determination of violations in one system and penalties
(as a percent of award) in another system. This would slow decision
making, increase costs, and reduce the ability to negotiate compromise
over all issues.
Alternatively, if the serious and willful or wrongful termination
claims trigger jurisdiction by the statutory system for the whole case,
then lawyers that venue shop could attach one of these as an issue to
any case they want brought at the statutory system instead of the carve-
out’s ADR.
We have no specific recommendation here, other than to create
further experimentation with different systems and monitor actual rates
of use, outcomes for employees, and transaction costs for each system.
To date there have been no problems resolving multiple-employer
claims.  However, it is not clear if the injured worker has the discretion
to bring a claim in the system of his or her choice, and whether an
employer could object to a claim being resolved in one system or the
other.  One solution proposed was to have these claims arbitrated under
the Section 5272 arbitration procedures of the statutory system.  Alter-
nately, the adjudication could take place within the system of the
employer first notified.  Since benefits are supposed to be equivalent
across systems, there should be no systematic bias in favor of either
party.
How are carve-out injuries adjudicated after the carve-out arrange-
ment has ended?
No concern seems justified.  The statutory system always exists as
a venue for resolution of a worker’s claim when the carve-out arrange-
ment is not in place.  Some CBAs specifically devolve this authority to
the statutory system; some have less clear language.  These agreements
specify that the carve-out will adjudicate all issues on claims filed
within 90 days of the termination/expiration of the carve-out agree-
ment.  Claims filed after that would be the responsibility of the WCAB.
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This ignores the issue of claims filed prior to expiration of the carve-
out on which the disputes arise months or years in the future.  Clearer
language within the CBA would direct that disputes occurring after the
expiration or dissolution of the carve-out would revert to the statutory
system. 
Worker Contact
The principal benefit of ombudsperson programs for injured work-
ers is ready access to information and personal assistance in the resolu-
tion of problems arising from their workplace injuries.  This assistance
ideally can prevent the unnecessary escalation of conflicts that are
information-based from maturing into, or being recharacterized as,
conflicts that are rights-based and therefore costlier for both stakehold-
ers and the system.  Indeed, all the carve-outs currently in place must
be seen as first-generation programs, each with features that are both
redeeming and troubling. When the best of the programs are pulled
together into a single vision, one can readily see how the ombudsper-
son office has the exciting and unique potential to provide comprehen-
sive services to injured workers: a personal shepherd to guide
individual workers through the system from injury to settlement; a
clearinghouse for medical and legal information (including references
to both doctors and attorneys as appropriate); and, ultimately, an agent
of change to improve health services while minimizing conflicts and
improving workplace safety and, possibly, culture.  If realized, such
potential would not only call for the continuation of carve-out pro-
grams in the construction industry, but it would encourage the expan-
sion of their availability to other industries.  Carve-outs might also act
as a template for focusing expansion of information and assistance
efforts by the regulatory agency in the statutory system.
Collective bargaining agreements should consider adoption of a
proactive contact by the ombudsperson, so that all injured employees
(or at least those with disability claims exceeding some minimum num-
ber of days) know of their rights and have information on how to con-
tact the ombudsperson. The evolution of carve-outs in this direction is
strong evidence of the effectiveness of this approach.  In the section on
future research we propose a study to determine objectively the impact
of the proactive approach.
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The Role of Unions
Insurers and employers automatically receive information on
workers’ compensation costs.  Unions do not automatically receive
information on outcomes for employees.  Thus, for effectiveness and
continuous improvement of carve-outs, union leaders should follow up
with injured employees.  For example, a short phone call or a one-page
survey asking about quality of care and about dispute resolution might
be helpful. The mere presence of this feedback will give insurers and
ombudsmen better incentives to provide high-quality service to injured
employees.  
Given the busy schedule of most union officials, coupled with the
relatively small number of seriously injured employees, the effect of
this recommendation is unclear.  At the same time, the credibility of
decentralized regulation depends on ongoing participation by union
leaders. 
The Role of Lawyers
Attorney participation in ADR
Attorney participation in ADR is controversial in at least two
important respects: whether they should be involved in the process at
all and, if they are, what their proper role should be.  On the first issue,
some contend that attorneys should not be involved in mediation at all
because mediation is a party-driven process which seeks to get beyond
legal issues to the underlying causes of the dispute; the presence of
lawyers will only lead to the domination of legal standards in a process
that seeks to get beyond such standards.  Because of the problem of
power imbalances, this is increasingly a minority view.  The issue of
role, then, becomes more important. Whether the lawyers should
assume their traditional role of primary spokesman and advocate for
their clients and the standards by which they should assess and provide
counsel on the ultimate mediation agreement are the subject of vigor-
ous debate in the dispute resolution community.
Ultimately a recommendation on the point may be made moot by
two developments.  First the courts may take up the issue of restrictions
on employee representation.  In Costa v. WCAB, the 4th District of the
California Court of Appeals clearly wanted the sides to raise in oral
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arguments the issue of labor unions’ ability to limit, through collective
bargaining, workers’ right for representation by attorneys.  At some
point a case on that issue is likely to be brought before the courts.  Sec-
ond, the role of the proactive ombudsperson is meant to eliminate
many early issues that can result in dispute, intervene in disputes early
reducing the need for mediation, and assist workers at mediation as
appropriate.  As such, this early, proactive intervention is expected to
eliminate many of the disputes on which opponents think attorney par-
ticipation is counterproductive. Restrictions on attorney representation
at mediation may be unnecessary if the ombudsperson is proactive.
This is even more true if injured workers are well informed about the
cost of attorney contingency fees and if future research confirms our
finding that employees’ benefits are protected within carve-outs
despite lower attorney participation.
Referring lawyers
Attorneys play an important role, even in ADR, in resolving diffi-
cult cases.  Due to the apparent conflict of interest, the ombudsperson
should not refer injured workers directly to lawyers.  One alternative is
to refer the worker to the union business agent for recommendations to
attorneys.  The business agent may want to provide a list of recom-
mended lawyers to the ombudsperson to reduce delays.
Employee versus employer representation
An unrepresented party is often disadvantaged when contesting a
decision against a party with legal representation. The data section
reviewed data from a carve-out that at least suggests that this imbal-
ance may be a problem.   Some CBAs require the insurer to pay legal
costs for the worker if that worker prevails at the latter stage(s) of the
ADR process.  Collective bargaining parties may want to review these
arrangements and strengthen the protections for the unrepresented
worker.
Attorney fees
Carve-outs should have all settlements reviewed for adequacy by
an arbitrator or agreed legal authority.  In such a system the mechanism
is in place to assign attorney’s fees just as they are in the statutory sys-
tem. The arbitrator would set the fees at settlement, just as they are set
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in the statutory system.  There have been no issues raised concerning
attorneys’ fees within the carve-outs on the numerous represented
cases, but this rule would resolve any potential issues in the area and
establish procedures that are not present in some agreements for review
of settlements for adequacy.
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY
The unionized construction industry in California is a large sector.
At the same time, the experience of carve-outs in one state has implica-
tions that are much wider.  Most directly, carve-outs in other states
should draw on the lessons outlined above.  Legislatures and regulators
considering initial rules to permit carve-outs may want to include many
of the protections listed above.
If carve-outs are successful in construction, they may be permitted
in other industries within California. Construction is a leading con-
tender for carve-outs because of its high injury rates and workers’ com-
pensation costs.  At the same time, as the study makes clear, the short
duration of almost all construction jobs greatly complicates carve-outs.
Thus, unionized employers in other industries with modest workers’
compensation costs and longer-duration employment relations may
find carve-outs to be effective.
Our results present a number of cautions about when carve-outs
will effectively protect employees.  At the same time, we found no evi-
dence of harm from carve-outs that should inhibit the dissemination of
an appropriate version to other industries.
More generally, the principles of ADR may be helpful in other
spheres of employment regulation.  For example, the principle of
“carving out” a sphere of regulation if a high-quality substitute pro-
gram has been approved by employees may apply to other areas.  Reg-
ulations such as unemployment insurance, safety, employee
involvement, and other areas might benefit from experimentation.  A
lesson learned in the California construction industry is that employee
representatives must remain active partners for deregulation to achieve
its goals.  At the same time, an important limitation of decentralization
is that trade union leaders have little time for the minutiae of workers’
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compensation and that unions with relatively weak bargaining posi-
tions initially appeared willing to accept alternative workers’ compen-
sation systems that were likely to be less favorable to injured
employees. 
These latter lessons apply to ADR in other areas of employment
regulation.  The courts are increasingly willing to permit employers to
unilaterally impose ADR programs on employees, often with only min-
imal quality standards.  Given the concerns we noted about programs
that did have union oversight, nonunion ADR programs would be even
more suspect.  (Texas, for example, permits employers to opt to handle
all workers’ compensation claims through the tort system.  Thus, an
ADR system unilaterally established by the company that includes
mandatory binding arbitration is legal [Barrier 1998].)
The strength of carve-outs was often the presence of an ombud-
sperson who contacted each injured worker and helped him or her nav-
igate the complex system.  Both private employers and the statutory
system should continue to experiment with such proactive systems.
There is some evidence that employees with better understanding of
the system return to work more rapidly (Daniels 1997). 
For example, Information and Assistance officers in the statutory
system  assist employees in navigating the workers’ compensation sys-
tem but only after employees first contact the Information and Assis-
tance office.  It would be worth experimenting to see if a proactive
approach would help employees avoid the many pitfalls in the statutory
system.  For example, half of a set of new claims could be given to
Information and Assistance officers for proactive contact and half
could be treated under current rules.  Employee satisfaction, post-
injury earnings, and the outcomes studied in this volume could all be
compared. 
Future Research
Carve-outs permit experimentation.  Nobody knows how to create
a coherent workers’ compensation system that best reduces injuries,
has low costs, and guarantees injured workers’ standard of living.
Thus, the workers’ compensation system must be open to experimenta-
tion and learning.   This conclusion has two implications. 
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First, the law states that carve-outs cannot reduce benefits to work-
ers.  This law cannot be interpreted to mean that carve-outs not reduce
benefits to a single employee under any scenario. Instead, each
employee must be made better off by joining the system at the time of
joining, even if some risks are shifted. 
For example, consider the case where, in the state system with a
given set of facts, a judge would hold half the time for the injured
worker and half the time for the employer. Thus, the employee would
receive either $1000 or $0. Because the facts are quite close in this
case, the decision is random from the employees’ point of view.  Fur-
ther, assume (as California Applicant Attorneys Association claims is
likely) that an arbitrator in the carve-out splits the difference and pro-
vides a sure $500.  In this situation, a risk-averse employee would pre-
fer the carve-out, though ex post half of the workers find themselves
worse off than in the state system.  Interpreting the current law to make
this situation illegal leaves workers worse off since it does not harm
employers and it makes employees better off in an ex ante sense.  It
should suffice that a rational employee should prefer at the time of
injury to be in the carve-out, not that they are never harmed by the
move to ADR. 
Second, experimentation is only valuable if there are mechanisms
in place for evaluation and feedback.  Employers, insurers, and unions
all have a stake in studying what is working and what is not.  As noted
above, the research in this report is very preliminary.  At the same time,
carve-outs are perhaps only worth having if follow-up studies will help
stakeholders monitor what is working and modify what is not.  More-
over, such monitoring is a public good because many of the lessons can
apply to other carve-outs and to the statutory system as well. Thus, it is
appropriate for the state to be involved in such studies. 
Finally, the outcomes observed at current carve-outs are imperfect
indicators of how future carve-outs will perform.  Even if carve-outs in
one study have poor outcomes, future carve-outs may learn from them
and perform better. 
One starting point for future research is repeating the current study
design with more years of data and more carve-outs.  For large projects
with hundreds of subcontractors, it might be possible to find a compar-
ison project with a similar mix of tasks. 
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A powerful methodology for evaluating the longer term effects of
carve-outs on employees is to follow up their earnings over time (an
outcome measured used by Peterson et al. [1998], in another context).
It would be important to see if carve-outs do better or worse at provid-
ing higher benefits to injured employees who, in fact, do not return to
full-time work.  
Finally, it would also be useful to survey employees about the
quality of care they received and about their perceptions of fairness
with dispute resolution.  Past research on ADR suggests that even if
observable outcomes are similar, employees who participate in ADR
procedures may be more satisfied with the outcomes.
In conclusion, experimentation is necessary for learning to occur,
but only if that experimentation is monitored and participants receive
feedback.  Carve-outs need feedback systems to current participants
such as union leaders as well as to stakeholders, ranging from injured




Potential for Phony Unions
A potential problem with carve-outs is the possibility that employers could
set up sham unions for the exclusive purpose of qualifying for a carve-out.  A
case in point is found in an application to the DWC in 1993 by the Builders
Staff Corporation (BSC).  The BSC was a multi-trade construction company
that leased construction workers to contractors.
In a posted advertisement titled “Evolve or Die,” the BSC stated their com-
pany assumed workers’ compensation coverage for the workers they provided
to construction contractors.  The BSC also assumed all employee-related risks
such as wrongful termination lawsuits and lawsuits alleging discrimination in
hiring, promotion, or firing under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
When BSC filed for a carve-out in October of 1993, they claimed their em-
ployees were represented by the United Association of Construction Workers
(UACW).  As part of the applications, they submitted a copy of the CBA be-
tween BSC and the UACW.  The agreement included an ADR process for
workers’ compensation grievances, as well as a list of exclusive medical pro-
viders and qualified medical evaluators for medical treatment for workers in-
jured on the job.
The San Diego Public Works Task Force, which is charged with the duty
of seeing that construction contractors in the San Diego area comply with the
California Labor Code, investigated the BSC and found the following.  BSC
claimed they had been approved by the DWC for a carve-out, and the president
of BSC gave the name of the union president to the task force.  When the task
force called this person, she claimed she was not the union president but the
ombudsperson for the carve-out.  This person was also the administrative as-
sistant of the president of BSC.
Current statute has minimum requirements that the employee representa-
tive provide evidence to the Department of Workers’ Compensation demon-
strating that it is a legitimate union.  Thus, BSC’s application for a carve-out
was eventually denied by the Department of Workers’ Compensation.
The current law is sensible, but will not necessarily stop all potential for
abuse.  It is unlikely, but still possible, for a legitimate existing union to partner





Preliminary Evaluation of Negotiating Strength 
and Terms of the Carve-Out
This appendix offers a preliminary look at how the strength of each em-
ployer or group of employers and union or group of unions correlates with the
balance of a carve-out agreement.  We scored the relative bargaining power of
the two parties and the relative balance of the agreement.  We then examined
if union-management pairs where the union had more bargaining power also
had agreements with terms that were likely to favor employees.
The parties were first evaluated on six dimensions of relative bargaining
power, as listed in Table B.1.  By convention, a plus score (+1) means a dimen-
sion favored the union.  For example, if the agreement will be covered by pre-
vailing wage laws, then the union’s position is stronger because union scale
will be paid on the job by law.  Conversely, if the employer has negotiated sev-
eral similar agreements and the union has not, the score –1 is applied.  
Each of 12 current and past carve-outs for which agreements were avail-
able were then assessed for the relative balance of the agreement; that is, does
the agreement favor employers or unions.  Each agreement was assessed on
eight dimensions (Table B.2).  Again, by convention, a plus score was assigned
when an aspect of an agreement favored labor.  For example, if the agreement
allows the worker access to a large number of medical providers during the first
30 days and that list includes the union’s Health and Welfare Trust preferred
provider network, the score is +1.  Conversely, if the provider list is highly re-
stricted the score is –1. 
These scores have meaning only relative to each other.  That is, a score of
+1 for the balance of an agreement has no meaning except to suggest that the
agreement is less favorable to workers than one with a score of +3 and more
favorable than one with a score of –2. For the graphical presentation, all scores
were centered zero. 
We analyzed only one scoring system.  The use of other systems with dif-
ferent values, say 1 to 5 for each dimension, or different weighting of dimen-
sions, or inclusion of different dimensions across which party strength and
agreement balance are measured could result in different rankings for each
agreement. 
With these caveats in mind, the data suggest that if unions were in a weak-
er position relative to employers when negotiating a carve-out agreement, the
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agreements were more favorable to employers (see Fig. B.1).  The rank-order
correlation is 0.75, which is statistically significantly different from zero at the
0.01 level.  Results were almost identical with the standard Spearman correla-
tion.
A more complete test of the hypothesis that bargaining strength matters
would come from evaluating how relative bargaining strength correlated with
employees’ outcomes. If bargaining strength matters, then we would expect to
see lower costs per payroll dollar, lower benefits per claim, and lower benefits
relative to future wage losses when the employers are relatively strong.  This
analysis would require comparing data on multiple carve-outs in a manner sim-
ilar to the difference-in-differences methodology presented in this report.  
This preliminary analysis should serve as an additional caution when in-
terpreting the data from the NECA/IBEW carve-out.  That carve-out received
a neutral value for relative party strength under this analysis.  Agreements with
more or less favorable provisions for either side might have quite different out-
comes. 
Finally, we need to consider the balance of the equation from the perspec-
tive of the average worker as well as that of the injured worker.  The evaluation
of the balance of an agreement in Table B.2 reflects point of view of an injured
worker.  During the bargaining process, union negotiators may be trading low-
er workers’ compensation benefits for higher benefits in other areas (e.g., high-
er wages, more jobs, etc.). After an injury (ex post), the worker may have
preferred a different agreement.  However, at the time of the negotiation (ex an-
te), the agreement may reflect a reasonable trade-off between higher wages or
steadier employment and the risk of being injured and receiving lower benefits. 
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Table B.1 Coding Bargaining Strengtha
Topic Explanation Scoring
Prevailing wage In a project controlled by 
prevailing wage laws, the 
employee has less  to gain by an 
agreement that  lowers employer 
costs; thus, power shifts to the union 
Project covered by 
prevailing wage  law = +1
No prevailing wage = –1
Multi-union Agreements requiring multi-trade 
participation (PLAs) likely favor 
the  unions; employer must meet 
needs of all trades simultaneously
PLA = +1
Otherwise = 0
Repeat players The side with repeat experience 
has upper hand
Union repeat player = +1
Employer repeat 
player = –1
Neither or both = 0
Experience of 
negotiators
Experience of negotiators matters;  
local-level organizations are less 
experienced than state-level, who 
are less experienced than
national-level.
Union local  = –1
Union regional or state = 0
Union national = +1
Employer local = +1
Employer state = 0
Employer national = –1
Percent of trade 
unionized (U.S.)
+1 if above national 
average 
–1 if below national 
average 
Workers’ 
compensation  cost 
relative to all 
construction
+1 if above average
–1 if below average 
($6.3/$100)
a Positive scores indicate strong union bargaining position.
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Table B.2 Coding Agreement Balancea
Issues Explanation Scoring 
Predesignation Elimination of predesignation 
indicates restriction on choice 
available in statutory system.  
Predesignation is neutral to the 
system.




Union approved list is a plus, a 
broad selection but employer 
determined is neutral, and a 
restricted employer determined
 is negative.
Employer + union PPO   = +1
Employer limited restriction = 0




Statutory system has no restriction. No restriction = +1
Some restriction = 0
Very restricted = –1
Who pays 
ombudsperson
If the employer pays, it is coded 
negative; employee pay is coded 
positive.  Management-labor trust
is neutral. 
Union pays = +1
Management-labor joint 
trust =  0
Employer  pays = –1
Mediation Management-labor committee is 
less generous than neutral 
mediator.  One party as mediator 
is bigger problem.
Neutral mediator = +1
Management-labor  
committee  = 0
Mediator chosen by 
employer = –1
Arbitration Some arbitrators are selected from 
rotating agreed list. One carve-out 
has arbitrator selected by employer 
representative.
Employee selected = 1
Rotating list  = 0







If not included, workers’ chance 
of recovering is reduced, because 
these recoveries are attached to 
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Figure B.1 Strength of Bargaining Position vs. Balance of 
Final Agreement
Issues Explanation Scoring 
Lawyer 
participation
Restricting legal representation is 
a loss for employees. 
Representation at all levels = +1
No representation at 
ombudsperson stage = 0
No representation at 
mediation = –1
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